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
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OUR COVER:

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
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A WORD FROM THE DIRECTOR

I am very pleased to present you the eleventh edition of the Revista da Escola de Guerra Naval. This year we celebrate the Bicentennial of the Corpo de Fuzileiros Navais do Brasil (The Brazilian Marine Corps) and, as homage to this centenary institution of the Brazilian Navy, this edition's cover shows different historical moments in the life of the Corps at so appropriate a moment of its existence.

Some changes in form and content were added to the Revista. The Advisory Board was enriched by renowned researchers related to the Politics and Strategy field; they will be able not only to present their works, but also to use their experience to assess the articles submitted for publication. The Editorial Board as well underwent some changes and included some Officers with academic background from the Political and Strategic Study Center, and civilian professors currently lecturing in the various courses offered by the Escola.

An improved care was taken regarding the published articles with the requirement to write abstracts for all the works and include keywords; the aim was to make research easier and provide a better understanding of the issues discussed in the text. Articles can now be accessed on the webpage of the Escola de Guerra Naval, which makes it simpler for the use of both students and professors.

Another favorable event was the partnership established with a major research and study institution in the area of Politics, Strategy and Military History of the United States, the Society for Military History (SMH). This relationship will enable Brazilian authors whose articles have been published in our Revista to appear in the SMH publication, Journal of Military History, as well as the translation of reviews from recently published books concerning Navy-interest subjects and written by renowned American professors, on a mutual-agreement basis.

All these initiatives were meant to strengthen the link between the Escola de Guerra Naval and the academic environment, according to orientation from the Navy General Staff (Estado-Maior da Armada), and to meet the vision of this Escola which is to be recognized by 2014 as a center of excellence in education and research in the National Defense field.

The Editorial Board welcomes new scientific contributions to the Revista. We hope to continuously stimulate discussions on key themes such as Maritime Politics and Strategy.

I invite you all to good reading.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, featuring a large, stylized initial 'W' followed by a series of loops and a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

WALTER CARRARA LOUREIRO

Rear Admiral

Director

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PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: THE REQUIRED UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

Prof. PhD Antônio Celso Alves Pereira

Lecturer, Escola de Guerra Naval. President, Brazilian Society of International Law. International Law Professor, UERJ (Rio de Janeiro State University) and Faculdade de Direito de Campos (Campos Law School). Former UERJ President.

ABSTRACT

Considering the importance of the Security Council and its prominence among other UN organs, its reform is urgent and absolutely undelayable to promote legitimacy and restore public confidence in its actions. In the proposed reform elaborated in the document entitled *A More General Freedom – Course to Security, Development, and Human Rights for All*, presented by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan during UN's 60th Anniversary Session, two of the more controversial topics were the unprecedented rise in membership and the possible changes to the Security Council voting method.

Keyword: Security Council - United Nations - International System.

INTRODUCTION

The need to undertake across-the-board reform of the United Nations has been on the international agenda since the early days following the Cold War. The international order formerly put in place in Yalta was gone with the collapse of the Soviet Empire. Today's complex world, the fast pace of global developments, and the dynamic trait of IT-driven events have turned our planet into an "intricate mutual dependence network",¹ thus inexorably increasing the transnationalization of all human activities.

The UN was founded in 1945 and, to date, its Charter still reflects the same political, economical, social and strategic post-war scenario. It is therefore obsolete. As the focus of world security concerns has since shifted to other issues, the United Nations now is urged to find common solutions to global challenges.

¹ BAUMAN, Zigmunt. *Europa*. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Editor, 2006, p. 46.

The discussions on the need for wide-ranging reform of the United Nations started during the tenure of former Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, in 1992. Back then, two important documents were launched with a view to restructuring the reform proposal: *An Agenda for Peace* and *An Agenda for Development*. Strongly opposed by the United States, Boutros-Ghali was unable to renew his term of office as UN Secretary-General. On his first day in office in 1997, his successor, Kofi Annan, resumed the UN shakedown issue by releasing a document entitled *Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform*, approaching the changes proposed by his predecessors. In these documents, Kofi Annan brought up the issue of the Organization's tight budget, proposed that priority should be given to strengthening the General Assembly and Secretariat, and hinted at establishing a better UN interface with non-governmental organizations, creating mechanisms for increasingly expeditious and effective peacekeeping operations and sustainable development, while fighting international crime, drug dealing and terrorism. Proceeding with the project, Kofi Annan established in December 2003, in New York, a World Commission chaired by former Thai Prime-Minister Anand Panyarachum, comprised of 16 internationally recognized dignitaries² from around the world, to assist with preparing the United Nations reform project.

Such action led to establishing the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,³ which throughout the year 2004 heard representatives from various industries of UN member countries during regional inquiries, seminars and workshops. As a result of such activities, the 129-page *A Safer World: Our Common Responsibility* report containing 101 recommendations was delivered to Secretary-General Kofi Annan on December 02, 2004.

The "Panel" identifies, alongside old recurring conflicts, the new events and threats that harass both individuals and nations in the 21st century, claiming, among other things, for multi-sided biological security actions. The report places an emphasis on the idea that "poverty is as much a matter of security as it is a matter of development issue." For example, it shows how the AIDS epidemic that has afflicted the African continent more severely than anywhere else represents a global threat. Two important "Panel" suggestions have already been implemented: turning the former Commission on Human Rights into a Human Rights Council, and establishing a Peacekeeping Commission.

² Members of the United Nations High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.

Panel Chair Anand Panyarachum (THAILAND); Roberto Badinter (FRANCE); João Clemente Baena Soares (BRAZIL); Gro Harlem Brundtland (NORWAY); Mary Chinery-Hesse (GHANA); Gareth Evans (AUSTRALIA); David Hannay (UNITED KINGDOM); Enrique Iglesias (URUGUAY); Amre Moussa (EGYPT); Satish Nambiar (INDIA); Sadako Ogata (JAPAN); Yevgeny Primakov (RUSSIA); Qian Qichen (CHINA); Nafis Sadik (PAKISTAN); Salim Ahmed Salim (TANZANIA); Brent Scowcroft (UNITED STATES).

³ See SOARES, João Clemente Baena. *As Nações Unidas Diante das Ameaças, dos Desafios, das Mudanças*. Dossiê CEBRI – Volume I – Year 4 – Rio de Janeiro: CEBRI, 2005.

In addition to the High-Level Panel, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan established two other important international commissions to assist with preparing the final United Nations reform project: the “Cardoso Panel”, created in February 2003 under the leadership of former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, comprised of 12 eminent members⁴, to conduct a study and offer recommendations on the best ways to improve United Nations-civil society relations. The second Commission established by Kofi Annan was chaired by Professor Jeffrey D. Sachs and consisted of 265 experts in development-related issues. The Commission’s final report – entitled *United Nations Millennium Project: Investing in Development* – proposes a set of actions to achieve the “Millennium Development Goals”, a document approved by the Millennium Summit held September 06-08, 2000 in New York with a view to reducing extreme world poverty rates by at least 50% by 2005, while dramatically improving the living conditions of 1 billion people in developing countries: 1) eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; 2) expanding global basic education; 3) promoting gender equality and empowering women; 4) reducing child mortality; 5) improving mother health; 6) fighting HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; 7) ensuring environmental sustainability; 8) building a global partnership for development.

The Sachs Report points out why little progress has been made in meeting the established goals and concludes that the required resources to easily achieve them could be funded by rich countries.

Based on the High-Level Panel recommendations and the suggestions of the Cardoso and Sachs Reports, Kofi Annan submitted the UN reform project – compiled into the *In Larger Freedom: Towards Freedom, Development and Human Rights for All* report – to the Special United Nations 60th Anniversary Assembly. The document proposes, among other things, reform of the Security Council and other key UN organs, as well as the establishment of the Human Rights Council and suggestions for full achievement of the “Millennium Development Goals”.

In addition to contributions from the High-Level Panel and the other two “Panels” mentioned, the Secretary-General included in his reform project the Brahimi Report recommendations on the changes the United Nations needs to implement to make its peacekeeping operations more effective. This “Panel”, chaired by Algeria’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Lakhdar Brahimi, was comprised

⁴ “Cardoso Panel” membership: Ambassador Bagher Asadi (Iran); Sociologist Manuel Castells (Spain); Mrs. Birgitta Dahl (Sweden); Mrs. Peggy Dulany (USA.); Ambassador André Erdos (Hungary); Mrs. Asma Khader (Jordanian); Mr. Juan Mayr (Colombia); Mrs. Malini Mehra (India); Mr. Kumi Naidoo (South Africa); Mrs. Mary Racelis (Philippines); Mr. Prakash Ratilal (Mozambique), and Mrs. Aminata Traore (Mali).

of nine experts from around the world highly experienced in humanitarian matters, development, and peace-driven political and military activities.⁵

It is worth mentioning that the Brahimi Report does not recommend building a permanent UN peacekeeping force. The document acknowledges that, in many instances, the United Nations has failed to live up to its critical role of keeping international peace and security. On the other hand, it points to situations where peacemaking operations have proved quite successful – East Timor is a case in point – and proposes such solutions as the funding of peacemaking initiatives, the UN action on conflict prevention, and offers suggestions on peacekeeping force composition.

CHARTER REFORM

The United Nations Charter is a special international treaty. It is not a multi-sided convention like any other, which creates rights and obligations for its signatories alone. Despite constitutional traits that place its provisions hierarchically above any other conflicting international treaty, the Charter is not a global Constitution; instead, it is a unique treaty that gives the Organization a life of its own and legal personality distinct from that of member countries. “Not only does this organic constitutional element set such instruments apart from other multi-sided treaties, it also plays a key role in assessing any given operational feature of such instruments, Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade says”.⁶ The universal character of the United Nations is supported by item 6, article 2 of the UN Charter. This provision establishes that UN member countries shall comply with the principles listed in art. 2. Considering the United Nations Charter was discussed, voted upon and put into effect some sixty years ago, many of its provisions are obviously obsolete by today’s standards; some have long awaited to be reformed or amended, while others must urgently be discontinued on the grounds of utter obsolescence. This is the case of articles 26, 45, 46 e 47, which provide on the establishment – never actually put through – of a “Military Staff Committee” to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council’s military requirements. It is also the case of articles 53 and 107, which refer to “states considered enemies of

⁵ “The Brahimi Report detected UN failure in handling peacekeeping operations, suggested the scenario for future missions, and called on both the United Nations and member countries to put an end to “accommodating measures” and enforce clearly established workable tenures instead. The document also claimed for more objective conflict assessment criteria, established integrated planning processes, offered suggestions for improved operating and logistic structures, and recommended improved standard training methods for all peacekeeping mission components. As a result, the Brahimi Report has designed safer and more efficient strategies for future missions, articulating each step or decision along the way with UN member countries, which thereby become co-responsible for the process.” See website <http://www.exercito.gov.br/VO/187/clpaz.htm>. Visited June 20, 2006.

⁶ TRINDADE, Antônio Augusto Cançado. *Direito das Organizações Internacionais*. Belo Horizonte: Del Rey, 2003, pp. 27/28.

any Charter signatory during World War II". Chapter XIII, which established the Trusteeship Council, is totally obsolete. In 1994, the Security Council ended the US-administered UN trusteeship for the last remaining trust territory - Palau Islands.⁷

In drafting the United States Charter, UN founders sought not to make the same mistakes that had led the League of Nations to failure.⁸ To a certain extent, they considered that "international reality events include power disputes, conflicts of interest, and ideological inconsistencies".⁹ Therefore, as a result of the right of veto bestowed upon permanent members, the model enforced to govern the Security Council's decision-making system was aimed at preventing the UN from losing its truly universal character, i.e., preventing the exclusion of member states that play a critical role within the international system, such as the former Soviet Union, expelled from the League of Nations in 1939 after invading Finland.

The proposed General Assembly reform project is primarily focused on revitalizing the General Assembly to become a global and democratic forum where the critical issues affecting mankind may be discussed and solved accordingly. Therefore, suggestions have been offered for increased institutional and financial support of the referred organ, while seeking qualified personnel to assist with a year-round schedule. Reform should gear the General Assembly to become an effective budget authority¹⁰ and update its agenda and procedures.

⁷ Referring to the origin and nature of the United Nations Charter, Adriano Moreira points out that Charter ideologists have sought to establish in the text the meeting of two Western legacies: on one side, the *Machiavellian legacy*, focused on plain political realism, on limiting politics to power relationships and hierarchy among States, which translates into the Security Council autocratic membership and the right of veto exclusively bestowed upon permanent members; on the other, the *humanistic legacy*, centered on the prospects of building an international order based on legal equality among States and on legal rules that would support an association of States and, as a result, put political strength and power of member states at the service of fair normativism. This *humanistic legacy* is clearly established in the General Assembly by-laws and horizontality, where the fictional notion of legal equality is reflected in the democratic voting system, i.e., each state is entitled to one vote. Obviously, these two cultural legacies are inherently controversial, though not fully inconsistent, according to Adriano Moreira, since "they are seemingly brought together under the rule of law: a fair rule whose enforcement is ensured by state strength or power. Actually, in the latter case, we assume the political strength or power will only comply with and be put at the service of fair normativism resulting from transcending values or the law." See MOREIRA, Adriano. *Teoria das Relações Internacionais*. Coimbra: Almedina, 2002, p. 569/570.

⁸ Throughout its lifetime, the League of Nations managed to settle as little as 35 disputes between member states – out of 66 investigated. The Organization was particularly successful between 1925 and 1932. By signing the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1927, the United States attempted to establish a closer relationship with the Organization. However, the years 1935-1939 had a critical impact on the future of the League of Nations. Most of its failures trace back to this period. The Organization was unable to keep Germany and Italy from interfering with the Spanish Civil War (1936-1938). Likewise, it had previously failed to prevent the Japanese invasion of China (1931) and the invasion of Ethiopia by Italy (1935/1936). The League of Nations reacted to the Soviet invasion of Finland by expelling the communist power from membership. As Karl Deutch observes, the exclusion was an ineffective action as the League of Nations had its moral strength undermined by a passive attitude towards International Law violations on the part of the Axis powers. See DEUTCH, Karl. *Análise das Relações Internacionais*. Brasília: Editora UNB, 1978, pp. 221/223.

⁹ See ARON, Raymond. *Paz e Guerra entre as Nações*. Tradução de Sérgio Bath. Brasília: Editora UNB, 1979, p. 671.

¹⁰ Article 17 of the UN Charter provides that the General Assembly has full authority to approve the UN budget.

The High-Level Panel recommends that General Assembly changes be aimed at building consensus around a broader and more effective collective security vision; streamlining its topic list to reflect today's major challenges; and finding ways to "avoid repetitive, unclear or unfeasible resolution projects". Like the Cardoso Report, the Panel suggests creating an efficient mechanism to develop dialog with international civil society organizations.

The "Cardoso Panel" recommends that, prior to holding key meetings, the General Assembly offer non-governmental organizations interactive hearings and build permanent interface channels with such organizations.

General Assembly Resolutions 58/126 (December 19, 2003) and 58/316 (July 01, 2004) established measures for reorganizing work, rationalizing the practices of the six main General Assembly Commissions, and reinforcing the role of the General Assembly board.

Since the approval of the United Nations Charter, the Economic and Social Council – ECOSOC has gone through two major structural changes. On August 31, 1965, an amendment increasing Organ membership from 18 to 27 members came into force. On September 24, 1973, a second amendment raised that number to 54.

The High-Level Panel suggests that the Economic and Social Council focus on key "Millennium Declaration" topics and become a truly effective organ in terms of normative leadership and ability to analyze economic and social issues. It also recommends that ECOSOC be given the opportunity to become a forum for an open, transparent follow-up of member state development goals.

The High-Level Panel report also recommends creating within the Economic and Social Council a negotiation forum to deal with such challenges as poverty, health and environmental issues, in addition to handling foreign aid, technology and foreign trade issues.

The United States reform process made big strides on March 15, 2006. During an outstanding voting session – 170 "yes" votes, 4 "no" votes and 3 abstentions, the General Assembly Resolution A/RES/60/251 approved the establishment of the Human Rights Council. The idea of establishing the referred council was presented by Kofi Annan during his April 07, 2005 address before the UN Commission on Human Rights, in Geneva, and was reaffirmed in the document the Secretary-General submitted to the United Nations Summit on the Millennium Development Goals, held in September 2005. The September 2005 Summit approved the establishment of the Human Rights Council to replace the controversial ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights. Council composition, objectives, member election criteria, and other provisions and procedures underlying Resolution A/RES/60/251 resulted in a five-month round of negotiations among member states, in order to produce a sufficiently

comprehensive text to gain unanimous support. Negotiations were conducted by General Assembly Chair, Ambassador Jean Eliasson, with the assistance of Co-Chair Ambassadors Ricardo Alberto Arias (Panama) and Dumisani S. Kumalo (South Africa).

The Human Rights Council is already fully operational and consists of 47 members (53 from the former Commission), elected by secret absolute majority vote (96 votes), i.e., 50% plus one of total member states (191), for increased legitimacy of the new Council. It is worth pointing out that the members of the former Commission on Human Rights were appointed by an electoral college comprised of 54 ECOSOC members.

The 47 Human Rights Council slots are currently assigned based on the following geographic criteria: Africa 13; Asia 13; Eastern Europe 6; Latin America and the Caribbean 8; Western Europe and other States, including the United States and Canada, 7.

The US government chose not to claim a seat on the Council. The United States, Israel, the Marshall Islands, and Palau voted against the Council establishment project, while Venezuela, Byelorussia and Iran accounted for abstentions. Human Rights Council member states may be suspended if held accountable for serious or recurrent violations of human rights within their own territories. Elected members will hold office for three years and will not be eligible for reelection after serving two consecutive terms.

In justifying his vote against the establishment of the Council as proposed by the resolution project, then US Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton said that he did not feel confident enough that the new Council would be more efficient than the former Commission.

Today there is consensus around the indisputable interface between human rights, security and development. Kofi Annan himself has all along pressed the point. The establishment of the Council is intended to provide the United Nations with a more expeditious and efficient mechanism that gives human rights the same level of attention the United Nations gives to international security, without the politization that marked the former Commission on Human Rights though.

According to Resolution A/RES/60/251, the Human Rights Council – operational as of June 19, 2006 – will act a General Assembly subsidiary organ and its activities will be reviewed by the General Assembly within five years of installation.¹¹

Secretariat shakedown proposals are primarily focused on administrative and financial rationalization. Problems stemming from improper management

¹¹ The Commission on Human Rights was discontinued on June 16, 2006. The new Council will convene three times a year for a ten-week period. The Commission used to convene once each year for a six-week period.

of the Iraq Oil-for-Food Programme brought up a number of issues that point to ineffective management and administration of UN General Secretariat structures.

Reform is also expected to address another important issue. Article 96 of the UN Charter must be amended to clearly include the Secretariat in the group of UN organs entitled to request advice from the International Court of Justice on the existing relationship between the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretariat.

SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

Security Council reform is urgent and absolutely necessary to ensure increased legitimacy and restore international public confidence in the United Nations. We are therefore talking about core reform. Security Council composition and functions as established by the UN Charter are provided in chapters V, VI, VII, VIII, XII and XIV. Together with the General Assembly, the Council is assigned the responsibilities and duties provided in articles 23 and 96 of the Charter and article 4 of the International Court of Justice By-laws.

It is important to make it clear that Security Council composition, as well as its installation in the early post-war days, was determined by political events now considered fully overcome. As Carrillo Salcedo writes,

“...one cannot ignore that the United Nations has originally come into being as a wartime coalition (Declaration by the United Nations, January 01, 1942); that the San Francisco Conference took place on the same day the Soviets invaded Berlin; that the United Nations has always been involved in a wartime atmosphere whose effort was primarily focused on the Great Power; and, finally, that the United Nations was founded at a time of blatant distrust between Westerners and Soviets.

“12

Today a new political, strategic and economic reality pervades the world. The new - still somewhat confusing - international order is not as clearly defined as the Yalta order. The security policy - formerly focused on terror-prevention and nuclear non-proliferation issues - has shifted its focus to fighting terrorism, global organized crime, pandemics, the likely proliferation of nuclear artifacts/

¹² CARRILLO SALCEDO. Juan Antônio. *El Derecho Internacional em Perspectiva Histórica*. Madrid: Editorial Tecnos, S. A., 1991, p. 77.

vectors and other weapons of mass destruction, and in particular, to global food security and environmental protection issues, among others.

Originally, the Security Council consisted of 11 member states – 5 permanent and 6 non-permanent – corresponding to 21.56% of the original 51 UN members. The United Nations currently comprises 192 States and the Security Council has 15 members – 5 permanent and 10 non-permanent -, an equivalent to 7.85% of the total number of UN member.

The current Security Council composition, therefore, does not reflect today's political, economic and strategic reality. In addition, as previously mentioned, the current status does not translate into representativity or legitimacy. States that rely on an indisputable economic and technological lead - like Japan and Germany - and regional powers that boast an outstanding position in the international scenario - like Brazil and India - may not, for the sake of the inherently realistic nature of the original Council composition, be left out of major SC political decisions.

The 34th General Assembly – held in 1979 – brought up the issue of a new reform aimed at increasing Security Council membership. On account of the decolonization process and the resulting entry of dozens of new States to the United Nations in 1963, the General Assembly approved an amendment to article 23 of the UN Charter that came into force on August 31, 1965 and stepped up the number of Security Council seats from 11 to 15 by adding four new non-permanent members. As a result, article 27 also was amended to adjust the voting system. Therefore, the decisions of the Security Council on procedural issues required nine “yes” votes to be approved – formerly seven “yes” votes were required – including the “yes” votes of all permanent members.

During the 34th General Assembly session in 1939, the need for Security Council membership equality made the priority list on the UN agenda following new member entries, as previously mentioned. Therefore, Algeria - along with Argentina, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Guyana, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Nigeria and Sri Lanka – kicked off the discussions on the subject, which would have an effect on General Assembly meetings over the following years. The General Assembly then approved resolutions 47/62 (1992) and 48/26 (1993). The latter created an open membership work group to examine the possibility of increasing the number of Security Council members and review the Council's working methods. Controversial issues, such as the right of veto, were approached by the working group, but, in the end, no consensus was reached. During the 51st General Assembly, Malaysian Ambassador Razali submitted a Security Council reform proposal. The so-called “Razali Plan” proposed the addition of five new permanent seats to be assigned as follows: two seats to be filled by developed countries and the remaining three to be filled as per the applicable regional criterion, i.e., each major region - Africa, Latin America and Asia - would be

assigned a seat. In addition to these five permanent members, the "Razali Plan" also suggested assigning three more non-permanent seats to the same regions, plus one extra non-permanent slot to be filled by an Eastern European State. The Council expansion project did not make it to the voting stage though. The United States strongly opposed the idea of raising the number of Security Council members to 24.

In an attempt to create the appropriate political conditions to implement reform, the General Assembly approved Resolution 53/30 on November 23, 1998, establishing the required measures to be enforced in the Security Council reform process.

Afterwards, on September 08, 2000, the Heads of State and Government attending the Millennium Summit approved the *Millennium Declaration*, whose paragraph 30 provides that UN members states shall endeavor to push through a broad and sweeping reform of the Security Council.

Following the Iraq invasion by the US-headed coalition in March 2003 and the increase in international terrorist acts and other threats and challenges, Security Council reform definitely has become the order of the day. Even countries that formerly refused to support any change to the Council no longer offer any opposition and now agree to discuss the format and scope of changes. According to former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, "every UN member agrees that the Council calls for reform as it no longer reflects today's political reality. It just has to be decided how to do it."¹³

Still on the High-Level Panel conclusions, it is worth mentioning that the final report submitted to the Secretary-General emphasizes, among the 101 recommendations from UN members, the need to assign the Security Council "additional responsibilities", including: a) examining the semiannual reports submitted by the director-generals of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW); b) in case of suspected or serious epidemic outbreaks or sanitary issues, the Security Council must consult with the WHO director-general; c) "enforcing established sanctions against States that fail to comply with anti-terrorism resolutions"; and d) establishing a Peacebuilding Commission in consultation with the ECOSOC.¹⁴

As previously mentioned, the Peacebuilding Commission is already fully established. Established in December 2005 by General Assembly Resolution 60/180 and Security Council Resolution 1645, this important Commission is aimed at helping countries recovering from armed conflicts to achieve political and economic stability. The Peacebuilding Commission consists of 31 members,

¹³ Interview to *Jornal do Brasil*, Section "Mundo", October 14, 2005 edition, p. 28. (free translation of quote).

¹⁴ SOARES, João Clemente Baena. O Caminho das Nações Unidas. In: *Carta Mensal*. Rio de Janeiro: Confederação Nacional do Comércio, nº 607, volume 51, October 2005, p. 43.

elected on May 12, 2006 and recruited as follows: 7 members from the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC); 7 from the General Assembly; 7 from the Security Council (the five permanent members and, for the first term of office, Denmark and Tanzania); UN top financial (5) and top troop (5) contributors.¹⁵

Based on their importance, the Security Council reform topics of general concern include the core issue of Council membership - especially the number of permanent members - along with the veto system.

The Security Council currently has 5 permanent and 10 non-permanent members and a variety of Council reform proposals have been submitted. For example, the High-Level Panel proposes the following: a) creating six new permanent non-voting members, plus three new non-permanent members elected for a two-year term; b) no new permanent seats would be created; however, a new category of eight non-permanent members elected for a four-year renewable term would be created, plus one new member elected for a two-year non-renewable term. In either case, the Security Council would come to comprise 24 seats. Kofi Annan simply suggests expanding Security Council membership to 21 members and offers two options: creating six new permanent non-voting slots; or creating six new non-permanent seats.

The proposal submitted by Brazil, India and Germany initially counted on the support of Japan – in the G4 Group with another three countries. However, though claiming its attitude would not entail the end of the G4, the Japanese government left the group in early January 2006 for considering the Security Council expansion resolution before the General Assembly an untimely effort. Nevertheless, the Japanese did give up on their claim for a permanent seat on the Security Council and continued working to counter the Chinese opposition and get US support for the reform process. The amendment proposal from Brazil, India and Germany entailed increased Security Council membership – from the current 15 members to 25 – with the addition of six permanent and four non-permanent seats. The new permanent members would not have the right to veto. The permanent seats would be filled by current G3 members, Japan and two African nations. The right of veto issue would be left for future discussion, i.e., 15 years after election of the States entitled to join the Security Council as a result of the planned change. In the first instance, the G4 nations advocated the addition of new permanent members holding veto power. In order not to render reform unfeasible, however, the G4 members later came to accept the proposal for permanent non-veto members. China opposes the proposal on the grounds of not agreeing to Japan joining the Council.

A group of states - called “United for Consensus” – consisting of Pakistan, Argentina, Canada, Italy and Mexico support the creation of ten new non-permanent member seats.

¹⁵ The establishment of the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission brings to light an old aspiration of developing countries. In the 1990s, Brazil submitted a proposal in this regard.

The African Union (AU) – representing 53 African nations – submitted a resolution proposal for raising to 26 the number of Security Council members, six of which would hold permanent veto-wielding seats.

Other so-called obstructionist proposals sponsored by States that fail to meet the Council permanent membership requirements have been submitted. These nations are in favor of only Japan and Germany joining in as full permanent veto-wielding members and propose creating regional seats on a rotational basis, increasing non-permanent membership, and establishing a new permanent non-veto member category.

In a recent keynote speech on the need to strengthen the United States and multi-lateralism, former US President Bill Clinton (1993-2001) said, benefiting from his experience as former head of UN's key member state: "We have to build international organizations and, if they do not work well, we have to improve them. I think the Security Council should be enlarged by assigning seats to Japan, Europe, India and Latin America's Brazil, one each."¹⁶

The Security Council calls for urgent reform, in order to reflect today's reality and enable the United Nations to operate in a more harmonious and effective manner on its two fronts of action: keeping international peace and security and taking global humanitarian, social and cultural actions.

Still undecided on the Security Council expansion, the government of the United States advocates the addition of one or more permanent non-veto and two or three non-permanent seats. Americans would seemingly be willing to sponsor just the entry of Japan as a permanent member. They accept a Security Council comprised of a maximum of 20 members. In addition, the US also requires that new Security Council members be selected on the basis of their countries' GDP, their commitment to democracy and human rights, and their financial obligations to the United Nations. Other criteria suggested include: military capacity, non-proliferation record, engagement in counter-terrorism activities, and contribution to and participation in peace forces.

The controversial veto issue brings up a variety of suggestions. Though recognizing the anachronous nature of the Security Council's current voting system, the "Panel" did not propose any changes in this regard. Due to the unfavorable scenario for the success of any veto-suppressing proposal, the "Panel" proposes limiting the use of the veto to vital national security issues. In addition, it suggests that permanent members avoid making excessive use of the veto, in order not to bring the Council to a standstill. The "Panel" also made it clear that 257 vetoes have been cast since 1946 - 80 from the US, 122 from the Soviet Union/Russia, and the rest from other permanent member states.¹⁷ Various member states advocate eliminating veto power. Some propose that

¹⁶ Clinton advocates seat for Brazil on UNSC. In: Folha de São Paulo, May 01, 2007 edition, Section A, p. 9.

¹⁷ See SOARES, João Clemente Baena. *O Caminho das Nações Unidas*, p. 45.

the right to veto only be exercised in cases that should be clearly provided for in chapter VII of the UN Charter, while others claim that the Charter should include an article establishing which matters fall into the procedural category.

It is worth pointing out that, as far as suggestions are concerned, some proposals have been submitted demanding that permanent member vetoes be given in writing, setting out the reasons that have led to casting a veto.

The proposed Security Council reform project includes another relevant issue that should be submitted for discussion and make the list of important topics on the change process agenda. We are talking about the need to create control mechanisms to determine the legality of Security Council actions.

This issue has been at the center of doctrinal discussions since the early days of the UN. However, there is no such international legal control body. The matter is of the utmost importance and should be on the United Nations reform agenda. None of the Commissions assisting the Secretary General with the reform project dealt with the subject. Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade observes that “over the years, the need for such a legal control mechanism has become quite evident, especially so as the United Nations has come to play an increasingly important role in an international scenario marked by new and intense conflicts – including internal conflicts. The United Nations Charter reform project calls for the urgent creation of a legal control mechanism to determine the legality of the actions of international political bodies.”¹⁸

Therefore, my understanding is that it would be most appropriate to expand the scope of action of the International Court of Justice by charging it with such critical task. Opponents, however, argue that subjecting SC decisions to any type of external control would certainly weaken the Council.¹⁹

Notwithstanding, it is worth mentioning that the issue was on the International

Court of Justice agenda in the Lockerbie case, when the referred court understood that Security Council decisions made on the basis of chapter VII of the UN Charter are not subject to reform by any international body, since they reflect obligations resulting from the Council’s mandatory resolutions. According to article 103 of the UN Charter, the latter prevail over the provisions of any treaty signed by UN member states. Reference to article 103 is associated with Libya referring before the International Court of Justice to the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against

¹⁸ *Direito das Organizações Internacionais*, p. 841.

¹⁹ “There is no such thing as a specific organ tasked with controlling the legality of UN actions. The critical role of the Security Council determines such non-control policy, since ICJ control could end up weakening the Council. In principle, control is thought to imply a hindrance to fast action-taking. There could be, however, some sort of control mechanism to curb any illegal actions. Furthermore, the International Court of Justice has dodged the so-called political issues that may not be solved under law. As far as the ‘Aerial Incident at Lockerbie’ case (1992) is concerned, the ICJ ruled that obligations arising out of SC resolutions prevail over any other treaty.” See Mello, Celso D. de Albuquerque. *Curso de Direito Internacional Público*. Rio de Janeiro: Renovar, 2000, pp. 647/648.

the Safety of Civil Aviation. The Libyan government turned to the Montreal Convention to support its claim for conservatory measures that ensured Libya the right to judge within its own territory the suspects in the bombing of a Pan Am aircraft over Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 1988. In 1991, Great Britain and the United States requested the extradition of those responsible for the crime – two Lybians – for trial. The Libyan government, in turn, remained silent on the request. The interested parties turned to the Security Council, which, based on chapter VI of the UN Charter – Resolution 731 of January 21 1992 – demanded that the Khadafi government respond to the extradition request. As a result, based on the Montreal Convention, Libya requested the above referred conservatory measures from the International Court of Justice, since the Convention's provisions allow the State to judge or extradite the indicted parties. Nevertheless, the Security Council approved a new resolution on March 31, 1992 – Resolution 748 –²⁰ on the subject (now based on chapter VII of the UN Charter), demanding that Libya surrender the two suspects. On April 14, 1992, the International Court of Justice turned down the Libyan request on the grounds of lack of authority to review Security Council actions supported by chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. It turned out that the dispute was settled by agreement between the United States, Great Britain and Lybia.²¹

As for the Security Council discretionary power of the use of force, the United Nations High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change proposes - based on Security Council and General Assembly resolutions - the establishment of criteria to discipline and ensure the legitimacy of the Security Council authority bestowed by the UN Charter. Therefore, it suggests that the use of force basically take into account the following: the seriousness of threats; making sure that all military measures have been exhausted; ensuring the action is intended to prevent threats to international peace and security; seeking to strike a balance in the use of military resources; and, before deciding whether or not to use of force, carefully assessing the consequences of the Council's likely action.²²

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The United Nations calls for urgent reform to continue playing its critical role. The critical issues affecting call for undelayable solutions.

²⁰ See TRINDADE, Antônio Augusto Cançado. *Direito das Organizações Internacionais*, pp. 823/853.

²¹ See BEDJAOUÏ, Mohammed. *Nuevo Orden Mundial y Control de Legalidad de los Actos del Consejo de Seguridad*: Bilbao: Instituto Vasco de Administración Pública, 1995. Also by the same autor: *Les Relations entre la Cour Internationale de Justice et les Autres Organes Principaux des Nations Unies*. In: BOUTROS Boutros-Ghali – *Amicorum Discipularumque Liber*. Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1999, pp. 175/226.

²² Ver SOARES, João Clemente Baena. *O Cominho das Nações Unidas*, pág. 41.

Considering that the Security Council is the United Nations' key organ, the issue of increasing SC membership - particularly the number of permanent seats - is currently in the spotlight. The Security Council is currently organized into an anachronous oligarchic framework that is far from reflecting today's world political reality. Those willing to democratize the United Nations propose eliminating the veto and suggest various voting methods for the Security Council, such as consensual voting. Current members will hardly accept the elimination of the system presently in force. Today's system was created in Yalta with a view to protecting the interests of the Big Powers. However, considering current developments, the United Nations calls for up-to-date mechanisms conducive to effectively and legitimately dealing with all issues brought up by international society organizations. Therefore, reform must take into account international society's increasing ability to contribute to world governance.

To be approved, the UN Charter amendments must be in compliance with the provisions of article 108. Although the article does not give permanent members the right to veto amendment proposals, amendments are only put into effect if approved by two-thirds of the General Assembly and confirmed by two-thirds of UN members, including all SC permanent members.

Current Security Council reform proposals are only intended to expand Security Council membership – an attempt to reflect the realities of today's world power distribution. In other words, keeping the current voting system “as is”, without breaking the oligarchic structure implemented back in 1945, will by no means lead to reform of the main UN organ.

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GLOBAL AND REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SECURITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR A NEW US MARITIME STRATEGY

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ABSTRACT

The end of the cold war and the terrorist attacks of 2001 brought about the need to implement a new maritime strategy for the United States capable of facing the new challenges of globalization, terrorist threats, and, ultimately, to ensure maritime security, which is critical for maritime commerce. This new strategy should derive from a consensus among allied nations and be based both on the 1000-ship navy idea and on the *Global Fleet Station*. This paper discusses the world strategic environment and the threats to be faced if such new policy is to be implemented and also discusses the Brazilian interests in the sea and the joint operations carried out by our Navy together with the U.S. Navy.

Keywords: Maritime Strategy - Globalization. *Global Fleet Station* - Terrorism. Brazilian-US joint naval operations.

INTRODUCTION

90% of the world trade, a fundamental activity for the economic expansion and stability of nations, is done by sea. A considerable portion of the world production of gas and oil is extracted from the sea. The sea is also the source of mineral resources, existing in large quantities both in the sea soil and subsoil, which are not economically exploitable today. Fishing, a renewable sea resource, is of major importance for the economy of innumerable countries.

All this wealth remains in a relative state of security which has only been broken every now and then by rare and insignificant terrorist actions and the criminal action of pirates.

However, many world leaders believe that the sea, due to its importance for the nations and the great difficulty to keep an actual control over it, will, in a short period of time, be subject to a large number of threats to its security, in the form of piracy, drug trafficking, human trafficking and slavery, exploration of exclusive economic zones, interruption of trade, weapon trading, organized crime, attacks to the environment, political and religious extremist movements, and terrorism.

All these above mentioned facts, apart from others that will come up throughout the present paper, were determining factors that caused a large number of nations, led by the United States, the hegemonic world power, to start studies on the integrated action of all towards actions capable of guaranteeing world maritime security.

The purpose of the present paper is to analyze such actions, especially the ones related to a new maritime strategy the US intends to implement.

A NEW STRATEGY FOR THE US.

THE STRATEGIC SCENARIO

Director of strategy and policy of the US Navy, Admiral Martoglio, presented in a lecture on the strategic plans of that Navy the main points of the American strategic scenario. They are: global war on terrorism, irregular warfare, homeland security and homeland defense, the existing traditional threats, i.e., regional powers possessing considerable conventional and nuclear capability, unrestricted warfare with mass destruction weapons, and high technology disorder generating systems.

According to this view, homeland security is the national priority and the country's first defense line is located abroad. Such threats to American territory must be restrained in their origin abroad and with the effective help of allied countries.

The Admiral believes that the American strategic objectives are defending the country from direct attacks, ensuring strategic access and guaranteeing freedom for global action, strengthening partnerships and alliances, and establishing favorable safety conditions.

In order to fulfill these objectives, the following vulnerabilities must be eliminated or, at least, substantially reduced: insufficient American capability to face challenges to global security; allies and partners might decide not to act in an integrated way or might lose the capability to do so; many nations resent

American predominance in the solution of world problems and object to American way of acting; and, finally, the fact that the US and their allies will be the primary target of terrorist attacks.

The Admiral addressed the issues he considered as key in national strategy in obtaining maritime security, which are: high national priority to foster freedom of the seas, access to ports, the right for ships to sail freely in international waters, and the traffic and passage of the innocent.

By the end of his lecture, he showed a diagram of partnerships and coalitions that would be the starting point to achieve the desired integration among nations aiming at establishing and maintaining maritime security.

The structure presented was divided in three parts. In the first part, the foundation, are ports, territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, and boundary lines. This level is related to each nation individually. In the intermediate part are international straits, regional waters, boundary lines, and archipelagic waters. This level is directly connected to regional security initiatives and is based on regional associations such as CAMAS (South Atlantic Maritime Area Control). At the end of the pyramid are boundary lines and high seas.

REASONS FOR A NEW STRATEGY.

The breaking up of the former USSR has represented a new and great challenge to the USN. Its maritime strategy, which had until then been oriented towards the fight against a single enemy and based on strategic deterrence, power projection, sea control, and naval presence, no longer makes sense. The USN is presented with a new situation to which it cannot find a convincing answer.

This new situation is represented by globalization whose three main effects point towards the need for a new maritime strategy. They are: growing interdependency of markets and world economies, whose trade is done mainly by sea, making maritime security an issue of capital importance to nations; the fact that the search for new oil fields at sea or the preservation of the existing ones are potential conflict-generating factors among nations, which reaffirms the need for security; and, finally, the idea that globalization has introduced what some authors call fourth-generation enemies, i.e., terrorists, mass destruction weapon dealers, criminal organizations, smugglers, drug dealers, and pirates.

Another reason for demanding a new strategy is the nature of the transformations military operations are undergoing, and which are compelling the Forces to review their structures and doctrines, since information, as it seems, has become the most valuable warfare resource.

If these reasons did not suffice, the 2001 terrorist attacks found a country under recession and forced to increase its expenses with homeland defense and the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq, later on; all this has contributed to increase the already high budget deficit, with severe consequences to the Navy budget.

Cornered by the facts and pressed by former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's statements,

...that the global war on terrorism determines the transformation of the armed forces so that they must be prepared to face asymmetric wars in a new and uncertain time¹,

the USN was forced to choose between proportionally reducing combat means, prioritizing a type of combat means over others, or taking further steps to increase its capability without increasing the number of ships.

According to some American article writers, the USN needs a threat and a strategy in order to fight against asymmetric threats. Otherwise it will be in a disadvantageous position in relation to the other Forces in competing for scarce budget resources.

THE NEW STRATEGY ACCORDING TO THE CNO.

Aware of the situation his navy is facing, CNO Admiral Mike Mullen decided, in 2006, to propose a discussion on a new maritime strategy for the USN by presenting some assumptions to the study of that subject.

The first and certainly most important of these assumptions is that "no country, powerful as it may be, is capable of doing what must be done", thus bringing to the discussion the participation of allied and partner countries in this new strategy.

The second assumption, of capital importance for the countries involved, is that

... the strategy needs a multilateral dimension and must be guided by the principles that have been consecrated by international law, such as respect to sovereignty and self-determination, to non-intervention and equality among the States, always in conformity with the legislations and major interests of the participants and with the focus on regional stability and well-being. It should also be

¹ Free translation of quote.

domestically in tune with the aspirations of the society, valuing current major issues, like the reduction of social inequalities and valuing human life and the environment².

Thus, this new policy must be the result of consensus among all the sectors involved, there considered people, politicians, the elements that compose the Force, allied countries, American or non-American companies, etc., and should also contain aspects related to humanitarian assistance, disaster control, and pre-conflict operations.

Regarding the US domestic area, the CNO considers relevant to take to the national agenda the discussion of the country's maritime capability and the relevance of the Navy in the future of the country.

Within a strictly military field, he believes that the key to success for this new strategy is to remain away from classified information due to the restrictions concerning its dissemination. In his opinion the aim is not establishing a permanent and international Naval Force either.

In his conception, the new strategy should be based on three basic characteristics of the Naval Forces, i.e., influence, anticipate and respond in a flexible manner, and build friendships and partnerships.

The effects of the USN strategic plan this new strategy will achieve are: dominate open sea and internal and coastal waters, as necessary; provide naval capability to the combined Naval Force, as well as other interdependent capabilities, as required by the combined Force; advanced presence to attack and dismantle terrorist networks and conventional campaigns; provide support to combined Force in deterring other potentially opposing State-nations, as well as trans-national threats; increase the cooperation with the Naval Forces of strategic partners, as well as with emerging partner nations; mould and align coastal infra-structure in order to provide effective support to the fleet; dimension, shape and stimulate human potential; and reduce the stress on the combined Force.

Concerning joint operations with other navies, one must consider the increase in operational-level cooperation and in technology issues. One should also anticipate a growth in the sharing of information and in the number of multinational drills.

To sum up, the new strategy should be able to obtain the support of the American people, as well as international backing, and should be adequate to face 21st century threats. It should be capable of fighting a single enemy, as did previous strategies, and also be capable of attacking fourth-generation threats.

² Free translation of quotes.

It should consider valuing elements that foster regional, cooperative, and multilateral security, with the sharing of responsibilities and agile mechanisms that enable opportune operational actions. It should also ensure the freedom of communication lines and maritime traffic, prevent and fight terrorism and criminal activities at sea, in river basins and in port areas, provide humanitarian assistance or help to natural disaster victims, and inhibit environmental damages.

THE 1000-SHIP NAVY AND THE GLOBAL FLEET STATION

As it has already been mentioned the USN is facing large budget cuts. This means that a reduction in the number of USN ships is also likely to occur. Besides, as it has also been analyzed, the USN considers it practically impossible to meet single-handed all the threats.

On the other hand, it is a widely known fact that the economic well-being of the US people and of the whole world greatly depends on sea trade, which makes maritime security a matter of importance to all. The nations are interested, apart from protecting sea trade, in protecting themselves against terrorist-related acts. Consequently, the new maritime strategy must consider the fact that everyone benefits from collective security and so everyone should share the responsibility of keeping it by controlling the threats in their own domains.

The cornerstone of this new strategy, the idea of the 1000-ship fleet, is based on previously explained facts.

This force, composed of 300 US ships and 700 ships from other navies, works over the idea of reestablishing the lost strategic depth by means of global maritime awareness.

Born together with the 1000-ship navy idea, is the idea of the *GLOBAL FLEET STATION (GFS)*. These would be a Command and a base to be used by the military, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations, focusing on regional maritime security. A GFS would have a commanding ship, one or more smaller surface ships, and, perhaps, a riverside unit and helicopters. It would also have an information center, medical facilities, and other support means. The idea of creating these GFS belongs to the CNO, who believes that they may collaborate in the creation of a flexible response capacity.

An important aspect to be considered regarding the implementation of the fleet has to do with the necessary interoperability among the Forces. The navies usually have different rules, systems, and procedures. Thus, issues related to command, control, and technology might become challenges to overcome, and it would be necessary to standardize equipment and procedures.

The US believe that the ideas of the 1000-ship fleet and of the GFS have received the effective support of a great number of nations; proof of this would

be the international cooperation in the evacuation of citizens in the recent invasion in Lebanon, with the participation 170 ships from 17 countries. The installation of a Base in the African coast, in Sao Tome and Principe, to be more specific, is well developed and will have the capacity to keep watch over a good portion of the South Atlantic. As compensation, and following the spirit of the new strategy of collaborating with all countries, the US are saying that they will help the African people in the control of illegal fishing, piracy, and illegal immigration.

In a symposium that took place recently in the European continent, with the participation of European countries, as well as Mexico, Singapore, and the *INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION* (IMO), this theme was widely discussed and, in principle, accepted by the participant countries.

OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION.

The world is facing insurrections, ethnic clashes, and regional competition, long known phenomena this new strategy will have to act against.

The complexity of the present moment is related to something and which some authors call *individual with great decision-making power (person or group capable of inflicting strategic damages to a nation with the use of advanced technologies)*.

The new strategy should be capable of overcoming three different types of obstacles. First of all, it must be recognized by those who will be responsible to make it work, the U.S. men and women. Second, it must convince the politicians who will review it. And at last, it should persuade friends and allies and be a threat to opposing powers.

The last test seems to be the most difficult to overcome. Actually, the new strategy might be seen as a contemporary review of Mahan's work on sea power and as a new form of American imperialism.

It is worth commenting on this last aspect. The raise of the US to the world-leader condition, apart from the irrefutable advantages that came with it, has also meant, on the other hand, the responsibility of playing the role of world police, a fact not always pleasant to most countries. It has also contributed to the rejection of countries of the positions defended by the US, the policy adopted by several US administrations that, as has often happened and recently occurred in the Iraq case, act despite the opposite decision of international organizations. It is also worth pointing out that the country that is now intending to count on international support in the maritime security area is the same that refuses to sign the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Although it has been previously mentioned in the present paper that the CNO believes that sovereignty and self-determination of the peoples should

be respected, the countries do not feel safe to trust a country that, supported by its military power, ignores the consensus decisions of nations

BRAZIL – ITS INTERESTS AT SEA, ITS THREATS, AND STRATEGIC THOUGHT

Through Brazilian jurisdictional waters, that encompass 4.5 square kilometers, and through our 40 ports, annually pass 95% of our international trade; in 2005, it represented US\$ 191 billions. 90% of our oil production is also extracted from the sea. These numbers tell by themselves the importance of the sea to our country.

Because of this, our main security areas are the South Atlantic, where our primary sources of energy (gas and oil) are located, the Blue Amazon and the Green Amazon.

That is the reason why it seems convenient to increase maritime security as defended by the US; although we do not in the short period face any kind of military threat, we cannot forget that in the future we might be threatened by disputes over our water and energy supplies, the situation of our frontiers, actions regarding our biodiversity, international terrorism, and transnational crimes.

Our government politically recognizes the need for a strong integrated effort among the nations to prevent and defend against terrorist threats; this brings us even closer to the American ideas of security.

Within the political sphere, Brazil has been playing an important role in the integration of the south cone countries, aiming at strengthening the regional integration process in South America.

HISTORY OF THE JOINT OPERATIONS OF THE BRAZILIAN AND AMERICAN NAVIES

During World War II, two facts have drawn our navies together. The first was when the Brazilian government lent to the US the Navy Base in Natal. The second event was more connected to naval operations and was the role we played in the protection of ally convoys by ships of the Brazilian Navy, also in WWII. In both situations, there was a significant interchange between the two navies, especially the installation of modern anti-submarine warfare equipment on board our ships.

Once the conflict was over, the two navies kept the close relationship, whether in the form of the transfer of naval means or in the form of Officer exchanges.

The Mutual Assistance Program (MAP) dates from this period. It enabled our Navy to receive new assets, on one hand, but on the other hand, it buried the construction of military ships in our country.

It is also worth pointing out that our Officers were for a long period influenced by the American way of thinking which was totally inclined to the type of activity that interested the Americans, i.e., anti-submarine warfare.

The MAP also made us dependent on spare parts for our ships.

In what concerns joint drills, the Brazilian Navy has always been present in operations such as UNITAS and in many other types of operations.

Nowadays, the participation of USN ships in our Navy is much smaller.

Thus, we believe that a growing cooperation between our two navies might come as a consequence of the mutual support in the military security field, in the interchange of intelligence actions, in the conduction of combined drills, in academic and doctrinaire interchange, and in technological interchange.

The interests that bind us together are connected to the new forms of fighting against terrorism, to maritime security, regional cooperation and peace, and the elimination or reduction of transnational crimes.

The Brazilian position regarding participating or not in the world network proposed by the US will greatly depend on that country assuming an actual role, instead of just playing the tutor, and showing the effective intention of conducting an operational and tactical interchange.

CONCLUSION

After reviewing all the facts concerning the American proposal of implementing a new maritime strategy that intends to consider the effective participation of the navies of other nations, as well as coast guards, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations, one may conclude that this proposition of increasing the level of maritime security meets the wishes of the large majority of the countries that also desire to reach this objective.

Brazilian defense policy has for fundament the improvement of international security. Thus, in the specific case of Brazil, the above conclusion is totally applicable; more so if one considers the close relationship that unites the two countries since WWII.

The CNO has declared that the USN must listen to the American people and their political leadership so that the new strategy can be successful. Likewise, our Navy must adopt a similar attitude.

Consequently, one can imagine the problems that might prevent Brazil from joining this new international network. Even tough, for the particular case of the Navy, joining this network may be considered convenient and appropriate, this might not be the perception of our political leaderships and of the Brazilian people who are used to seeing their country ignored in the discussion of major international issues.

Finally, one must consider that, although the American discourse points towards the need of a trade that is free and free of protectionism, practice points the other way, especially if one looks at the innumerable obstacles the US has brought to the DOHA summits and which have caused so many losses to Brazilian economy as they actually inhibit free trade between the two countries.

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CONFIGURATION OF COMBAT SYSTEMS IN THE PROCUREMENT AND MODERNIZATION PROCESS OF SURFACE SHIPS

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ABSTRACT

The present paper proposes a methodology for the selection of surface-ship combat system components. Its objective is to evaluate the performance of the system while it is still in the design phase. Initially, proceedings for the selection of weapons and sensors are presented, with the proposal of mathematical models for the adequate simulation of each equipment's operation in stand-alone mode. Then, one addresses the definition of the architecture for the Tactic Control and Weapons System (SICONTA¹), as well as the required stages for its systemic evaluation integrated with the weapons and sensors. Finally, one analyzes system performance in a simulated combat against an air threat, describing each event, from detection to assessment of kill probability of threat at the end of the engagement sequence.

Key words: Combat System; and Kill Probability

INTRODUCTION

The procurement or modernization of a ship is a project that involves activities related to the ship's platform and combat systems. This division refers to the historical separation there is of the various systems on board, i.e.

¹ The acronym SICONTA was used for the first time in the modernization project of the Light Carrier "MINAS GERAIS" to refer to the Tactical Control System. During the frigate modernization (Modfrag) project, the acronym SICONTA started to designate the Tactical and Weapons Control System.

propulsion, steering, power generation and distribution, air-conditioning, damage control, etc., traditionally united in the “platform” group, and those related to the configuration of the ship’s combat system. The latter involves higher complexity of command functions required for the implementation of the ship’s combat capability itself.

The practical result of this separation has been pointed out by some authors as a simplification of the weapons and sensors selection processes during the combat system configuration activity. That is the opposite of what happens with the other surface ship platform component systems (ARTHOU, 1997, p. 39). This simplification has limited the selection of equipment for the combat system to qualitative information.

On the other hand, combat in current naval warfare scenarios take place at high speed and demand the automation and integration of detection, target designation, and threat engagement actions. The large amount of information made available by the combat system is still cause for debates about the need to increase the Artificial Intelligence of Digital Operative Systems, in such a way that, according to Zimm (1999, p. 31), are “*attuned to the human decision making process*”. The case of American frigate STARK, hit by an *Exocet* missile in 1986, and the incident with the USS VINCENNES that, on July 3, 1988, shot down, in the Persian Gulf, an Iranian commercial airplane (flight IR655) with a *Standard SM-2* missile, are cases that continue to motivate the development of adequate functionalities for the SICONTA – an integral part of the current combat systems.

In such context, the present paper presents a project methodology divided in three distinct parts, but which are connected by means of a logical sequence. To start with, are discussed procedures regarding the selection of weapons and sensors whose performance needs to be technically analyzed with the help of mathematical models that simulate the operation vis-à-vis the threats and scenarios that appear on the ship’s Systems High Level Requirements (RANS). Then, the SICONTA architecture is addressed. It integrates weapons functionalities and sensors to the tactical scenario of the ship’s operation. The last part addresses a proposal for the simulation of the engagement against an air threat, with the purpose of checking the performance of the combat system while it is in the design stage.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE NAVY COMBAT SYSTEMS PROJECT

The idea of combat system is relatively new. This system has been traditionally associated to a simple set of weapons and sensors that are part of the ship’s configuration. However, the combat system is the primary reason for the existence of warships, whose objective is to use all their integrated capabilities in a combat mission. According to Baker (1990), a warship has two

major divisions: the platform and the combat system, i.e., *Warship = Combat System + Platform*. Other authors, such as Gates (1987, p. 1), argue that a warship is the combat system itself and prefer to define the system as *Warship = Combat System*.

In the Brazilian Navy (MB) the first concept has been used more often, maybe due to the equipment jurisdiction division between Diretoria de Sistemas de Armas da Marinha (Navy Weapons Systems Department), that deals with weapons, sensors, and SICONTA – the combat system – and the Diretoria de Engenharia Naval (Naval Engineering Department), responsible for all the other systems in a ship, such as hull and structure, propulsion, steering, air-conditioning, electric power generation and distribution, etc. – the platform.

Ship building and design technologies, that produce the platform of surface ships, have been a Navy domain since the time when Brazil was still a Portuguese colony (BARBOZA, 2005). The development of the techniques employed in the platform design and building by Brazilian shipyards has more or less followed the technological advances occurred in countries that have traditionally invested in the intense development of new techniques, such as the European Community countries and the United States. However, the same can not be said regarding the technological domain required for the design and development of combat systems for our Navy ships, especially surface ships.

The first steps towards qualifying our national industry to produce such equipment were taken with the modernization project for the Light Carrier “MINAS GERAIS”. But its peak was reached with the modernization project of the “NITERÓI” Class frigates (Modfrag).

Before these two projects, the configuration of the combat systems was limited to comparative studies of arrangements in which the weapons and sensors were selected without the use of simulation tools. Rear Admiral Alan (Naval Engineer) (ARTHOU, 1997, p. 39) had already identified this fact as a drawback in the acquisition process:

Feasibility Studies, in the Brazilian Navy, are limited to comparing the different arrangements of weapons systems for a given ship; only a few studies are able to demonstrate the effect of alterations in certain systems of the ship, as it is done in the USA and the UK. These studies allow the operations sector to balance the requirements for the systems with the support of a factual basis.

WEAPONS AND SENSORS SELECTION CRITERIA

The Modfrag project marked the beginning of the use of mathematical modeling tools to simulate surface ship weapons and sensors. While the project

was underway, emphasis was given to the analysis of the performance of combat system engaged in air targets, since the times involved in the attack kinematics are extremely short. Thus, in the case of surface ship anti-air defense, the Modfrag paradigm indicates selection criteria that are applied from tactical sensors, such as vigilance radars and sonar, to weapons and sensors employment in the engagement, including equipment for electronic warfare systems.

In the process for procurement and modernization of the means employed by the MB, it is in the conduction of Feasibility Studies (FS) that weapons, sensors and SICONTA are selected. The studies vary in complexity and according to the tasks and specified scenarios. These studies check which of the weapons and sensors available in the market are capable of engaging and destroying the threats expected to take place during a naval operation.

Before the Modfrag project, such selection was either contracted with foreign companies that supplied a “complete package” with all the components for the combat system, or simply carried out based on the data provided by the manufacturers. In both cases, the result was not very reliable.

Another aspect in favor of this selection methodology is the possibility of designing weapons and sensors to an adequate level, thus preventing discontinuities and blind sectors in their employment coverage. On the other hand, precise knowledge on the capabilities and performance of the equipment enables systems composing the combat system to be economically dimensioned, i.e., without the use of extremely sophisticated weapons and sensors to face threats that could be effectively fought with simpler configurations.

A key remark should be made here: the difference between the MB combat system project and that of the other countries with the capacity to design and manufacture the weapons and sensors that equip their fleets. Brazil could be placed among the countries that master the systemic project and the integration of combat system components, but have limited capability to manufacture their own weapons and sensors. Consequently, the equipment selected for the Feasibility Studies is commonly used by the MB and is available in the international market. The countries that master the production technology for those combat system components are less liable to the limitations imposed by the weapons market, even if they are partially conditioned to the traditional supply lines of the companies in their defense-oriented industrial park. These countries are able to design weapons and sensors to meet specific requirements of combat systems for new ships.

The next items of this paper will address the modeling of weapons and sensors that are typical to this system, and are of widespread use in the MB, aiming at providing an example to the methodology proposed for their selection. The modeling of the other combat system equipment, such as the Gun, the Surface-to-Surface Missile, the Sonar, the Close-in Weapons System, the Tracking Radar, the Optronics Sight, the Optical Sight, and the Electronic Warfare

System, are described in the CASTRO SOBRINHO paper (2007), whose selection process is addressed with equal extent and depth.

SEARCH RADAR

The modeling of this sensor is a key element for the assessment of a combat system since all the command sequence and required actions for both attack and defense take place, in most cases, after the detection of a contact by the search radar. The time elapsed from detecting till engaging the target must be enough to allow a response of the combat system as a whole; otherwise, the threat might hit the ship with its weapons before the defense systems are able to neutralize it. In short, the radar must be able to detect the contact the further away from the ship as possible.

In order to evaluate how critical the capacity of a radar to detect a threat is, one has to estimate the time a ship will have to defend itself from an anti-ship *sea-skimmer* missile, for example. In general, this threat has an attack speed of 300 meters per second. If one considers its detection at a distance of 30 kilometers (16.2 nautical miles), a very optimistic performance, the ship will have 100 seconds to identify it, designate it to the tracking system and engage it.

Radar operation is also a stochastic phenomenon whose detection probability is inversely proportional to the target distance, as well as being affected by the atmospheric propagation conditions. For the purpose of comparative performance analysis in a selection process, one assumes that the propagation conditions are the same for all the analyzed equipment. However, one must simulate equipment performance in some adverse propagation conditions to check the performance of the radars in situations related to the ship employment.

One of the analytical tools normally used to model radar performance is the coverage curve. Figure 1 shows the coverage curve of a typical radar used for the detection of a hovering helicopter with a two square meter radar cross-section – RCS. Two different antennas are considered here: one mainly for the detection of surface targets ($\sin(x)/x$) and another for combined search ($\cos^2(x)$). The detection probability adopted was 80% for sea state 4 on the Beaufort scale. This curve was obtained with the use of a “*Radar Evaluation Software*”, as mentioned by Macfadzaen (1992, p. 300). This diagram represents, on the left side of the curve for each antenna, the region with over 80% probability of radar detection.

The analysis of the radar coverage curve presented on Figure 1 confirms that the range estimate made previously for the detection example of a *sea-skimmer* missile is very optimistic, because apart from the fact that the radar

cross-section for this type of missile being much smaller than that of a helicopter (of around 0.1 m^2), its high approach speed makes it difficult to confirm it as a target and start tracking. Another aspect indicates that the detection of an anti-ship missile is only possible at even smaller distances is the 80% probability adopted for the building of the Figure 1 diagrams. If for detection sake a larger probability is used, the diagram contours will come closer to the graph's origin, meaning an even shorter detection distance. It is important to emphasize that this preliminary analysis presented here does not consider other restrictions to radar performance, such as atmospheric propagation conditions or “fading zones” formed near the sea surface, causing intermittent detection for low-altitude air targets, as is the case of the *sea-skimmer* missile.




Figure 1 - Typical radar coverage diagram for an 80% probability of detecting a hovering helicopter ($RCS = 2 \text{ m}^2$) over a Beaufort scale sea state 4. Comparison between $\text{cosec}^2(x)$ and $\text{sen}(x)/x$ antennas (obtained through “*Radar WorkStation* version 2,2” program).

Another critical aspect in the selection of a search radar is the radar antenna rotation speed. Using the same above-mentioned example on the detection of a *sea-skimmer* missile, for each scan of a radar operating at a maximum angular speed of 15 r.p.m., search, detection, acquisition, start tracking, identification and target destruction evaluation will take at least 24 seconds, 24% of the total response time (100 seconds). This estimate considered that at least one scan (4 seconds each) is needed for each stage. CIWS radars operate at 60 r.p.m., which reduces this time to 6 seconds.

SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE (SAM)

A surface-to-air missile, or anti-aircraft missile, is similar to a gun-shot projectile with an autopilot. The analogy with gun ammunition is possible since the missile accelerates to reach projectile supersonic speed. This similarity has given rise to research on the production of course-corrected gun ammunition and increase kill probability of guns.

The autopilot that guides the missile to the target is the feature of this weapon that provides it with more or less kill probability during target engagement. One can use different ways to implement this characteristic depending on the missile type, classified according to autopilot location, tracking sensor radiation, and algorithm used in the autopilot.

As to the location of the guidance control, the SAM are divided in two groups: those guided from the launching base – surface ships, in this case – and those whose guidance control is located in the missile itself. The missiles from this second group are guided by the radiation coming from the target. Such radiation allows for yet another variation within this group, i.e., semi-active missiles and active and passive missiles. The semi-active ones are provided with another energy source located in the ship and which “focuses” the target so the missile sensor can be guided by the energy reflected by the target. The other missiles are guided by means of active or passive emissions, i.e., they either pick up the energy reflected by the target, coming from a source located in the very missile, or follow the energy generated by the target.

According to the type of energy the sensor picks up, missiles can be classified as electro-optical or electro-magnetic, depending on the band of the given spectrum. From the standpoint of the algorithm used in the guidance control, the SAM can be of *Command to Line Of Sight* (CLOS) that maneuvers the missile to keep it in the line of sight, uniting the target to the sensor installed in the ship. The other type of guidance is proportional navigation, whose corrections during flight are proportional to the missile deviation angle in relation to the target, i.e., the missile seeker angle², so that its trajectory intercepts the target trajectory at a future point (GARNELL, 1977, p. 181-189).

The type of algorithm used in the guidance control is of key importance for the modeling of a SAM. This algorithm will influence the form of the kill probability diagram for the missile designed to be used against a given target.

The mathematical model of a SAM describes its guidance by means of a transfer function whose input is the relative position of the missile in relation to the target, and whose outputs are the commands for correction of the trajectory of the aerodynamic surface controls of the missile, according to the

² It is the angle the radar or missile infrared sensor describes with its symmetry axis.

type of navigation implemented, i.e., CLOS or proportional (MACFADZEAN, 1992, p. 136 e 213). The first results obtained from the simulation with the missile model are the constant lateral acceleration kinematic curves, shown in Figure 2. The curves represent the maximum lateral acceleration (normal) a missile is able to develop, i.e., its maneuverability.




Figure 2 - Constant lateral acceleration kinematic curves (g = gravity acceleration) and flight time (s = seconds) of an anti-aircraft missile achieving supersonic speed Mach 3.0 in 22.7 seconds (MACFADZEAN, 1992, p. 200-208).

The kill probability diagram for a missile is designed from the kinematic curve shown on Figure 2, where the constant kill probability curves are similar to those of constant g .

Besides maneuverability, which keeps a direct relation with the miss-distance missile-target, the proximity fuse model is also considered, increasing the action radius of the missile warhead within a stochastic analysis. Macfedzen (1992, p. 262) comments that “[...] warhead characterization data is used in conjunction with the miss-distance distribution that results from the guidance and control functions to estimate kill probability.”

THE PROCUREMENT CONTRACT AS A PERFORMANCE GUARANTEE

All the models and analyses proposed in this paper depend on the reliability of the information provided by the manufacturers of the weapons and sensors considered during the selection process. In some cases it is possible to evaluate the consistency of the data through the output obtained in the simulations. Actually, this is one of the aims of using an analysis methodology.

However, since it is impossible to confirm through simulations much of the information supplied, the data declared by the manufacturers should appear in the agreement for future verification purposes during factory tests or in the operational assessment of the equipment (BAKER, 1990, p. 513).

SICONTA SELECTION

Feasibility Studies (FS) are the starting point for the selection of weapons and sensors for the configuration of a surface ship combat system. SICONTA selection is done during the FS phase and it defines a weapons and sensors integrated architecture which will allow the ship proper task performance within the scenarios specified in the RANS.

Nevertheless, the methodology used for the SICONTA performance analysis differs from the one proposed for the selection of weapons and sensors. As a Digital Operational System, developed to process information and perform commands and controls in "real time"³, its design phase simulation consists of three basic activities: design of the functional combat system model; analysis of the flow of information at SICONTA (data net traffic); and interface simulation.

The functional combat system model is designed considering the requirements established in the ship RANS and it is a diagram that originates in the system high level functions. The functions to be performed at lower levels are detailed using this graphic representation, until achieving the lowest levels, which represent the resources needed for the performance of the system tasks, i.e., equipment, software, personnel, information, and logistical items, among others (BLANCHARD, 1998, p. 62-64). Nowadays there is software that helps in the design of the system functional diagram, such as *System Architecture*.

The exercise of representing a combat system by means of a functional levels detailed diagram (*breakdown*), following a sequence that goes from the highest to the lowest level (*top-down*), is the approach that helps in the selection of the architecture during the FS phase. Combat systems that need to perform a large number of high-level functions all at the same time, for a large number of threats, will probably be better designed with a distributed architecture. Other systems that have been created to face scenarios of just a few threats, might be configured with a centralized architecture.

Another activity needed for combat system performance analysis is the simulation of the flow of information passing through the SICONTA for the execution of its functions. Even after the type of architecture to be used in the

³ In most definitions, "real time" is described as a fast response feature, compatible with the functions a system should perform (ALLWORTH, 1981, p. 12).

system is defined, it is necessary to test its performance in order to check its ability to process in “real time” the essential combat functions, such as target engaging, both in attack operations and ship-defense operations. Besides, the system should be able to perform auxiliary functions, such as gyro, anemometer and odometer signal distribution, at a priority level compatible with the required speed for the essential processes of the system.

The simulation of the flow of information during the Feasibility Studies phase may be done either by means of merely theoretical studies of the system load or by comparison with other combat systems already in operation. More complex modeling might even use computers and data networks with the same capacity designed for the SICONTA architecture.

Feasibility Studies, within the same evaluation of the combat system while performing its essential and auxiliary functions, should also analyze the interfaces that enable the interconnection between SICONTA and the weapons and sensors. Depending on how important the equipment is, interface analysis might vary from a simple theoretical checking of signals to a test involving simulators that monitor data traffic through the interface during the operation.

SICONTA ARCHITECTURE

The purpose of SICONTA is to automatically perform functions that used to be performed by operators, before the advent of digital computers. Tactical picture compilation, navigation problem solving, tracking initiation, etc. started to be implemented by the various systems composing SICONTA (PAKENHAM, 1989, p. 96-103).

In this case, two basic architecture types for SICONTA can be identified and will be addressed in this chapter in order to illustrate aspects that need to be considered in the design and development of this system: centralized and distributed.

Due to the historical development of computer systems, the centralized architecture was the first one to be used in combat system design. This architecture is basically composed of a central processing unit, denominated *mainframe*, through which passes all the information and where are processed all the calculations needed for the conduction of system functions; and of peripheral units that are the users of such information.

As illustrated by Figure 3, the centralized architecture demands the entire system load to go through the central computer (Central Data Processor). This requires high performance processing in order to keep up the high speed needed to simultaneously perform combat tasks even in intense system load, i.e., during intense information flow in the central computer. Pakeham (1989, p.101) comments that “*the demand for such rapid response taxes even a computer’s*

ability, and the need to react within few seconds can pose an impossible task in a busy situation with several threats occurring simultaneously.”





Figure 3 - Diagram of a centralized architecture combat system for SICONTA (source PAKENHAM, 1989, p. 97).



re 4 is composed of several
to share system function
Data Network that enables
and sensors, with various
ce of more than one task,

Figure 4 - Diagram of a distributed architecture combat system for SICONTA (source PAKENHAM, 1989, p. 102 and BAKER, 1990, p. 493).

A distributed architecture provides more reliability to SICONTA because it allows system re-configuration in case of damage of one of the computers (Users on Figure 4), which means that the system can continue to operate in degraded mode, something not normally possible with a centralized architecture. (PAKENHAM, 1989, p. 103).

However, the operation on degraded mode cannot be applied to all system functions. The ship must be able to keep certain combat capabilities even in the presence of damages. In general, this redundancy principle should be applied to the critical system functions, in conformity with the requirements established by RANS.

COMBAT SYSTEM PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

Macfadzean (1992, p. 289-290) suggests that engagement simulation is the proper level to analyze combat system performance. The engagement process, when the ship meets a threat, involves the basic functions of the system which should be performed within a time frame compatible with the attack kinematics.

Similar to what was discussed previously, an engagement simulation is conducted with the help of a mathematical model that enables the evaluation of combat system performance within a pre-established scenario. Nevertheless, it will require more than a model to describe all the engagement phases, some of which have a deterministic nature, as the guidance model of a flying missile, and others are stochastic, as the gunfire model.

COMBAT SIMULATION

The combat system macro-functions, performed when a threat is confronted, are detection, target designation for one of the weapon systems (*Target Indication* – TI), and threat engagement. During the last phase of this sequence, the system selects the weapon and the sensor, fires at the target and assesses the destruction of the threat.

Figure 5 illustrates a surface ship's point defense against an aircraft armed with bomb. The combat sequence is represented by numbered steps, from (1) to (12), in which the weapon used during the engagement is an anti-aircraft missile.

The sequence simulation starts with the search (1). The moment the threat reaches maximum detection distance is used as the count-down mark for aircraft approach and will determine its position in each combat stage.

Then there is the threat detection (2) by the search radar. Besides the radar coverage diagram shown on Figure 1, it is necessary to establish a

minimum acquisition probability value from which the establishment of a valid contact will be considered, i.e., target acquisition (3). This event involves a minimum number of radar scans (detections) before the acquisition takes place since the radar coverage diagram is usually calculated for a single scan. Since each detection is an independent stochastic event, the acquisition probability after 3 scans is, for instance, obtained by the expression: $P_{(N \text{ scans})} = 1 - (1 - P_{(1 \text{ scan})})^N$, for $N=3$. For example, for an 80% detection probability in 1 scan, the acquisition probability after 3 scans will be 99.2%.

The initiation stages of target tracking (4), identification (5), and designation (6) are modeled regarding the time spent for the performance of each of the stages, whether they are done manually or automatically by the system. These times will affect the distance in which the target will be destroyed, and, consequently, the system combat performance evaluation. The same happens with the weapon/sensor designation (7) stage which will start the engagement sequence.




Figure 5 - Combat process against an air threat. Detection phase: search, acquisition, tracking, and identification. Target designation phase. Engagement phase: weapon and sensor designation, tracking, solução de tiro, firing, ammunition trajectory, and activation of the proximity fuse (source GATES, 1987, p. 24-28 and MACFADZEAN, 1992, p.298).

During tracking (8), one must take into account the times intervals needed for the performance of manual and/or automatic sensor operation events. This stage introduces a new variable in combat simulation: tracking precision used for the miss-distance calculation, in case the missile used is the CLOS.

After that, the system calculates the firing solution (9) according to the data continually received from the tracking sensor. In the mathematical model adopted for the combat simulation, the algorithm used in predicting the aiming point for the target must be implemented according to the characteristics of the weapon employed in the engagement.

The firing (10) ends the simulation of the events involving the systems installed on board. The time spent for the firing solution, up to the moment when the weapon is effectively fired, should be considered for the target position calculation in the beginning of the following combat stage, i.e., weapon trajectory.

During the weapon trajectory (11) simulation specific models should be used for each type of ammunition. It is worth pointing out that the mathematical treatment for the gun projectile is considerably different from, for instance, the one used for a missile whose trajectory is corrected by its guidance system.

Once the missile position relative to the target is obtained in the miss-distance, one must check the activation of the proximity fuse (12) that will blow the missile warhead in case the miss-distance is shorter than the maximum sensibility distance of the proximity fuse. One must apply the missile warhead fragment spreading model and calculate the target destruction probability.

After evaluating target destruction, the model might also include a second engagement to be performed with the same weapon or with another weapon more appropriate for the engagement at closer distances from the ship, with the CIWS shown on Figure 5, or any other small caliber gun.

PERFORMANCE MEASURING

When establishing the requirements for a ship one must bear in mind the performance of tasks in real operation scenarios. Because there are no opportunities, during the phases before commissioning, to carry out system operation tests, in order to do intermediate verifications, it is essential to employ some performance measure to allow for requirement alterations before the detailing phase of the ship design. A type of measure that can be used for this purpose is threat destruction probability. This type of measuring can be calculated by means combat simulations.

CONCLUSION

The first phase of the procurement and modernization process of MB ships is the conduction of Feasibility Studies whose purpose is to propose configurations that will meet the functionalities established for the ship's RANS. The results of the FS are used to validate the requirements or subsidize changes meant to make them feasible. For this reason, it is essential to use mathematical

models to simulate the operation of the systems while performing their various functions, especially in combat operations against anticipated threats in the scenarios where the ship is likely to operate.

Naval construction technologies are the domain of the Navy since the Brazilian colonial period (BARBOZA 2005), whereas the use of anti-aircraft missiles was only introduced in the MB in the 1970's with the procurement of the "NITERÓI" class Frigates. The same can be said about the use of combat systems based on Operative Digital Systems.

The first project to use mathematical modeling procedures and simulations to evaluate combat system performance was the Modfrag project. Similar procedures were used during the Ocean Patrol Vessel project, but in a smaller scale, since the weapons and sensors configuration was simpler than the Modfrag project combat system.

This was the main motivation for the present paper. A combat system configuration methodology is proposed for the surface ship procurement and modernization process, more specifically in the conduction of the FS.

The proposed methodology is divided in three connected phases. It starts with the selection of weapons and sensors by means of the performance simulation of each equipment individually, i.e., in stand-alone operation. This procedure is built over mathematical models of weapons and sensors related to qualitative analyses of their technical features.

The second phase concerns the study of the features of the architectures adopted for SICONTA which will be, once integrated to the weapons and sensors, the configuration of the ship's combat system.

After the conclusion of the first two phases, the possible configurations for the combat system are attained – the ones that are theoretically capable of meeting the RANS-established requirements. However, it is essential to check weapons and sensors integrated to SICONTA as to their performance during combat against anticipated threats, for the scenarios in which the ship is likely to operate. This is done on the last phase of the proposed methodology with the simulation of the various engagement stages against an air target and within a given timeframe. Thus, it is possible to achieve a performance measurement for the system, expressed in terms of kill probability of a representative threat. The main purpose of the methodology proposed in the present paper is to anticipate problems and deficiencies while the combat system is still in the design stage; these are usually identified only in ship's operational evaluation stage.

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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION Evolution and Perspectives

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ABSTRACT

The changes in the worldwide strategic landscape, brought by the end of the Cold War, demanded from NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) the adoption of a new strategic concept, which enlarged its sphere of action beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. The expectancy of a calculated and full-scale aggression was replaced by the perception of multi-faceted and multi-directional risks such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ethnic rivalries. Lately, the Europeans have been trying without much success to improve their **ESDI (European Security and Defense Identity)** in order to assume a greater degree of autonomy and power of decision for the defense and security issues of Europe. In Brazil's case, interchanges and strategic partnerships with NATO can be beneficial for the Brazilian Armed Forces and national industry, especially the arms industry.

Keywords: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Cold War - Strategic Concept - European Union and Brazil.

INTRODUCTION

Men realized a long time ago that joining efforts with other men would increase their chances to survive and overcome obstacles that would otherwise be insurmountable. As years went by, such primitive associations evolved into complex multi-purpose human organizational structures which eventually gave rise to a knotty worldwide web of relationships as they started interacting with each other.

The State is the ultimate expression of this need to join efforts, to live in society, and to attain goals that, in this case, are referred to as national interests. The States in turn realized that certain international issues, arising out of the struggle to safeguard their specific interests, could not be solved by the mere application of traditional diplomatic means. Such compulsion gave rise to

organizations designed to advocate the common interests of a group of States, encompassing a variety of functions and areas of action; by minimizing the occurrence of direct disputes such organizations not only give a contribution to world stability, but also provide the international community with behavior parameters (Pecequillo, 2004, p.67-68). Such organizations were denominated, in some segments, International Governmental Organizations (IGO's).

The present paper provides an analysis of the past and the future of one of the most outstanding IGOs in the present days, namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). For this purpose, a comparison is made between NATO's pathway and the history of the world from the years that followed World War II (1939-1945) up to the present days. NATO was formed to provide the member states with a defense and collective security mechanism against external aggressions, especially against the emerging communist threat. Although NATO lost most of its *de facto* main purpose after the end of the Cold War, it survived by re-evaluating its role and expanding its activities in the world scenario.

It is also relevant to include in this analysis the controversial NATO's humanitarian interventions, the aspiration of Europe for a security and defense system of its own, the weight of the perpetual influence of the North American hegemony on the Atlantic Alliance, and the organization's future perspectives in view of the expected potential changes to the world scenario. Finally, the entailment of the Brazilian Armed Forces, particularly the Navy, with NATO will be addressed.

BACKGROUND

After World War II, antagonistic and irreconcilable differences between the United States of America (USA) and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) came to an end. Previously allied in the war effort against the Nazi-Fascist enemy, these two powers brought about a bipolarization in the world structure of power. On the one hand, communist USSR, with a planned out economy, one single party, and ideals of social equality; on the other hand, the USA, advocates of capitalism, of market economy, of private property and democracy. From the late 1940's up to 1989, both superpowers endeavored to disseminate and establish their political-economic systems in other countries. This period of time is referred to as The Cold War. This expression describes a clash that took place only in the ideological and diplomatic field, in the fight for a hegemonic power position, without any declared and direct military confrontation. As a matter of fact, in spite of the apparently prevailing peace, the "Armed Peace" and the "Balance of Terror" were the concealed reality: both the USA and the USSR engaged in an arms race, including nuclear weapons, thereby deploying armies and armaments over their own territories and over

the countries in line with their doctrines. Military equilibrium was the only warranty of peace.

With the purpose of thwarting the advance of communism over any part of the globe, the USA designed the Truman Doctrine in March 1947. Considered to be the initial logical framework of the Cold War, the doctrine was aimed to ensure American military aid to defend any allied country against external aggressions from the USSR or against internal subversion stirred by the international communist movement. In practice, from that moment the United States started to play the role of world police, accomplishing interventions in defense of their interests at global scale.

The difficulties to surmount the economic, political and social devastation caused by the war brought uncertainty to the future of Europe. As the Cold War scaled up, Europe would become more susceptible to both North American and Soviet influences.

As far as economy is concerned, the Truman Doctrine materialized in the European continent through the Marshall Plan, the primary plan for reconstruction and economic stabilization of the countries involved in the war. Launched also in 1947, the plan was named after Truman's Secretary of State General George Marshall. Through this initiative, some seventeen billion dollars¹ were made available and offered to European countries to keep them from adhering to the escape routes proposed by the communist cause for the critical situation those countries were going through at the time, and thereby keeping them loyal to the USA.

In the military field, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created in 1949, which, according to NATO official webpage², is a "political and military alliance," whose objective is "to assure the collective defense against any form of aggression and to maintain a safe environment for the development of democracy and for the economic growth" of all partner states. For President Truman, the Marshall Plan and NATO were the "two faces of the same coin". In fact, the United States wanted to secure the military hegemony in capitalist Europe, and also to guarantee a fast and efficient attack in the case of any confrontation with the Soviet Union.

As a main response to NATO, the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, or simply Warsaw Pact, was established in 1955 by the Eastern European countries and the USSR. Established as a regional alliance for collective security, the treaty indeed served as a political and military instrument used by the Soviets to preserve discipline in the satellite countries and also to suppress any internal insurrections against USSR authority.

¹ SARAIVA, J.F.S. (Org.). *Relações Internacionais. Dois Séculos de História: Entre a Ordem Bipolar e o Policentrismo*. Brasília: IBRI, 2001. V. II apud Devedove, 2005.

² NATO in the 21st Century. Available at: <www.nato.int/docu/21-cent/21st_por.pdf>. Accessed on: April 19, 2007.

The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the Warsaw Pact played a significant role in dividing the world into two spheres of influence, making real a divide that virtually existed since the end of the World War II.

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE END OF THE COLD WAR

Established on April 05, 1949, NATO's list of founding members includes Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the United States, France, the Netherlands, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. Thereafter, the evolution of the geopolitical scenario allowed the incorporation of new members. Greece and Turkey joined the Treaty in 1952, West Germany joined in 1955, and the newly democratic post-Franco Spain joined the alliance in 1982 while the Cold War was still in course.

The North Atlantic Treaty¹ is indeed a very simple document, comprising only fourteen clauses in total. Building on the principles set forth under the United Nations Charter, from which the Treaty derives legitimacy, the wording of the Treaty initially requires a commitment to peace and the peaceful resolution of any international disputes. However, the Atlantic Alliance reserves the right to individual or collective defense whenever one or more of the members become the victim of an armed attack, which may even imply in the use of armed force. The Alliance recognizes, however, that the United Nations Security Council is the body charged with the maintenance of international peace and security, but still encourages the members to keep and develop defensive capacities. Members are to resource to mutual consultations whenever the territorial integrity, political independence and security of any member are threatened. Moreover, the Alliance geographical operation areas are clearly delimited, including the portion of the Atlantic Ocean above the Tropic of Cancer and the territories of the Treaty member countries. In spite of having an eminently military scope, NATO professes the elimination of any political barriers that would otherwise prevent the strengthening of economic ties between the members. It also establishes that any issues related to the application of the Treaty are to be addressed by a council under mutual agreement. Besides, the expansion of the Alliance by the adhesion of new members upon invitation is also expected, provided that such new members are apt to support the principles of the alliance and to contribute to an increased security in the North Atlantic region, in compliance with a process that is referred to as expansion.

¹ North Atlantic Treaty. Available at: <www.nato.int/docu/other/po/treaty-po.htm>. Accessed on: April 19, 2007.

The USA had basic objectives at the time of proposing the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty, namely to contain the USSR socialist expansion, to take over the leadership of the western block, and to preserve the economic relations with democratic and capitalist European countries. In other words, by setting up an institutionalized tie between the USA and Western Europe, the Treaty enabled the Americans to postulate a presence in the European territory and to secure their military, political, and economic interests in the region. This way, there was an intention to harmonize two principles of the international relations: namely, balance of power and collective security (Loyal, 2004).

In a bipolar world, characterized by ideological competition and by the arms race, establishing an organization like NATO should not raise any significant controversies between member states' domestic policies. However, in only two years the dynamics of the international system changed dramatically, making the future of the Alliance rather questionable.

1991 STRATEGIC CONCEPT⁴: NEW TRENDS

The fall of the Berlin Wall bringing down all Soviet aspirations removed the Atlantic Alliance's *de facto* main reason to exist. The first really significant normative changes to NATO's structure took place in 1991, in an attempt to adapt the alliance to the new reality of the post-Cold War world. Thus, the members ratified a document named Alliance Strategic Concept, whose 59 clauses not only reaffirmed the basic principles of the Treaty, but also implemented a re-evaluation of its strategic basis, thereby implementing a real change to its concept of security.

This way, the perception of threat to security shifted from being exclusively geopolitical in order to include "varied and multidirectional risks." The possibility of a massive and calculated attack to NATO members was virtually discarded and replaced by the fear of an impact caused by economic, political and social difficulties, including ethnic antagonism and the territorial disputes faced by Central and Eastern European countries. In other words, the security of member states is now directly related to the assurance of stability and the promotion of free institutions as well as to the assurance of a market economy in European countries. The remaining risks referred to have a more comprehensive nature: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, interruption in the flow of critical resources, terrorist actions and sabotage. Dialog and cooperation are proposed by the document as proper tools to face such wide ranges of threats besides the maintenance of a collective defense capacity,

⁴ The Alliance's Strategic Concept. Rome, 1991. Available at: <www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/b911108a.htm>. Accessed on: June 11, 2007.

although within stricter patterns, proportional to the new situational requirements, with emphasis on mobility, flexibility, ability to adapt to the contingencies, and the multinational character of military forces.

The document also includes the development of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) capable of enabling Europe to take more responsibility for its own defense, thereby becoming the European pillar for the Alliance. However, the document states that, in view of the preponderance of NATO military capacity, NATO would still be the main body responsible for the security of the continent and that the presence of North American forces, both conventional and nuclear, in the European territory would still be critical.

Yet, the text is nonspecific in defining which non-belligerent threats may be considered as a risk to allies' security and how to objectively deal with such threats in order to reestablish peace and order. Even though the conciliatory democratic-liberal values promoting posture are the main resource for solving these types of conflicts, how to harmonize this new guideline with the military nature of the Alliance is not clear. In the text, all references to NATO's performance are always linked to the traditional use of force; in other words, the idea of security was expanded, but remained focused on the defense of members' territory, just like it had originally been conceived in 1949.

Another problem caused by the ambiguous definition of threat is that the decision to activate the collective defense system could become an eminently political issue. Normatively, armed intervention in regional instabilities has not been considered, unless such instabilities were considered a real and direct threat to the security of the allies (Viggiano, 2005).

This lack of objectivity in relation to the re-establishment of peace in the case of conflicts was certainly due to the fact that the Atlantic Alliance abides by the precepts of the United Nations Charter, which did not change after the end of the world bipolarity and which states in its Chapter VII that the use of force should only be considered legitimate in cases of armed aggression. Therefore, armed action continued to be limited to self-defense by the members. In order to address threats of a wider reach, beyond its scope of performance, the Alliance chose to support preventive actions like cooperation and dialog (Barroso, 2006). In fact, the strongest virtue of the document was to emphasize the need to establish cooperative relations with other intergovernmental bodies and non-member States. Such commitment was vouched for during the activities performed by the Combined Task Forces and by the Partnership for Peace, developed in the early 1990's.

On the other hand, adopting the new strategic concept made the Alliance more susceptible to antagonisms, either in relation to non-member countries, due to the emergence of conflicting political-strategic interests, or in relation to allied countries that concurrently belong to another IGO, that are likely to

appear as soon as NATO's line of action starts to diverge from the obligations undertaken in relation to the former.

1999 STRATEGIC CONCEPT⁵: CORRECTING THE ROUTE

The political transformations in Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of the USSR enabled three former Warsaw Pact signatory countries to join NATO in 1999, namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Finally, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined the Atlantic Alliance in 2004, comprising the current number of 26 member states.

The revision of the Alliance's Strategic Concept was ratified in 1999, comprising 65 clauses in the new format and curing all inaccuracies detected in the previous version and facilitating the operability of the new security concept. Basically, the new text restates all commitments undertaken under the first version, sets forth more clearly all NATO's performance parameters and, in a normative way, allows the use of force to ensure the stability of the environment and expands its own geographic area of action. The maintenance of stability, previously a strategic priority, is now regarded as a complementary organization task, despite being of great interest as far as the collective security of the allies is concerned (Barroso, 2006).

By issuing this document NATO got rid of the straitjacket that would prevent any belligerent action and, additionally, opened its military knowledge and capabilities to lead armed interventions not originally included in the 1949 Treaty (Viggiano, 2005). Although the term humanitarian intervention is never used, there is an explicit reference to the fact that all allies should strengthen the human rights and that humanitarian emergencies could justify an intervention by the Alliance. However, a decision about any such crisis management and responsive operations as referred to in the document, a contribution of the Alliance to the resolution of conflicts, will be made on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, a normative precept that gives the Alliance a great flexibility as well as political advisability regarding whether the Alliance should or not get involved in conflicts.

NATO's official Website provides a summary of the new features of the Alliance for the 21st Century:

In response to changes in the overall security environment, the Alliance has taken on additional responsibilities. These include addressing both instability

⁵ The Alliance's Strategic Concept. Washington D.C., 1999. Available at: <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>. Accessed on: June 11, 2007.

caused by regional and ethnic conflicts within Europe and threats emanating from beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. Today, the Alliance is engaged in an increasingly broad range of activities, [...] such as those (challenges) posed by international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In order to remain effective in defending and promoting security in this new and rapidly changing security environment, the Alliance is engaged in an ongoing transformation affecting all aspects of its agenda, with new missions, new members, new capabilities, new partnerships, and new ways of doing business. As a result, NATO has moved from being a geographically defined alliance to one that recognizes that security threats are no longer limited in terms of their location and predictability and is prepared to address them whenever and wherever they occur. In response to the new security challenges, NATO has evolved from being primarily a tightly knit Alliance with responsibility for collective defense, to becoming the focus for a partnership of nations cooperating closely in the wider field of security.⁶

THE INTERVENTION IN KOSOVO

After the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, NATO intervened militarily in the Balkans on three occasions - Herzegovina in 1995, in Kosovo in 1999 and in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2001, always allegedly in defense of human rights in the region. It is currently leading two peacekeeping missions, the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in the southern Serbian province of Kosovo. Both missions seek "to guarantee a secure environment, in which all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origins, can live in peace and where, with international aid, democracy can begin to grow."⁷

At the time of the Bosnian conflict, while still bounded to the 1991 Concept, NATO's action was basically limited to negotiation and to a few punitive bombings without any significant consequences. In Kosovo, however, when the Alliance was about to ratify the 1999 guidelines, the Atlantic Alliance

⁶ NATO in the 21st Century. Available at: <www.nato.int/docu/21-cent/21st_por.pdf>. Accessed on: April 19, 2007.

⁷ NATO in the 21st Century. Available at: <www.nato.int/docu/21-cent/21st_por.pdf>. Accessed on: April 19, 2007.

fired a large-size, eleven-week air raid, in a military operation that was named Operation Allied Force. In both cases, the public justifications provided by the allies and by NATO itself for the armed intervention were based on the need to safeguard the human and humanitarian rights that were being violated (Barroso, 2006). The conflicts went beyond the former Yugoslavia borders in the form of thousands of war refugees who, in their search for shelter and safety in the neighboring States, caused all sorts of trouble in the sheltering countries.

According to more realistic experts, interventions driven by exclusively humanitarian interests are exceptions, and even in such cases such intervention is only feasible in the presence of a power asymmetry and when the cost for the intervening agent is low.⁸ Thus, regardless of any human solidarity, any intervention action driven by humanitarian purposes will usually entail political-strategic considerations.

The effects of the Balkans Wars were reflected in the 1999 concept, after which “the uncontrolled movement of a large number of people”, especially when triggered by armed conflicts in the Euro-Atlantic periphery, was regarded as a clear threat to the security and the stability of the Alliance. Ethnic antagonism, territorial disputes, inadequate or defective reform efforts, violation of human rights, and the dissolution of States were also regarded as root causes for regional instabilities with a potential to affect the Alliance if they flow out to the neighboring countries.

The intervention in Kosovo has been the subject of all-consuming and fiery discussions regarding its legitimacy. Not a few people question which principles, rules and procedures would legitimate the violation of the sovereignty and the non-intervention right of a State, not only to remedy humanitarian crises, but also to impose the conditions upon which peace and order will be rebuilt later. Doubts also refer to which players in the International System would legitimately claim the right to intervene in the internal affairs of other States to halt or to solve any cases of human rights violation. Besides, the list of charges presented by the opponents to the Atlantic Alliance action includes suspicions on the real motivation behind the humanitarian speech as well as disapproval regarding the unilaterality of the decision to act independently from any authorization by the UN Security Council, seeing that the Council holds the monopoly to use armed force to preserve international peace and security, as assigned by the Charter of the United Nations, in clear violation, therefore, of the international law.

However, although NATO had acted without any explicit mandate from the Security Council, neither the Security Council nor the UN Secretary-

⁸ KRASNER, S. Sovereignty and intervention. In Lyons, G.; Mastaduno, M. (Ed.), *Beyond Westphalia? Sovereignty and International Intervention*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. apud Nogueira, 2000.

General reprobed the intervention of the Atlantic Alliance in Kosovo. "the Security Council rejected the resolution that would classify NATO's action as a violation of the United Nations Charter. Secretary Annan emphasized the deficiency of the UN Charter in providing refuge for the victims of such atrocities."⁹ Besides, the International Court of Justice recognized that no excesses were committed by NATO, although the former Yugoslavia claimed that the bombings in March 1999 had killed hundreds of civilians, violating the principles of the International Law, especially the human rights related principles.

NATO acknowledged that the intervention in Kosovo had raised controversy; however, NATO claimed that "the action taken resulted in the achievement of the fundamental conditions needed to begin reconstruction"¹⁰ in the region. In reality, the inclusion of humanitarian issues in the 1999's concept, yet not associated only to intervention maneuvers, points to a clear acceptance of the legitimacy of this type of operation by the Alliance, in the years that elapsed after the 1991 concept was ratified.

Besides the external criticism, NATO had to face domestic dilemmas relatively to its involvement in the Kosovar crisis: namely the disagreement among the European allies concerning the standing to be adopted by the organization, the USA rationale by which the military campaigns should be carried out outside the scope of the Alliance collective organisms, and the support given by the European members to the new European Union Security and Defense Policies (ESDP).¹¹

Regardless of any discussions raised relatively to this issue, it is undeniable that the humanitarian intervention, whichever the format, is becoming a more frequent and significant practice in the post-Cold War world. This initiative, historically taken by all powers, has been the subject of countless debates among International Law experts, as a result of the current status of the conceptual evolution of certain traditional principles that govern the international system: sovereignty, non-intervention, and self-determination (Nogueira, 2000, p. 158). This is a doctrinaire debate that is far from reaching its final chapter.

However, after the September 11 terrorist attack to the USA, the discussions on humanitarian interventions became secondary in the international agenda in view of the increased relevance of the terrorist actions and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

⁹ STROMSETH, J. Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for Incremental Change. In: HÖLZGREFE, J.L.; KOEHANE, R.O. (Ed). *Humanitarian Intervention. Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas*. Cambridge: Cambridge University apud BARROSO, 2006. (free translation of quote)

¹⁰ NATO in the 21st Century. Available at: <www.nato.int/docu/21-cent/21st_por.pdf>. Accessed on: April 19, 2007.

¹¹ Uma OTAN Renovada. Available at: <www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue3/portuguese/art1.html>. Accessed on: April 19, 2007.

THE EUROPEAN PILLAR OF THE ALLIANCE

The first European attempt to set up a defense system of its own traces back to the Treaty of Brussels in 1948. Formed only by countries that had been destroyed during the war (Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom), the treaty aimed at congregating the remaining defensive capacity of the members to repel attacks against their integrity. Despite having been defeated, Germany was still seen as a threat, which was expressly stated in the document. However, the actual military power of the Pact would not be enough to protect the members from any aggression, especially if coming from the emerging USSR.

NATO appeared originally from the support given by the USA to the Treaty of Brussels. The coming of the USA into the European dynamics, through the Marshall Plan and through the Atlantic Alliance, caused a change in the perception of the source of threat, which shifted from Germany to the USSR. A gradual quenching of the antagonism between the European countries and the harmonization of their policies followed the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty. In 1954, West Germany and Italy joined the Brussels Treaty, giving origin to the Western European Union (UEO).

However, the European allies remained under the comfortable and exclusive protection of NATO until the dissolution of the USSR. The idea of a security policy would only bloom again in Europe after the end of the Cold War.

The Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992, making this aspiration of the newly-born European Union (UE) come true by establishing the Common Foreign & Security Policy (CFSP). The changes to the strategic theater caused by the progresses in the European integration stirred the UEO out of the operational inertia it had been in since the creation of NATO. Upon the establishment of the CFSP, the UEO became both the armed wing and the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. However, UEO's action was limited to a few small-size operational missions in the Adriatic Sea, whilst NATO remained in charge of European defense. This became evident when the interventionist actions during the Balkans wars were led exclusively by the Atlantic Alliance.

In 1999, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was established, a defense organization under the jurisdiction of the CFSP, and the creation of an European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) was agreed, designed to act in the missions assigned by the Petersberg Declaration. All these missions are part of the ESDP and are clearly specified under the European Union Treaty. They include the following missions: prevention of conflicts, management of humanitarian crises, and enforcement and maintenance of peace.

In 2000, the European Council meeting in Nice sanctioned the gradual transfer of all operational functions from the UEO to the EU and established the permanent structures of the political-military chain of command. In 2001, the EU was declared operational, and in 2003, it carried out its first crises-management military missions. Still in 2003, European Security Strategy was approved, and the European Agency for Armament was created. In short, after the Maastrich Treaty the EU made all efforts within its reach to fulfill the European ambition of setting up its own defense system.

This European wish of recovering the control, lost after the World War II, over security and defense issues within its own territory was not only well accepted, but also encouraged under the Strategic Concepts of 1991 and 1999. Both documents clearly strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and the development of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), provided that there is no discontinuity in the transatlantic link. Likewise, a more significant role and increased responsibilities for the European allies in relation to security issues is encouraged, because this would not only serve its own interests, but would also reinforce the effectiveness of the Alliance as a whole. However, NATO is emphatically declared as playing a central role in the new Euro-Atlantic security structure being developed concurrently with the European integration.

Getting rid of the dependence on NATO exclusively (and on the USA, consequentially) would give the EU more autonomy and more power in the decisions related to its own security. However, this opinion is not unanimous within the European Union: on the one side, France wants the EU to be as independent as possible from NATO and from the USA. On the other hand, the UK, faithful USA partisan, wants a narrower Euro-Atlantic tie, because the UK considers NATO's tactical schemes indispensable in more complex ERRF operations.

Negotiating cooperation agreements with NATO was the way found by the EU to progress without being rejected by NATO supporting countries. The 2003 "Berlin Plus," by which NATO's capabilities and means of command are made available for the UE, is the most outstanding of such agreements.

In addition to the lack of consensus among the European allies about the intervention in Iraq, doubts related to NATO's real mission were raised again: to secure the defense and the security of the allies or to defend the USA interests wherever such interests are being threatened?

In spite of the efforts made by the EU, the European defense is far from being emancipated from NATO. The relatively low research and military development budgets, the poor synergy among the weapons industries due to the independence of the defense policies of European governments, and deficiencies in the rationalization and interoperability of their military resources

make the European Union dependent on the Atlantic Alliance, and consequentially on the USA. In geo-strategic terms, if a more balanced partnership is to be established, the EU will have to invest more in defense, harmonize its military efforts, and learn how to overcome the lack of consensus between “Atlantist” and “Europeist” members.

In reality, in spite of the divergences, the EU (ESDP) and NATO may be considered as complementary, seeing that the strategic partnership between the two entities is critical to deal with the complex challenges of contemporary world. While NATO evolved to fit the American strategic interests, the EU, which is unable to conceive its collective security without the USA, develops its own crisis-management tool to defend its interests where the Americans are unwilling to intervene.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE AMERICAN HEGEMONY

The establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 met both the needs of a weakened Europe in the postwar period and the American desire to guarantee its political, economic, and military hegemony in the region. The USA wanted “...not only to create a prosperous and democratic European partner but also to help build a structure, which would serve legitimate North American security interests.”¹²

By the end of the Cold War, while doubts on the future of NATO were raised, the USA was engaged in injecting new life by adopting new guidelines. Essentially American (Ribeiro, 1999), the new strategic concept continued to meet the USA security interests, to secure both the USA presence in Europe and the control of the Alliance integrated military commands. As mentioned before, the new concept appeared to be in favor of developing a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) provided that under NATO. Alliance’s capacities and military resources were made available for UEO operations, on a case-by-case basis and upon consensus. Thus, the European members would take more responsibility for their own security as they would participate more effectively in NATO missions and activities, thereby reinforcing the indissoluble transatlantic link.

However, the USA appeared to be reactive to such advancement in European defense which, according to the Americans, would contribute to the development of their capacities to strengthen the Alliance rather than to evolve to the detriment of the Alliance. Such a standing ended up in a refusal of the “3D” by the Clinton administration in 1998; namely disengage, duplicate and

¹² NATO in the 21st Century. Available at: <www.nato.int/docu/21-cent/21st_por.pdf>. Accessed on: April 19, 2007.

discriminate. In the first case, disengaging Europe from the USA was out of question, in other words, the European decision-making process should not be unleashed from the broader framework of the Alliance. Secondly, the forces, the structures of operational command, and the decisions about equipment acquisition should not be duplicated, i.e., one to NATO and another to the EU. Finally, NATO non-EU members should not be discriminated in their participation in the military operations carried out by the EU (Costa, R. 1998; Rest., 2004). Ever since, the relationship between the EU and NATO has been progressing, but the issue regarding the extent of autonomy assigned to the European defense in relation to the current Atlantic Alliance has always been present.

The Americans are interested in the development of ESDI because the USA wants to share the financial and military expenses with the EU, instead of bearing the heaviest burden to fund European security and defense. If this aspiration materializes within NATO, then the USA will be able to control and even have a veto power within the scope of European security and defense (Fontoura, 1999, p.188; Loyal, 2004, p. 235;). Moreover, the unbeatable American military power gives the USA a key position in the Alliance decision-making processes.

ESDI is currently set up in such a way as to be subject to the limits and conditions stipulated by the USA. The shock of interests has a potential to eventually cause the Europeans to progressively move away from the Americans politically and militarily, rendering critical the set-up of an autonomous capacity. However, this is not likely to occur in the short run because the EU, before anything else, must solve all problems referred to above: namely, the internal divergences among its members, the relatively low military budget, and the lack of a common security policy among its members.

The expansions both NATO and the EU are currently going through are rather similar geographically. The acceptance of countries from Eastern Europe into both organizations will operate to reinforce the supremacy of the USA in NATO as well as the USA influence in the EU. Those countries still have a live memory of the Soviet oppression against which they were protected by the Americans as the USA supported their coming into NATO. This makes them "Atlantist" members, committed to please the USA, which could help the scale of power in the Alliance to slide more and more towards the Americans.

Having an active participation in international organizations in general, and in NATO specifically, is a strategic decision driven by the guidelines and orientations provided in many American high-level policy documents. This enables the USA to have a decisive influence on the governing of such organisms, which causes them to become very useful tools in attaining the objectives of the American foreign policy. The 2002 edition of the National Security Strategy

of the United States (NSSUS)¹³, for instance, established that “America will implement its strategies by establishing coalitions - as wide as possible...” and that “leading a coalition properly requires clear priorities, as well as evaluation of third-party interests and consistent consultations between the partners with a humble spirit.” The 2006 NSSUS, which reinforced and complemented the guidelines set forth in the previous edition, states that one of the pillars of the American strategy is “to face the challenges of our time, leading a growing community of democracies.”¹⁴ Therefore, charging the USA with trying to influence international organisms for its own benefit is a mere attestation rather than an “accusation”, (Abreu, 2006, p.114).

In view of the above, a consequential conclusion is that NATO was created, following a North American initiative, as a political-military instrument to serve private interests basically, even if the stated purpose of the Treaty was to protect and help rebuild the weak postwar Europe. After nearly sixty years, the military supremacy of the USA has been ensuring that such reality remains unaffected, despite the fact that its political leadership is challenged whenever it is seen as incompatible with European interests.

As summarized by Almeida (2002), NATO’s military ability to take over its new proposed duties has proved to exceed its internal political cohesion. In other words, the absence of a consistent awareness to handle “the human rights cause, the democratic cause, and the environmental cause may lead NATO into pathways that are more difficult than those previously gauged by the Manichaeism of the Cold War.”

A FUTURE PERSPECTIVE FOR THE ALLIANCE

Against all expectations, NATO survived the geo-political revolution caused by the end of the Soviet threat and has been undergoing transformations in order to meet the demands posed by the new reality. The Atlantic Alliance is aware that the change process must not be halted if NATO is to keep pace with the evolution of the international scenario.

Thus, in 2005 the CCSS (Clingendael Centers for Strategic Studies), in The Hague, collaborated with NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency - NC3A in carrying out a study on potential future contexts with the purpose of aiding in the planning of the Atlantic Alliance defense. This study, entitled “Future NATO’s”¹⁵, provided one of the sources used by NC3A to collaborate with the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in the development of a range of potential “future worlds,” each of them posing a different security scenario and, consequently, a different NATO.

¹³ Available at: <www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/>. Accessed on 8/18/07¹⁴ Free translation of quotes.

¹⁴ Free translation of quotes.

¹⁵ Disponível em: <www.otan.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue2/portuguese/military.html>. Accessed on: July 1st, 2007.

According to that paper, the various studies already carried out concerning the future of the Atlantic Alliance tend, if normative, to reflect the political bias of their authors, or otherwise they merely extrapolate current trends when they try to investigate the future. The several overturns undergone by the international system over the last decades - namely, the dissolution of the USSR, the German reunification, the appearance of terrorism as the biggest threat to world security - make evident the limitations of the extrapolation approach to provide input to a long-term defense planning like the one proposed by NATO.

In order to go round such pitfalls, CCSS sponsored a workshop that brought together a high-level group of Dutch analysts representing a diverse mix of professional, academic and ideological backgrounds.

In the first stage of the work, the analysts identified the key characteristics of NATO that might be subject to change over the next twenty years and the main drivers that were felt to trigger those changes. The key characteristics identified included: the strength of the Transatlantic link, the US leadership, the geographical range of operations, the extent to which the Alliance is able to make decisions on contentious issues, the extent to which NATO is able to sway the decisions and actions of its members, the range within the conflict spectrum in which NATO will carry out missions, the scope of capabilities at the Alliance's disposal and the Alliance's effectiveness in the joint application of its coercive instruments, the balance between the political and military dimensions, and the extent and geographic spread of NATO membership. The workshop participants discussed the main drivers that they felt might trigger change and the following three key drivers were identified: US willingness to assume a leadership role in NATO (strong or absent leader), impact of the European Union development (coherent or weak political actor), and threat perception (common to all members or diverse).

In the second stage of the work, five instantaneous scenarios were proposed which should be viewed as illustrations of all likely futures for NATO up to 2025, including a gradation of value for the characteristics and drivers previously identified. Without intending to be an exhaustive listing of all likely futures for NATO, the analysts were careful enough to select sufficiently diverse and broad scenarios as to capture the main dimensions of change. The first scenery is characterized by a strong US leadership, a commonly defined security perception, and a relatively weak European Union. In the second scenario, the transatlantic link appears strong combined with an active partnership with a united Europe. In the two following scenarios, the transatlantic link and the US leadership progressively decrease, until the last and fifth scenario, in which the USA has lost all interest in the Alliance beside a fragmented European Union.

At the end of the work, the group concluded that the Alliance's future is grim in the absence of US leadership in NATO, whether the European Union is weak or strong and irrespective of threat assessments. In other words, more than any influence or threat originating from external security environment, the developments within the Alliance will be the most critical factors to guarantee its future.

The work developed by CCSS only confirms the opinion previously stated that NATO was created by and for the Americans. Without the military power, the political leadership, and the interest of the Americans in its continuity, the Atlantic Alliance is doomed to an inexpressive role in the international scenario or even, who knows, to disappearance.

THE BRAZILIAN ARMED FORCES AND NATO

Exchanges with the Armed Forces from other countries and new strategic partnerships are critical to achieve any improvement in the national capability, as set forth under the Strategic Guideline for the National Defense Policy (PDN).¹⁶ Thus, addressing the entailment of the Brazilian Armed Forces, particularly the Navy, with NATO was considered relevant.

It is to be highlighted that such entailments also contribute to the implementation of several PDN Guidelines, especially the following ones:

- 'XXIII – be able to project power, targeting potential participation in operations established or authorized by the UN Security Council;
- XXIV – establish new partnerships with countries that are capable to contribute to the development of technologies of interest for the defense;
- XXV – participate in peace missions and humanitarian actions, in compliance with the national interests; and
- XXVI – progressively participate in the international decision-making processes, perfecting and increasing Brazil's negotiation ability.

One in the most traditional and advantageous exchange means includes the accomplishment of joint military exercises with other countries' armed forces. This type of activity enables the development of interoperability with foreign Armed Forces, the acquisition of new knowledge, the establishment of

¹⁶ Among others, the PDN provides the following Strategic Guideline: "6.11 In addition to traditionally allied countries and blocks, Brazil shall endeavor to establish other strategic partnerships, seeking to expand exchange opportunities and to generate reliability in the field of defense."

interpersonal and future collaboration contacts between the participants. But, above all, it allows Brazil to show the flag, in other words, to disclose the capability of our country and our military forces to the world.

Aware of the above-referred advantages, the Brazilian Navy made an effort to enhance its relationship with NATO Navies by participating in several operational drills in the North Atlantic area, such as operations Linked Sea and Swordfish, besides representation missions. However, budget restrictions prevented the accomplishment of this type of event, considerably reducing the Brazilian presence abroad, not only in North Atlantic, but also in other settings of interest. Fortunately, according to an article published in BONO issue 399 of June 29, 2007 by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Navy intends to intensify the commissions to foreign countries

Understanding that, besides fulfilling the strategic purpose of showing the Brazilian flag, such commissions will provide the crews with a unique opportunity of cultural enrichment and, in view of the motivation that are brought about, they strengthen the dedication to the service, thereby contributing to optimizing naval training.

An important partnership that Brazil established with NATO includes the signature, in 1997, of a bilateral agreement with NAMSA (NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency)¹⁷, upon the affiliation to NATO Codification System (NCS). The NCS enables the Atlantic Alliance members to get maximum efficiency in material management and logistical support by standardizing the identification, classification and coding of supply items. Initially, Brazil was admitted as Tier 1 (partial participation), which means a non-ally country that has access to cataloguing data, to the publications, and to the services available to all NATO countries. In 2002, Brazil climbed up to Tier 2 (full participation), which allows the non-ally country, in addition to the previous benefits, the right to include its own defense material in the NCS catalogs. Thereby, more than fifty system countries immediately became potential customers for the materials manufactured by the Brazilian industry, especially the weapons industry. As a Tier 2 member, Brazil will also be entitled to voice an opinion and vote within the NAMSA scope, thereby supporting its national interests relatively to defense items and technical-administrative issues.¹⁸

¹⁷ NATO main logistics agency that made the NCS to be available to non-Atlantic Alliance countries.

¹⁸ Data obtained from the Executive Branch Activities Report relatively to the Ministry of Defense on the Federal Controller General's website. Available at: <www.cgu.gov.br/Publicacoes/BGU/2004/Volume1/C%20-%200006.pdf>. Accessed on: June 14, 2007.

It is to be emphasized that such approach initiatives with NATO do not mean that Brazil is willing to apply to become an effective member, like Argentina did a few years ago. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Celso Amorim, in a paper presented at a round table sponsored by the Ministry of Defense in 2003, South America has its “own strategic identity, which is not to be mistaken for that of North America; this causes hemispherical security concepts of the ‘one size fits all’ type to be inapplicable... we do not participate, and we are not willing to participate in any military alliances of doubtful compatibility with the United Nations.”

To Ambassador Macedo Soares (2004, p. 149-150), South America is a region that enjoys relative stability which, except for rare exceptions, has no record of significant military tension or risk of war. The issues that concern the developed countries are only partially shared, because South American countries are affected by different drivers that are security-linked rather than defense-linked. Therefore, such particular strategic identity makes a South American security and defense agenda to be naturally addressed as a means to reduce the vulnerability of the region, to reinforce its position in relation the other blocks, and to provide better conditions to cope with the challenges posed by the insertion in the international scenario.

CONCLUSION

Following a US initiative, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was created as a political-military tool to bring down the Soviet aspirations in Europe, saw its *de facto* main reason collapse together with the Berlin Wall. The restructuring of the Atlantic Alliance, started in 1991 and completed in 1999, was the natural consequence of the necessary adaptation to the new world scenario that was brought about after the end of the Cold War and continued to develop in the following years.

The focus on the allies’ collective security and defense shifted from the expectation of a calculated, large-size conflict to a wider and multi-direction perception of threat. The new strategic concept allowed the Alliance to expand its original mandate and range of action and to act in a wider range of situations within a vague geographic space in terms of boundaries. Yet, that new profile caused the Alliance to be more susceptible to antagonisms either in relation to non-member countries, due to the emergence of conflicting political-strategic interests, or in relation to allied countries, due to obligations assumed by such countries with other IGOs having lines of action incompatible with NATO.

At the same time, the European Union has made efforts to implement a security and defense instrument of its own that identifies more with the needs of the European strategic scenario, which not always are coincident with North American interests. However, the relatively low military budgets, the

lack of a common defense policy, and the absence of a consistent awareness among its members have prevented the European Union from reaching the desired autonomy in relation to NATO, and the Atlantic Alliance, therefore, remains mostly responsible for the European security. The Americans are interested in the development of an ESDI, provided that under NATO, because the USA wants to share with the EU the financial and military burden of playing the role of police of Europe and the world, but without losing their ability to influence on European security and defense issues. The shock of interests between Europeans and Americans may eventually cause the EU to establish its ESDI more efficiently and to a gradual political-military separation from the USA. However, such scenario is not likely to occur in the short run.

Having an active participation in NATO (and in any outstanding international organizations) has enabled the USA to have a decisive influence on the governing of such organism so as to fulfill their political-strategic interests. This instrumental character of IGOs is due to guidelines and orientations provided in many American high-level policy documents, such as NSSUS.

Created by and for the Americans, NATO's future is guaranteed as long as there is a US interest in feeding the Atlantic Alliance both financially and militarily. Without the hegemonic power, whether the European Union is united and strong, NATO is doomed to an inexpressive role in the international scenario or even, who knows, to disappear.

As for Brazil, the establishment of exchanges and partnerships with the most powerful military Alliance of the present time, as set forth under the PDN, may provide significant advantages to the Brazilian Armed Forces and to the national industry, especially the weapons industry. The accomplishment of military exercises with the allied countries and the participation of Brazil in the NATO Cataloguing System (NCS) are examples of a successful approach to the Atlantic Alliance. However, such approach maneuvers do not mean the country is willing to become an effective NATO member. Brazil sees the South American hemisphere as a priority because the countries in the continent have their own strategic identity which is security-linked rather than defense-linked. Thus, a South American security and defense agenda would lead to reduced regional vulnerabilities, to a more effective standing in relation to other blocks, and to better chances of insertion in the international scenario.

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CONTRIBUTIONS FOR DESIGNING A NEW US MARITIME STRATEGY

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ABSTRACT

This article focuses on a few points the United States is expected to take into account in designing and enforcing their new Maritime Strategy. With various concepts in mind and different ways to look at them, as well as a variety of maritime issues and different types of common interest, one will try to identify the issues on which the Brazilian Navy and the US Navy could tighten cooperative ties. Finally, it brings up a few thoughts on some of the impacts that may arise from such new US Maritime Strategy.

Keywords: Maritime Strategy. Naval Strategy. Interests. Areas of Responsibility. Cooperation.

INTRODUCTION

A strategy can be defined as the route between "where we are" (present) and "where we want to be" (future). This oversimplified concept serves to show that, as we achieve the envisioned goal, the reason for the outlined strategy ceases to be, thus requiring a new strategy to be designed in the light of a new objective. Therefore, every strategy is finite.

Similarly, while a successful strategy is in force, corrections must be implemented in order to prevent any deviations from getting in the way of achieving the established goals.

In charting this "course", several steps must be followed. First, we must understand "where we are" and, therefore, be aware of the prevailing

circumstances. Second, vital “interests” must be established. Finally, a vision of the future must be created, in which case scenario techniques play a major role in designing the relevant strategy.

More often than not, a strategy – though not yet written – has its main lines drawn up beforehand. This is the case as a strategy normally is the result of concepts set forth in top-level, periodically reviewed documents.

This text is intended to discuss three relevant issues underlying the approach to a cooperation proposal, namely: What is the strategy to be discussed? In which strategic interest areas are the agreed actions to be implemented? How can we be of assistance? In addition, we will bring up a few thoughts on the new US maritime strategy design.

A MARITIME STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATES OR A STRATEGY FOR THE US NAVY?

In order to contribute in a way that may assist in designing a new strategy, we need to make sure both parties look at the different concepts much in the same way.

The United States defines “Maritime Domain” as “all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances”¹. This concept is very similar to that contained in the Brazilian definition of *elements of Sea/ Maritime Power*², according to which the means a nation rely on to achieve its goals associated with the sea, rivers, lagoons and navigable lakes are “of a political, economic, military and social nature and include a maritime awareness among the people and the political class, the Merchant Marine and the Navy, the shipbuilding industry, the ports, and the sea trade structure”.

According to the Brazilian concept, the Navy – with its naval, naval-air and Marine Corps units, as well as its equipment and staff infrastructure – comprises the *Naval Power* and is the military component of *Maritime Power*.

However, in US texts the term “*Sea Power*” is employed either meaning *Naval Power* or *Maritime Power*. Some American authors warn of such dichotomy.³ The US Chief of Naval Operations himself has claimed that the Navy needs to take a fresh look at sea power. “We have a pretty good idea of what we can’t do without [sea power], but do we really know all the things that we can accomplish with it?”, Admiral Mike Mullen said⁴.

¹ National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) - September, 2005 - White House - p. 1

² Política Marítima Nacional (PMN) - October 11, 1994 – **Presidency of the Republic - p.VIII**

³ See Stubbs, Bruce B. - “The Maritime Component: Coast Guard Plays Expanded Role In U.S. Sea Power Equation”, August, 2001 at: http://www.navyleague.org/sea_power/aug_01_06.php

⁴ See “CNO Calls for New Definition of Sea Power”, September 6, 2005 at: http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=19924

Though it may seem a merely semantic discussion, this has much to do with how we contribute to a future strategy.

In view of the above, considering that a maritime strategy spans all of the *elements of Naval Power* (or rather included in the *Maritime Domain*), it will turn to detailed studies to be especially prepared by government and non-government agencies and bodies associated with Foreign Trade, the Merchant Marine, International Relations, Shipbuilding and Maritime Equipment Industries, the Navy, and others. Because of its comprehensive scope, a *Maritime Strategy* is a document drafted by a country's highest echelon – the Presidency of the Republic. Imbued with such spirit, the US designed on September 2005 the *National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS)*, which, supplemented by eight supporting plans⁵ - written by various Department-level bodies –, is fully targeted at maritime security.

On the other hand, in determining that a new Maritime Strategy be designed, the *CNO Guidance for 2007* establishes that “such strategy shall reflect the roles and missions that we (US Navy) intend to carry out: in the war against terror, in conventional campaigns, in national defense, and in “conformation”⁶ and “stabilization” operations. It must strike a proper balance between the long-term requirements of traditional naval capacities and those required to face and influence the highly dynamic security environment of the Twenty-First Century”⁷.

The American society has not been left out of the strategy design process. The CNO himself has included it in the debate upon determining that a number of “Talks with the Nation” seminars be held. However, that is not to say the focus is not on the US Navy.

It is worth pointing out that, in the US, the responsibility for the *Naval Power* is shared by the US Navy, the US Marine Corps and the US Coast Guard. In Brazil, the responsibilities for those three institutions are incumbent on the Brazilian Navy, but for a few cases⁸.

Therefore, in seeking to achieve a balanced vision of conceptual understandings, we can infer that the problem at hand entails establishing a *US Navy Strategy* that comes to contribute to the *US Maritime Strategy*. Such understandings seem to be most appropriate, considering the US effort towards

⁵ Namely: 1. *Notional Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness*, 2. *Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan*, 3. *Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan* aims for coordinated United States, 4. *International Outreach and Coordination Strategy*, 5. *Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan*, 6. *Maritime Transportation System Security Plan*, 7. *Maritime Commerce Security Plan* e 8. *Domestic Outreach Plan*.

⁶ “Conformation” (*shaping*) operations are ongoing partnership-building operations conducted with local, regional or international governmental or non-governmental organizations in advance of impending events as a way to prevent or mitigate a conflict or crisis, in order to create a safe global environment in the best interest of the US. (in LOPEZ, LtCol Mott - *MILITARY SUPPORT TO SHAPING OPERATIONS JOC*)

⁷ CNO Guidance for 2007 - 2 February 2007 - p. 5.

⁸ These exceptions refer to Federal Police maritime police activities and IBAMA (Brazilian Institute for Environment and Renewable Natural Resources) marine environment protective inspections.

designing the *NSMS* and bringing future strategy guiding actions into the scope of the CNO.

WHERE WILL COOPERATION TAKE PLACE?

Another relevant aspect is the outlining of the common strategic area where the interests of the involved countries may be disputed.

On the part of the US, the first indication can be found at the beginning of the text of the *National Security Strategy (NSS)*, which states that “seeking and supporting movements and each nation’s and culture’s democratic institutions is an integral part of the US policy, in order to wipe tyranny out of our world. Today, the fundamental character of the world’s regimes is just as import as the distribution of power among them. Our government is determined to help create a world of well-run democratic states committed to the needs of their citizens while showing a responsible attitude within the international system. This is the best way to provide the American people with long-term security”⁹. Notwithstanding the various interpretations of tyranny and democracy¹⁰, it is clear that the US will have to play a role at a worldwide level.

Also at the beginning of its text, the *NSMS* concisely and objectively establishes the coverage area of its Naval Power upon stating that “US economic protection and safety is primarily dependent upon the safe use of the world’s oceans”¹¹.



In order to be militarily active in the global scenario, the US has created the *Unified Combatant Commands - UCC*, where official-generals of the highest rank hold the combined

command of military forces, both within predetermined geographical areas of responsibility and performing specific functional activities throughout the

⁹ National Security Strategy (NSS) - March, 2006 - page 1.


¹⁰ Definitions include: tyranny - a government in which absolute power is vested in a single ruler; democracy - a government in which the supreme power is vested in the people; various understandings may result from such interpretations.

¹¹ NSMS - September 2005 - p. ii.

planet¹². UCC is also comprised of civilian officials from various governmental agencies.

According to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986¹³, those commands report to the President through the Secretary of Defense. Command and control channels between them are conducted through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Figure 1 shows the Map of UCC Areas of Responsibility¹⁴, effective October 2002 through February, 06, 2007, when President George W. Bush authorized the creation of the *US African Command - USAFRICOM*, having assigned Rear Admiral Robert Moeller as officer in charge of the transition team. USAFRICOM should be fully operational by September 2008. Such Command will be responsible for areas previously assigned to three other UCCs, according to Figure 2¹⁵.



On our part, the National Defense Policy (PDN) notes that “the South American subcontinent is the regional environment Brazil is an integral part of. In an attempt to tighten its

cooperative ties, the Country envisions strategic surroundings that extend beyond the subcontinental territory into the Southern Atlantic and Africa’s bordering countries”¹⁶. It further mentions that “defense planning includes all regions and, in particular, the core areas of political and economic power. In addition, it prioritizes the Amazon and the South Atlantic on the strength of its resources and access vulnerability through land and sea borders”¹⁷. It states that “Brazil prioritizes South American and African countries – particularly those in Southern and Portuguese-speaking Africa – with a view to narrowing its relationships with those countries. Increased cooperation with the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries, comprised of eight countries spread over four continents connected by the common components of history,

¹² Namely: U.S. Space Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Strategic Command; and U.S. Transportation Command.

¹³ Excerpted from: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/congress/title_10.htm on April 15, 2007.

¹⁴ Excerpted from: http://www.cdi.org/issues/usforces/commands_Oct02.html on April 15, 2007.

¹⁵ Excerpted from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Africa_Command on April 15, 2007.

¹⁶ National Defense Policy (PDN) - June 2005 - item 3.1.

¹⁷ Ditto - item 4.3.


culture and language, is another relevant element of our foreign relations.”¹⁸. Finally, it provides that “because of their strategic importance and wealth, the Brazilian Amazon and the South Atlantic are priority areas to National Defense”¹⁹.

This geostrategic dimension stemming from previously explained PDN aspects has been brought into the naval scenario by the Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces (CEMA)²⁰, who introduced “the key strategic maritime areas for the deployment of Brazil’s Naval Power, in order of priority (ranked from top to bottom):

- a) Core Area: the area covering the Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone, Exclusive Economic Zone (ZEE), and Continental Shelf (PC).
- b) Primary Area: the South Atlantic area located between parallel 16°N, the West Coast of Africa, Antarctic, Eastern South America and the Eastern Lesser Antilles, except for the Caribbean Sea.
- c) Secondary Area: engulfs the Caribbean Sea and the South Pacific area located between the Beagle Channel – the Coast of South America, the 085° W meridian, and the Panama Canal parallel.
- d) Other areas of the globe”²¹.

In order to support the points approached in a unique presentation, we have drawn Figure 3, where the Southern/African Command Areas of Responsibility and the Core and Primary Strategic Maritime Areas of the Brazilian Navy are highlighted²².

This figure highlights two important aspects. First, it shows that the strategic interests of the Brazilian Navy are not limited to those associated with the US Southern Command, as we have traditionally thought, but extend over the future USAFRICOM area.



¹⁸ Ditto - item 4.9.

¹⁹ Ditto - item 6.12.

²⁰ Opening Class of the Brazilian Naval War College (*Escola de Guerra Naval*) Advanced Study Course – March 05, 2007 - “A MARINHA DO BRASIL - ASPECTOS ESTRATÉGICOS”. Available at: <http://www.egn.mar.mil.br/eventos/ocorridos/2007/aulaInauguralCEMA.zip>

²¹ EGN opening class in 2007 - p. 18.

²² Though not shown in figure 3, one can easily infer the Secondary Strategic Maritime Area lies within the Southern Command Area of Responsibility.

Second, at an operating level, the agreed actions must be coordinated by the Commander-in-Chief of the US Southern or African Command (according to the area of responsibility involved) and Brazil's Chief of Naval Operations (CON) (considering that the Fleet, the Fleet Marine Force and the District Forces report to him).

HOW TO COOPERATE?

The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Mike Mullen, has personally advocated the idea of building Global Maritime Partnerships – “The 1,000-Ship Navy”. That initiative is aimed at encouraging all of world's navies to engage in the fight against terrorism and sea piracy, in addition to promoting economic and political stability as a way to offering maritime nations the benefits of globalization. According to this vision, the US naval force consisting of an estimate 313-ship fleet by 2020 would be supplemented by naval units of US friend and partner countries.

Both the concept of the “1,000-Ship Navy” and the future “*Maritime Strategy*” will be based on the following principles:

a) The objectives of the US Armed Forces, included in the National Military Strategy: protecting the US against a direct attack; ensuring strategic access and retaining the freedom for global action; reinforcing alliances and partnerships; and establishing favorable security conditions.

b) The mission of the US Navy, consisting of organizing, training, maintaining and preparing combat-ready naval forces capable of: winning the global war against terrorism and any other armed conflict; countering any enemy attack; preserving freedom of the seas; and promoting peace and security.

In introducing the actions carried out on behalf of the “1,000-Ship Navy” in 2006, the Chief of Naval Operations mentioned²³ the multinational efforts undertaken in Eastern Africa to curb piracy; the training operations conducted with the Gulf of Guinea's and Latin America's navies; the search and rescue drills conducted with the Chinese Navy in Hawaii's, Southern California's and Zhanjiang's waters; the deployment of hospital ship MERCY on a 5-month humanitarian mission in Southeast Asia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, East Timor, and the Philippines; and the evacuation of thousands of US citizens from Lebanon. He further mentioned the contribution from supplying small board and Automatic Identification Systems – AIS to the Gulf of Guinea's nations, thus providing expanded maritime traffic control in that area.

The Chief of Naval Operations also commented on the idea of creating a Global Fleet Station – GFS, a “1,000-Ship Navy” support center within the

²³ CNO Guidance for 2007 - February 02, 2007 - p. 6.

regional area of interest, according to the “sea basing” concept. A GFS is a maritime operations base primarily focused on the so-called “conformation” operations; on cooperation in the security and operation fields; and on global maritime awareness. According to the Chief of Naval Operations, the GFS provides the means for increased regional maritime security by deploying the combined efforts of military forces, agencies, multinational partners, and non-governmental organizations, without necessarily becoming a forceful presence on shore. According to the Chief of Naval Operations, the GFS provides the means for increased regional maritime security by deploying the combined efforts of military forces, agencies, multinational partners, and non-governmental organizations, without necessarily becoming a forceful presence on land.

On our part, the Brazilian Navy’s vision of the future consists of becoming “a modern, well-balanced and evenly arranged Force provided with naval/air-naval resources and Marines that are consistent with the political and strategic insertion of our Country into the international scenario and, in synch with the desires of the Brazilian society, permanently ready to act – individually or jointly - in “blue”, “brown” and inland waters, in order to comply with its mission”.


In introducing the Brazilian Navy mission, the CEMA²⁴ has made a point of clarifying our understanding of such terms as “modern” (consisting of up-to-date resources twenty years old or less), “well-balanced” (ensuring simultaneous deployment in “blue”, “brown” and inland waters) and “evenly arranged” (capable of gradually carrying out basic Naval Power tasks - controlling maritime areas, denying the use of the sea to an enemy, extending power over land, and contributing to dissuasion). In “blue” waters or areas off the coast, Brazilian Navy units will be deployed on naval war and naval patrol operations and actions; in “brown” waters or coastal and inland areas, those units are deployed on naval patrol operations and naval inspection actions for the purpose of compliance with Maritime Authority responsibilities.

The CEMA has argued that today Brazil is a threat-free country from a military point of view, which does not mean it will continue to be so in the future. Therefore, our Naval Power must be able to dissuade possible threats, push through our laws, and defend our economic goods in Brazilian Jurisdictional Waters (AJB), ensure safety of maritime traffic within the areas of interest to Brazil, extend power over land, participate in peace operations and allied coalitions, and influence South Atlantic bordering Navies.

In addition to these actions, the Brazilian Navy often takes part in activities similar to those introduced by the CNO which fit within the context of the “1,000-Ship Navy”, such as:

²⁴ EGN opening class in 2007 - p. 11.

- civil and social actions (ACISO) carried out by our vessels in the rivers of the Amazon and Paraná-Paraguay basins, not just on behalf of the Brazilian people, but also of our Bolivian, Colombian, Paraguayan and Peruvian neighbors;



- **SAR Area**



preventive naval patrol conducted within the “Blue Amazon” and focused on two specific areas. One, acting independently, involves a commitment with national sovereignty, such as the deliberate passage of vessels and undue exploitation of our Exclusive Economic Zone’s natural resources. The other, in cooperation with other governmental agencies, contributes

to curb illegal actions within AJB, such as smuggling, drug dealing, illegal fishing, and terrorism;

- security actions by doing hydrographic work (designing nautical charts, maintaining lighthouses and buoys) and prioritizing Naval Inspections, in order to ensure ideal conditions of use of vessels by various users;

- **SISTRAM**

safeguard human life at sea through the Search and Rescue Service -



SALVAMAR, supported by the Information System for Maritime Traffic - SISTRAM, in order to provide rescue services to damaged vessels that might be sailing within Brazil’s SAR area; and

- prioritize international relations at various levels with African countries, with an emphasis on the Naval Cooperation Agreement with Namibia, through which the

Brazilian Navy has transferred former corvette “Purus” to that country. In addition, we have supported the education of Officers and Soldiers at our schools

and training centers, the building of a patrol vessel and four patrol boats, and the implementation of that country's continental shelf delimitation program – similar to that conducted in our “Blue Amazon”.

In terms of cooperation, the areas covered by the Brazilian Navy and the US Navy are rather converging, especially as far as the issue of the “1,000-Ship Navy” is concerned.

A FEW THOUGHTS ON A NEW US MARITIME STRATEGY

This document is intended to answer three questions.

First, it is aimed at defining the level at which cooperation proposals should be submitted, according to the Navy scope of action.

Second, it is intended to delimit the areas of common interest to both Navies, while establishing the parties in charge of implementing the cooperation effort. Such procedure has warned us on the importance of bearing in mind the interests of both parties and the relevance of interactions between the COM and the Commanders-in-Chief of the US Southern and African Commands.

Finally, it is targeted at offering a wide array of converging efforts of cooperation between the Brazilian Navy and the US Navy.

However, while these answers may contribute to designing a maritime strategy for the US, they are not enough for actually doing so. And that leads us think back on a few points.

The first one refers to the beginning of this document, stating that a strategy is a way to be followed. Such a way may only be followed by those who have paved it. Any outsiders – whether friends or partners – will be no more than “contributors” that may be taken into account or not and, in the former case, each will be assigned a relative weight by contributor and confirmed by the strategic decision maker. A strategy only adds value to those pushing it forward.

The “inquiry action” is another fact to be considered. The act of inquiring may be understood in two distinct ways. A positive way, seen as a search for cooperation, closer friendship, and mutual trust action; and a negative way, corresponding to a preventive action intended to support a future decision (since the strategy has not yet been designed and approved) that may be disputed by any involved party. In this case, the answer may as well be “but you have been heard and had the opportunity to voice your opinion on this matter”. Such attitude would only serve to reduce the level of trust placed upon the call for cooperation, thus weakening the initial partnership-building effort, which seems to be a higher goal to be achieved by this strategy.

Last but not least, we are hereby showing the success of any strategy involving international partners must be focused on a desire to share

“intelligence”. Technological edge allows for obtaining a greater amount of data in the shortest possible period of time. Yet, unprocessed data are just data. Data analysis conducted in the light of other information available between the parties, turning data into “intelligence”, is what will actually add value. Exchanging the results of such intellectual activity may be a differential within the context of the “1,000-Ship Navy”. One single vessel in the right place, at the right time and under the right conditions to curb threat is worth more than several vessels wandering through the vastness of the oceans.

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CHINA NAVAL FORCES VERSUS CHINA NATIONAL INTERESTS: Perspectives for the 2007 – 2020 Period.

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ABSTRACT

A country with a vigorous economy and an extremely closed political system, China is the main concentration center of North American, European and Asian multinational companies nowadays. Besides this economy in permanent expansion (about 9% in the last five years), another dangerous growth is happening and alarming the International System: that of the Chinese military power. In the deceiving Beijing's silence and dissimulation, it's already possible to identify some strategic movements. The most important one is the progressive increase of the annual Defense Sector budget (the second in the world, in 2007). Although Chinese authorities, guided by the current national interests, deny vehemently any kind of aggressive or expansionist aspiration, the issue is still undefined. Inside this complex economic and political context, limited by the period of 2007 – 2020 and focusing on the naval forces of People's Republic of China (as a segment of People's Liberation Army), this presentation shows the historic, geographic, social, economic, national and international political aspects, comparing these aspects with the Chinese National interests. After the establishment of this correlation, important strategic questions are extracted and necessarily justify the establishment of an adequate naval power. In going deeper in this perception and considering the knowledge on the actual Chinese military structure, two opinions are drawn: modernization and refitting for pacific aims or a modernization and refitting for non-pacific aims.

Keywords: People's Republic of China. National interests. China's Armed Force. People's Liberation Army. Chinese Naval Force. Chinese Air Force. Chinese Army. Communist Party of China. Taiwan. Naval Strategy.

INTRODUCTION

Deserving a significant attention from the media (COSTA, 2007, pp. 42-43), the announcement of People's Republic of China's (PRC) military budget

for 2007, officially totaling 50 billion dollars, that is, 18% above 2006 budget, produced a significant impact and drove the international public opinion to think about two basic questions: how and where will the People's Republic of China invest such funds?

Considering the well known dissimulated posture adopted by the Chinese government and the resulting unavailability of official data, it can easily be inferred that there is no easy way of formulating answers to these questions. Corroborating the proposition that where clarity is missing speculation thrives, the same international public opinion, guided by the current multilateral and unpredictable nature of the International System (IS), started to work with the assumption that PRC is strengthening its military power in order to safeguard its national interests, be them pacific or not.

Based on this scenario, considering the complexity involved and author's personal options, the problem to be analyzed was laid out within the following limits: PRC Naval Forces (navy), a timeline going from 2007 to 2020 and current PRC's national interests. In other words, the problem to be investigated can be introduced by the following question: considering RPC's national interests, within a timeline going from 2007 to 2020, how (based on rational and logical reasoning) should the Beijing administration conduct the mandatory Naval force modernizing and refitting process?

As to the relevance of this present paper, note should be taken that valuable lessons for Brazil and the Brazilian Navy could be taken from the Chinese situation, mostly when it comes to awareness building and dissemination of the strategic significance of setting up, preparing and operating a modern and appropriately equipped war navy, based on actual domestic needs and foreign threats. The collection of inputs for future revisions of navy-related strategic concepts is another important issue to be highlighted.

About the problem object of this paper, there is a large number of "trustworthy" publications and papers about related subjects (some featuring in depth approaches and others just touching the surface of the problem) discussing Chinese history, economy, armed forces and political structures. However, direct approaches, capable of fully answering the proposed question were not identified.

Specifically, in face of this gap, the main objective of this paper is to approach and elucidate the following points of interest:

- § Identification and fundamentals of current RPC national interests;
- § Military implications arising out of the Chinese national interests; and
- § Considering the already mentioned limits, present an outline of the strategies capable of making the indispensable refitting and modernization of PRC's Naval forces feasible.

With the purpose of setting up an appropriate context, initially this paper will approach the historical, geographic, social, economic and political aspects of China. To supplement this first part PRC's national interests will be described and analyzed (including principles or correlations with the above-mentioned aspects and military implications).

Next, the current status of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) will be presented together with a relatively updated overview of its ground (army), air (air force), naval (navy), strategic and nuclear (satellites, missiles and nuclear artifacts) forces.

To conclude this survey, with our main focus directed to the Chinese navy, two assumptions will be presented: refitting and modernization for pacific aims (defense or determent) and refitting and modernization for non-pacific aims (offensive or expansion).

Last, a synthesis of the discussion and a general summary of the arguments presented in the paper are laid out in the conclusion.

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Currently, the word China is associated to the following expressions: "regional and global threat", "dictatorship", "economic power", "military power", etc. In sum, what does the People's Republic of China (PRC) really mean? What type of historical roots does it have? Which types of political, social and economic structures have been established there? These and other critical questions will be answered in the following sections of this paper with the purpose of identifying the foundations and the implications of the Chinese national interests.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

It is estimated that as a result of the natural process of social organization the first of a succession of dynasties that was to rule China until 1912 appeared in 18th century BC. The Chinese empire reached its peak under the **Sui-Tang** dynasty and collapsed under the **Qing** dynasty rule.

The fall of this empire is largely related to its self-sufficiency in face of the significant economic and technological advancements which, by mid-18th century A.D., started to redefine and resize the Western civilization and of European incursions in the Chinese territory, eagerly looking for raw materials and new markets to meet the demands of the Industrial Revolution source of the innovations. Without really understanding the gravity of the process that was underway and the actual power of the invading nations, the Chinese Empire chose to go to war without adequately preparing for it and without a true

assessment of the war power of the spoliators². For failing to keep up with the technological advancements the Chinese Empire was successively defeated suffering numerous defeats³, which compromised the Imperial authority and the national sovereignty.

Demoralized, the Empire started to crumble and its territory was broken down into influence zones, controlled by England, Russia, Germany and France. Completing this occupation, for the first time in history Japan invaded the Chinese territory (during 1894 and 1895), occupying Taiwan.

After the Boxer Uprising, the nationalist movements opposing the Empire and the presence of foreign nations inside the Chinese territory started to gain momentum⁴. It was then that Sun Yatsen appeared as the national leader, to be later on (January 1st, 1912) appointed interim president of the Republic of China, in Nanjing. It was also at that time that the political significance of the Guomindang⁵ Party started to grow.

After the first proclamation of the Republic (1912) and consequent abdication of the last emperor, a consensus was reached about raising General Yuan Shikai to power to rule the nation. Despite an attempt to enforce a democratic regime, the political reform failed and the acting president established a dictatorship.

After the death of General Yuan Shikai, in 1916, the Republic of China fell headlong into chaos and ended-up divided in two states: the state of the port cities affected by the Commercial Treaty (signed by the end of the Boxer Uprising) and the state of landowners of the North supported by the "Warlords". A confrontation between these two factions was inevitable and Sun Yatsen came back to the political arena to fight for national unity.

In parallel to these last events, the Marxist theory, introduced in China early in the 20th century, starts to get more and more followers and the combination of the prevailing political chaos and the success of the Russian Revolution lead this doctrine to flourish in the former Middle Kingdom territory. The leadership of Marxist Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) was then firmly established.

In 1923, as he did not receive any Western help Sun Yatsen joined the Communist Party of China and, later on, accepted the collaboration of the Soviet revolutionaries. Thus, the military and political structure that was to wipe away the "Powerful Warlords" and reunite the country (1927) had been established.

² Failing to follow two important principles of the "Art of War" (SUN TZU, 2005, p.46).

³ Discredit among the people; outbreak of internal uprisings as a result of the progressive economic impoverishment (in progress since the turning of 18th century) and resulting effects (shortage of supplies, hunger, unemployment, etc.); and payment of heavy war compensation; loss of territories and the opening of several ports to the European nations (Hong-Kong is the most famous example).

⁴ Foreign imperialism.

⁵ Or Kuomintang (which means People's Party).

Surprisingly, soon after the above-mentioned reunification, the nationalists of the Guomindang⁶ Party broke away from the Communists and a new civil war erupted. With less military power available, the communists took refuge in the North region of the country and launched a tenacious rural guerrilla war. The “Big March” took place in this phase of the Chinese history.

In the period comprised between 1931 and 1945 and encompassing the Second World War, the Japanese launched their second invasion of the Chinese territory. As unbelievable as it may sound, from 1937 to 1945, this invasion stopped the raging civil war once nationalists and communists had to join forces to fight their common enemy⁷. After the Japanese defeat in 1945, the civil war started anew and lasted until 1949.

After the victory of the Communists headed by Mao Zedong and supported by the former Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was immediately proclaimed. The nationalists led by Jiang Jiesh and supported by the US had no option but to seek refuge in Taiwan⁸.

After the 2nd proclamation of the republic (October 1st, 1949), important historical events that reached the headlines of the international⁹ media made the pages of the already rich history of the Chinese nation. In a continuous “process of trial and error”, the economy, society, the industry and all other structural Chinese segments were and continue to be subject to intervention from the Communist Party of China (CPC).

Despite the setbacks and tragedies¹⁰, at last, by the turning of the eighties China’s transformation began: backwardness and anarchy are pushed away to make room for public order and economic and technological development. Over a territory of significant geographical complexity, an economic and military power was then established to face immense challenges and social problems.

RELEVANT GEOGRAPHIC FEATURES

Extending over 9,572,900 km², in terms of territory size, PRC ranks third¹² among the largest countries in the world. China is located in the East

⁶ Led by Jiang Jiesh (or Chiang Kaishek).

⁷ Japan.

⁸ Republic of China until 1971.

⁹ RPC’s participation in the Korean War (from 1950 to 1953); invasion and occupation of Tibet (1958); mastery of nuclear artifact production (1964); RPC is recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the Chinese nation before the UN (1971); fall, overthrowing and imprisonment of the Chinese Communist Party radical wing (1976); rise and ascension to power of the Chinese Communist Party progressive wing (1976); deployment, from 1978 until 1997, of the “Four Modernizations” (Agriculture, Science and Technology, Defense and Industry) governmental policy. It was also in this period that a moderate political reform took place; the deaths of Mao Zedong and his prospect successor Chu Em-lai; the “Tiananmen Square Massacre” (1989); progress and consolidation of the above-mentioned economic, military and technological reforms with the PRC changed into an economic, military and technological power; and PRC’s admission to the WTO (2001).

¹⁰ Failure of the “The Big Leap Ahead” government policy and the “Cultural Revolution”.

¹² Or, the fourth, once there are some controversies on the subject.

part of Asia and has borders with fourteen nations, among which are Russia, North Korea, India and Pakistan¹³. It is important to note also how close China is to Japan, South Korea and Australia.

As to maritime borders, on the East, China borders the Yellow Sea, on Southeast the China Sea and the Taiwan Strait and on the South the South China Sea. On this aspect it is important to note that China is very close to the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea and to the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

The Chinese ground, "... as a whole [...] forms a colossal staircase, which [...] in successive plateaus [...] comes down from the highest peaks in Tibet to the Pacific Ocean. There are more than 3,000 islands. Close to the coast" ... (<http://pt.www.wikipedia.org>). If on the East and North of the country the altimetry profile is extremely uneven, on the other hand on the East and Southeast there are rolling plateaus and lower altitudes.

But China's grandeur is not limited to the size of its territory. With a demographic density ranging around 140 inhabitants per square kilometer, the equivalent to a population of 1.3 billion people, this country presents complex and contradictory human geography features.

SOCIAL FABRIC

The social issues continue to give the authorities in Beijing much reason for concern, once it is proved that 55% of the Chinese population still lives below the poverty line (refer to annex D). Discussing this serious situation, Trevisan (2006, pp. 53-59) remarks that China is divided in two halves: a China of the wealthy (living in the Special Economic Zones¹⁴) and a China of the poor (outside the Special Economic Zones¹⁵). While in the first one there are jobs and improved living conditions, in the latter the situation is precisely the contrary, there is a shortage of almost everything and there is a lot to do and to provide for. Also on this issue Trevisan (2006, p. 52), makes this incisive comment:

The new China the West is seeing has a known address: it is represented by the emerging middle class living in the large cities on the East coast of the country [...]. This region has driven the economic growth in the last 27 years and drifted away from the rest of the country and, especially, from the poor provinces on the West. The Communist Party, which

¹³ Nations that own mass destruction weapons (nuclear artifacts).

¹⁴ Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Nanking and Guangzhou.

¹⁵ Peripheral areas of the Special Economic Zones and rural areas.

by definition should reduce inequalities, faces the dilemma of governing a country where inequality is spreading faster than anywhere else in the world. The discrepancies between the East and West regions, between rural and urban areas and between the wealthy and the poor continue to grow.

Notwithstanding the discontent of the “excluded” Chinese citizens and the snail pace of regime slackening, the current internal political situation in China appears to be stable. In search of and in order to maintain this stability, and supported by an autocratic and carefully articulated structure, there is a powerful state institution in action: the CPC.

POLITICAL STRUCTURE

Since 1978, with or without a specific intent, the PRC has become the “laboratory” where the combination of the theoretical currents of thought of Liberalism and Marxism is being tested, that is, a hybrid ideology the Beijing Government calls a “[...] market economy with socialist characteristics [...]” (GRYZINSKI, 2006, p. 106, emphasis added). If success is achieved, repeating the global historical processes seen in the past, this model will be adopted by a large number of nations. If it fails, it will have been evidenced that the Marxist principles and structures are not compatible with the Liberal principles and phenomena¹⁶.

In practice, what we see is the enforcement of a party dictatorship, which is carefully planned, established, coordinated, handled and monitored by the CPC. Within this framework, government, power and the only existing political option constitute an extremely cohesive symbiosis.

Despite the impressive economic advancements and marked social ascent¹⁷ recorded in the last 28 years, it is still impossible to challenge the central government without running the risk of facing legal consequences. Economic prosperity is allowed in China but the Chinese still cannot openly and freely conjugate the verbs linked to the democracy existing in higher social and economic development nations, such as, challenge, demand, denounce, refuse, liberate, protest, apply pressure, face, elect, etc.

About the CPC and PRC’s political structure, Trevisan (2006, pp. 79-86), makes these highly precise statements:

¹⁶ Globalization, capitalism, cooperation, freedom, democracy, individuality, etc.

¹⁷ In the Special Economic Zones and in the macro point of view once the number of those who live in a misery conditions has been significantly decreased (TREVISAN, 2006, p. 55).

Holding the reins of power since 1949 and with 68 million members, the Party is viewed as the largest political movement in the world and is virtually present in all the institutions of the Chinese society: government, plants, universities, district organizations, class entities, state companies, high-schools and even McDonald's. There is no plurality of parties, there is no taking turns in power. Despite the formal existence of more than eight parties, they are all subject to CPC's guidance and do not come even close to threatening its supremacy. The communists control the administration at all levels, and there is no clear border between the Party and the government. [...] Faithful to the Marxist-Leninist democratic centralism, CPC's system of power features a pyramid-type structure: In the base is the Communist Party National Congress, which convenes every five years and sets out the main lines of action for the next five years. This Congress elects the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, a group of approximately 350 people who meet once a year. The members of the five governing bodies, among which are the Politburo, the General Secretariat of the Communist Party of China and the Central Military Commission [...]. Party's to ranks also have a chance of feeling the pulse of the rest of the country at the annual meetings of the National People's Congress, which differs from the Communist Party National Congress once it includes representatives of other segments of society, such as religious leaders and members of ethnic minorities, besides the eight parties sanctioned by the government. Comprising 3 thousand people, the National People's Congress has limited decision making power and normally ratifies the decisions already made by the Politburo Standing Committee. But, during the meeting, that normally lasts for ten days, the officials meet with representatives from the most diverse regions of the country and are able to perceive any possible focus of discontent towards the central government.

Despite the repulse and the skepticism of the democratic countries, added to other structural elements, the strict social control imposed by the CPC, has been achieving surprising national, and international economic gains. The sum of factors like state control and fomenting actions, discipline of Chinese workers, cheap labor and abundant internal demand catalyzed by external elements, such as massive investments and demands generated in other countries, has radically changed PRC's economy. If 25 years ago, this was a chaotic and limited economy, today and has been for some time now, the "driving motor" encouraging, moving and impacting, with no exception, all the global markets (FISCHMAN, 2006, pp. 9-21; 277-324).

THE ECONOMY

Describing the complex and important economic structure of the People's Republic of China in just a few lines is no easy task. The current "Mecca" of international market and the most impacting example of what the "globalization" phenomenon means, the Chinese economy is positively and negatively impacting all the other markets in the planet. Ignoring it may result in huge financial losses and, in some cases, in bankruptcy. But, more than ever, countries must pay attention to the contemporary meaning and the depth of the expression "negócio da China" (a Portuguese expression that means 'a unique bargain').

With the country recording the highest economic growth since 1980 (JARDIM, 2006, p. 148), the Chinese GDP already is the fourth largest GDP in the world, and experts are saying that soon it will be reaching the second position in the ranking. As to the possibility of topping the GDP of the only superpower in the planet, the US, optimistic forecasts say that this could happen between 2030 and 2040 if China keeps its current growth pace (TREVISAN, 2006, pp. 25-26).

If prior to 1978, PRC was basically an agricultural nation, nowadays it is markedly industrialized. The production of state-of-the-art goods, such as computers, TV sets, cell phones, digital watches, nuclear submarines, nuclear artifacts, satellites and space rockets place the former Middle Kingdom in the "first world" of mechanical, electronics, nuclear, space and digital technology.

As to the state growth promoting actions referred to above, they come into being mostly through the policy that resulted in the establishment of Special Economic Zones¹⁸, inside which, attracted by tax incentives and the low cost of production, powerful multinational companies have been doing business and prospering under contract commitments of transferring technology to PRC.

¹⁸ Established to make the economic reforms initiated by former president Deng Xiao Ping feasible (FISHMAN, 2006, p. 97).

About the current picture the Chinese economy, Fishman (2006, p. 23) has the following comments:

China has become critical to other countries both as a client and a supplier. Japan and Germany are nowadays recording large commercial surpluses with China once this country is the largest global buyer of industrial machinery and needs equipment manufactured both in Germany and Japan to be able to start producing the machines and electronic products which they are now manufacturing. Countries with abundant natural resources do good businesses selling them to China, for processing in Chinese plants, and the energy resources needed to run them. According to Morgan Stanley's chief economist, in 2003 the Chinese purchased 7% of the global oil, one fourth of all the aluminum and steel, almost one third of the iron ore and coal and 40% of all the cement in the globe. The trend is now of steady increase of such quantities. (free translation)

When describing the interdependence relationship existing between the US and PRC, which ultimately affects the whole international economic-financial system, L.J. (2006, p. 155), had the following comments:

In 1995, just 5% of the products sold in the US by the giant Wal-Mart came from its own plants. Nowadays, one out of two of the products sold by Wal-Mart comes from China. The meaning of this is goes beyond the intense bilateral trade between these two countries and the existence of a financial umbilical cord – almost all the money the Americans spend buying Chinese products goes back to the US when the Chinese government returns the kindness by purchasing American Treasury bonds. (free translation)

As to the stability of this same economic system, there is a strong mistrust hovering over the international market. We can say that the most acute problem is the fragile financial system, which, according to external sources records a default of about 30% of domestic financing (TREVISAN, 2006, pp. 211-212).

With its gigantic population PRC has become a true “black hole” (RICUPERO, 2004) on Earth, once it has been consuming growing quantities of natural resources and of manufactured products produced by other nations (refer to Annex A). As it is impossible to increase production of such resources to meet the increasing demand, important economic arrangements were, are and will be naturally revised, that is, in markets where previously just the economic powers prospered, now PRC is now prospering as leading player or major competitor. Obviously, this economic reorganization has been promoting significant geopolitical changes, and will continue to do so for an undetermined period of time, once as China gets richer and develops, the Chinese influence and power in the International System (IS) gradually increases.

PRC’S INFLUENCE INSIDE THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

A permanent member of the UN Security Council, PRC has been gradually climbing up to a leading position in the IS. The following conclusion is not unquestionable but, everything leads us to infer that this could result from the sum of three factors: current PRC economic power, current political scenario characterized by multilateralism and the spread of the global phenomenon called “Anti-Americanization”.

As discussed in topic 1.5, the world is turning towards the attractive Chinese market. As a result, this redirection of the economic flows is contributing to changes in the international political scenario. The outcome of this reorganization is that the international relations involving the PRC are steadily getting deeper and deeper.

About current Chinese diplomacy in the IS, Sandschneider (2005, p.13), makes the following remarkably precise comments:

Nowhere the basic pragmatic approach of the Chinese policy can be best outlined than in its foreign policy. The Chinese politicians are carefully calculating how to handle their international partners. And, they resort to the full range of possibilities available: restrained and exercising a dosed pressure in the case of the US, bold and provocative towards Japan, cooperative and inviting towards Europe and partners, although sometimes domineering in their relations with their neighbors in the Southeast of Asia. (*free translation*)

Disquieting the planet, this unquestionable advancement of the Chinese political clout has been causing or catalyzing political and economic friction involving the global players PRC, Japan, Taiwan and the US (LOONG, 2005, pp. 103-108).

INTERNATIONAL TENSION INVOLVING PRC

Nowadays the following disputes are attracting the attention of the media and of international political scenario analysts:

- § Reintegration to PRC territory or definitive independence of Taiwan, which Beijing calls "the rebel province of Taiwan"¹⁹;
- § Increased political tension between Japan and RPC²⁰; and
- § Economic disputes inside the World Trade Organization, involving the US and PRC²¹.

To complete the discussion presented above, note should be taken also that nowadays there are no news of relevant stresses involving PRC and the nuclear Asian nations, that is, Russia, India, Pakistan and North Korea. As already mentioned, the Chinese diplomacy is highly skilled and calculating.

Once PRC's historical, geographic, social and political aspects have been approached, it is time now to look into and analyze the Chinese national interests. But, after all, what interests are we talking about?

PRC'S NATIONAL INTERESTS

According to Dan (2006, p. 216), PRC's National Interests can be broken down into two groups: the basic interests, which are "[...] fundamental and critical to the State [...]" and the essential ones "[...] arising out from the need to meet, support, ensure and further the basic national interests[...]" The same author offers the following description of such interests:

By order of priority, these are the basic Chinese national interests:

- 1) Ensure territorial integrity, independent sovereignty, nation's unity and State unification;
- 2) Ensure political and social stability, avoid and prevent any political and social disturbances;
- 3) Achieve continuous, stable and rational [Sic] economic growth and reduce all economic risks.

¹⁹ Available at <http://www.cartacapital.com.br>

²⁰ Available at <http://www.nikkei.com.br>

²¹ Available at <http://g1.globo.com>.

Likewise, by order or priority, these are the essential Chinese national interests:

- 1) increase Chinese commercial and non-commercial exports share of the international market, increase imports of resources and products facing reduced domestic supply, absorb foreign capital and introduce advanced technologies worldwide;
- 2) Keep and safeguard relatively stable peripheral circumstances and promote Asian economic prosperity and peace [Sic] in the Pacific region;
- 3) Take an active part [Sic] in international matters and ensure international order in its various dimensions

A careful analysis of such national interests allows us to establish the following correlations with the content of the previous topics:

- § basic interest "1": correlation with historical (1.1), geographic (1.2), social (1.3), political (1.4), economic (1.5) and international political (1.6 e 1.7) aspects.
- § basic interest "2": correlation with social (1.3) and political (1.4) aspects.
- § basic interest "3": correlation with social (1.3), political (1.4), economic (1.5) and international political (1.6 e 1.7) aspects.
- § essential interest "1": correlation with economic (1.5) and international political (1.6 e 1.7) aspects.
- § essential interest "2": correlation with economic (1.5) and international political (1.6 e 1.7) aspects.
- § essential interest "3": correlation with international political (1.6 e 1.7) aspect.

Supplementing this analysis note should also be taken of the fact that five out of the six national interests presented above²² are directly related to the possibility of the use of force by the Chinese State, in other words, depending on the existence of an adequate political and military structure. The achievement of the remaining national interest, although in a smaller degree, is also related to the same state security forces, once, normally, warfare demands and technologies contribute to the economic growth of any country.

Once the strategic significance of the Chinese military structure has been identified, it must be said that this leads to the existence of a modern, adequately equipped and prepared Navy. This need results basically from two facts that characterize the PRC: it is the second largest oil importer in the

²² Basic national interests 1 and 2. Essential national interests 1, 2 and 3.

planet²³ (in 2006, something around 145 million ton) and answers for a significant portion of the sea cargo traffic. Within the current global economic context, permanent unobstructed passage along the waterways Strait of Ormuz-PRC, Red Sea-PRC, South Atlantic-PRC and East of Africa-PRC is mandatory and critical. The control of Chinese territorial waters is another strategic issue exclusively dependent on the naval power, once, as with Brazil, it is linked to the territorial sea, the contiguous zone and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). By analogy to the concept of the Brazilian “Blue Amazon”, China has plenty of strategic reasons for establishing, for example, a “Blue Tibet”.

In the next section of this paper, further details will be provided on the Chinese PLA. As previously stated, this is a state apparatus of significant strategic importance.

THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY

A structure similar to the Brazilian Ministry of Defense, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is comprised of four²⁴ secondary armed forces: ground, air, naval and strategic and nuclear forces. In the whole it is estimated that the total of the Chinese armed forces adds up to 2,300,000²⁵ troops in active duty, thus standing as the largest military force in the planet. It is interesting to note that total auxiliary and police forces range around 1,200,000 men²⁶.

GROUND FORCES (ARMY).

The ground forces are PLA's largest and most important component and its origin dates back to CPC foundation and it is absolutely clear, as seen during the second phase of the Chinese Civil War, the Cultural Revolution and the Tiananmen Square Massacre, that this segment is the armed arm and main sustaining pillar of the political system existing in the PRC, in other words, it can be compared to a “Praetorian Guard”²⁷. Based on this finding and taking the lack of specific data into account, it can be inferred that PLA's modernization actions started by and have been more intense in this segment.

An analysis of the data and opinions presented in Annex B evidences that China's PLA profile is still defensive or dissuasive towards external threats from large war powers. However, PLA's superiority and its offensive or expansionist character relatively to some neighboring countries (for example: Myanmar, Vietnam and Laos) must also be taken into account.

²³ FOLHAONLINE (2007)

²⁴ (LOBO, [1999?], p.17)

²⁵ (LOBO, ([1999?], p.17)

²⁶ (LOBO, ([1999?], p.17)

²⁷ (RECCO, 2003). Available at <http://www.folha.uol.com.br>

AIR FORCE

Taking into account the strategic significance of the Air Force for the purposes of defending and preserving the national airspace, as well as for its possible employment against “internal enemies”, the modernization of PRC’s Air Force has been matching PLA’s Ground Forces refitting efforts. On this expansion of the air power, the following comment was made by Lobo ([1999?], p.10):

In recent years, especially in the nineties, significant advancements were achieved from the development of more sophisticated aircraft, especially the Chinese design of supersonic fighters, such as the interception aircraft J-8 I/II. In recent years Russia supplied SU-27 fighters (J-11, produced locally) and SU-30 aircraft to China, provided with sophisticated technology and designed for air space control and interception. Russia, the former enemy, has become an opportune supplier of state-of-the-art military technology.

Still on the issue of PRC’s air force modernization, it is also important to consider the future provision to this segment of the PLA of advanced J-10 fighter-bombers, of fully domestic design, technology and production.²⁸

The assessment of the data presented in this paper, corroborated by the information provided in Annex B and in view of the limitations described, respectively, by Lobo ([1999?], p.10) and Rühl (2005, pp. 95-96), leads us to conclude that PRC’s air force “has reduced offensive capacity against its bordering neighbors “ and reduced “ defensive capacity against attacks from the sea (naval and amphibious landing operations)”, evidencing that PRC’s air force profile is also of a defensive or dissuasive nature.

NAVAL FORCES (NAVY).

In face of the already mentioned strategic significance to countries with a maritime frontier to form and render operational a modern and properly equipped (operational) naval force, it would not be wise to assume that the PRC’s Navy has been excluded from the process of modernization that is taking place on the other segments of the People’s Liberation Army.

In his work Lobo ([1999?]; p.p. 12-13), states that, “[...] initially relegated to a secondary position in relation to the other components of PRC’s PLA, the

²⁸ Available at <http://www.chinatoday.com>.

Naval Forces went through a vigorous development in the eighties [...]". Continuing, the same author furnishes details of this evolution, reporting that "[...] From an inventory basically restricted to attack boats and obsolete Soviet submarines, the country started to invest in the procurement and production of modern naval resources such as nuclear submarines, conventional submarines, frigates and destroyers.[...]"

According to the Federation of American Scientist²⁹, currently, PRC's Navy counts on 250,000 men, who are assigned to three commands (North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet and South Sea Fleet). The same source³⁰, remarks that until 2010, PRC will have the naval resources listed in Annex B.

The assessment of the data and information provided in this topic evidence that, just like the ground and air forces, PRC's Navy profile has a defensive or dissuasive profile.

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES.

An important segment of the PLA, the strategic forces are in charge of managing and operating the arsenal of conventional and nuclear missiles existing in the PRC, which because of their great destruction power, constitute the main dissuasive tool PRC has available. Annex B provides relatively updated information on PRC's strategic and nuclear forces.

According to Lobo ([1999?], p. 14-15), "[...] Chinese nuclear capacity is still defensive, with a dissuasive profile, similar to the French model, presenting a *nuclear-nationalist strategy* [Sic] which is essentially defensive [...]".

THE FUTURE OF THE NAVAL FORCES IN THE 2007-2020 PERIOD.

As presented in the last part of section 1, as a result of the current international economic context, the strategic significance of PRC's naval forces has grown to the point of making it critical to the achievement of the national interests of the former Middle Kingdom. If the Beijing government still does not understand that the prosperity and the perpetuity of the Chinese nation depend on the sea, it should do so quickly, because the lesson contained in the sentence "[...] fleets cannot be improvised [...]"³¹ (emphasis added), by Rui Barbosa, cannot be denied and prompts any nation in the planet to reflect on the issue.

Reinforcing this last reasoning, Till (2005, p.16) warns that:

²⁹ Available at <http://www.fas.org>.

³⁰ Available at <http://www.fas.org>.

³¹ Broadly disseminated within the Brazilian Navy (MB).

Another reason for the significance assigned to the control of the seas is the fact that it can be used both to attack and protect trade; for projection over other countries, in the defense against power projection from other countries and for all and every type of contribution to global and regional maritime security.
(*free translation*)

For some time now a question which still remains unanswered by the Chinese authorities has been arousing the imagination of military analysts: how will PRC modernize and refit its naval forces in the near future? Two possibilities will be discussed in the next and last session.

THE FUTURE OF THE NAVAL FORCES

Once the strategic significance of PRC's naval forces has been established, it is now time to consider its future (by the end of 2010 decade), taking as guiding principle the fact that there are to possible paths to be followed: a "defensive or dissuasive" path and an "aggressive or expansionist" one. When discussing this dilemma, Glaser (2005, p.43, text in bold characters by the author), appropriately use the expression [...] "strategic crossroads" [...]...And, China has now reached such a "crossroad".

DEFENSIVE OR DISSUASIVE STRATEGY

Considering current PRC national interests, we can imagine that the PLA is now being modernized to be able, when the time comes, to dissuade enemy nations from attacking the Chinese territory, under penalty of being forced to face significant resistance and disburse a huge amount of financial resources. As Beijing does not disclose its plans and military projects to the public nor does the Pentagon (discloses the Chinese plans), very little is known about "how", "where" and "with what degree of intensity" the modernization and the increase of the military capacity of the four segments of the "armed wing" of the CPC is taking place. In reality we have only the official recognition by the Chinese authorities that military spending has been increased by 18% against 2006 budget, in other words, something around 56 billion dollars.^{32 33}

³² (COSTA, 2007, pp. 42-43).

³³ In RÜLL (2005, pp.93-94), it is said that [...] American assessments led to the estimated that China would have to spend in armament an amount equivalent to three times the amount referred to in the current public budget and reported by Chinese Minister of Defense in October 2005.[...].

Comparatively, in decreasing order, US, PRC and Russia have the largest estimated expenditure in 2007 (refer to Annex C).

Within this context, based on the strategic significance of the Chinese Navy to the achievement of PRC's national interests, it is assumed that among other tasks assigned there is the protection of coastal cities and structures of strategic relevance, assuring sovereignty over its territorial sea and guaranteeing the freedom of movements on its maritime routes of interest.³⁴

Thus, following the universal consensus that maritime nations cannot do without an adequate naval power, it can be inferred that significant investments are and will continue to be made in PLA's naval forces in the next few years, with the purpose of modernizing and refitting it. Current operation of nuclear and conventional attack submarines is an interesting strategic option to be expanded³⁵. The same can be said about the number of ships and aircrafts designed for anti-submarine and surface warfare, which, in practice, by similarity with the Japanese needs Rüll (2005, p. 100), indicates the requirement of "[...] helicopter carriers, missile destroyer and cruisers [...]".

Still on the issue of this defense or dissuasive strategy, the following generic suggestions proposed by Galante ([1998], p.5), about a possible attack on the US should be considered:

[...] less technologically and economically capable countries wishing to oppose the threat posed by the American Naval Air Power should invest in mine warfare, maintain a modern land-based long range attack aviation capable of anti-ship missile saturation attacks, deploy supersonic anti-ship missile batteries on the coast and invest, above all, in submarines equipped with anti-ship and cruise missiles. A successful attack to an aircraft carrier may fail to sink it but could prevent it temporarily from taking further part in its intended mission (*mission kill*) and force diplomatic negotiations, if the issue at hand is not of vital interest to the US.

OFFENSIVE OR EXPANSIONIST STRATEGY

Considering the possibility of PRC revising its national interests and start taking an aggressive stand in the International System, it can be imagined

³⁴Especially on those related to imports of oil, food and raw materials for the base industries. Otherwise it would be vulnerable to eventual maritime blockades that may be imposed to PRC, during international crises. In the case of the PRC and its 1.5 billion inhabitants, it is obvious that subjection to future foreign maritime blockades, will bring about severe domestic and international economic, political and social consequences.

³⁵ (CARVALHO, 2006, p. 3).

that its naval power would have to be increased to enable it to face and defeat an enemy of the size of a US-NATO combination or the Russian Federation separately. This conclusion is based on the assumption that the international community will probably respond to any expansionist attitude from PRC, against nations of weaker or similar military capacity. Corroborating this assumption is the fact that Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, historical enemies and potential targets, are traditional military allies and economic partners of the US. A similar partnership³⁶ exists between the United Kingdom, India and Pakistan. (FIG. 1)

As to the issue of Taiwan, it must be said that to be able to recover its “rebel province” by force the Chinese navy needs, both now and in the future, a massive investment of resources to modernize and refit it (nothing is impossible when it comes to China). Equipped with state-of-the-art technology and, probably, exceptionally well trained as a result of its permanent preparedness, the Taiwanese navy is quite a difficult obstacle to overcome. In current times, it can be inferred that China still lacks the necessary conditions to prevail without significant human and material losses over the second of its largest historical enemies³⁷. Supposing an ensuing international intervention after a PRC-Taiwan armed conflict, the following teachings about the “Art of War” would certainly apply to this hypothetical situation”:

War is a vital issue to the State. Once this is the field where life and death are decided, the path that leads to survival or to ruin, studying it in all of its details is of the utmost importance [...] Generally, for a warfare operation one thousand fast cars with four horses, one thousand wagons covered in leather and one thousand men protected by coat of mail are needed [...] rather than prolonged operations the essential issue in war is victory [...] (SUNTZU, 2005, pp .23, 33 e 38). (*free translation*)

With the purpose of providing grounds to the assertions made in the previous paragraph, the table below lists the means Taiwan had in 2000 and will have available by 2010:

³⁶ British Commonwealth.

³⁷ Japan is the largest.

TABLE 1
Inventory of Taiwan Navy war ships

TYPE	2000	2010
Destroyers	7	4
Frigates	21	36
Missile launching fast attack boats	62	41
Submarines	4	12
Amphibian ships	15	14

Source: Federation of American Scientist (<http://www.fas.org>)

Rühl (2005, p.95) says that from the moment PRC starts to operate modern aircraft carriers³⁸ equipped with aircraft equivalent to those used by the US Navy, a change in its strategic stand will be characterized, that is, it will have gone from dissuasive or defensive to offensive or expansionist. Underlining this concept, Galante ([1998?], p. 2) affirmed that “[...] if an armed conflict is actually inevitable, few countries in the world would be able to face the power of an American aircraft carrier – whose aircraft have a firing power exceeding the joint power of many air forces in the planet [...]”.

However, the time-money binomial cannot be ignored... The construction of last generation aircraft carriers is extremely expensive and making them operational takes a long time. In the best case scenario, taking into account the establishment of feasible timetables and a continuous inflow of financial resources at ideal levels, it can be imagined that it is in the 2015-2020³⁹ period that the current Chinese navy will become a naval power capable of operating and imposing itself in “blue waters”⁴⁰.



³⁸ According to Galante ([1998?], p. 2), in 1998, the US had 12 units in operation

³⁹ (RÜHL, 2005, p. 96).

⁴⁰ Currently, a privilege of the US Navy.

FIG 1. This satellite photograph shows how close China is to the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the location of the European Union (EU) players (UE), Russia, Iran, Iraq, India, South Korea, North Korea, Taiwan and Japan. The closeness to the Northeast region of Africa and the Middle East (regions with significant oil reserves) is also highlighted.

Source: <http://pt.wikipedia.org.br>

To close the discussion of this challenging subject we are posing a question and immediately after stating an historical truth: considering the period estimated in sub-item 1.5 (between 23 to 33 years), exclusively based on “soft power”, will China be able to become the richest and most influent nation in the planet? With innumerable examples in the last 500 years, world history tell us that the current economic supremacy (US) and all prior ones were ensured and, in some cases, conquered by force...

CONCLUSION

In five out of the six current PRC's national interests (based on the Chinese historical, geographic, social, economic and political aspects), one can read between their lines a need for a robust military structure. Despite accounting for, in practical terms, significant material and financial demands resulting from the established military structure, the achievement of the remaining interest (related to economics) does not necessarily imply the establishment of powerful armies.

Embodying this critical military power and acting as the military arm of the Chinese Communist Party, the People's Liberation Army comprises four secondary segments: ground, air, naval and strategic nuclear forces. In face of the current economic and political scenario the strategic significance of PRC's naval forces is enhanced.

Current “locomotive” of global economy, China has been gradually assuming a leading position in the International System. In parallel to such increments, another disquieting development has been calling the attention of the world: the growth of the defense sector. By-passing the traditional dissimulation and the repeated denials of the Beijing government, the opinions of experts are converging towards the fact that PRC is gradually and constantly arming itself. There are the arguments out there about the legitimate need to establish a naval power of a defensive or dissuasive nature and the growing military budget (currently the second among the best kept secrets in the planet) corroborating this consensus. The establishment of a naval power of an offensive or expansive nature is also an option to be considered once, behind pro-peace speeches there are greedy men and the unforeseeable nature of the International System.

In face of this dilemma and looking at the period that goes from 2007 to 2020, the acceptance of, or consideration being given to, two strategic options (courses of action) can be assumed. In the first case, considering the current national interest and the control over Chinese jurisdictional waters, we can perceive the need to invest in naval resources appropriate to Submarine or Surface Warfare. In the second case, aiming at breaking possible foreign blockades and possible expansionist actions, the procurement or construction of attack aircraft and modern air carriers that would enable the Chinese navy to operate in “blue waters” (currently a US privilege) becomes mandatory..

It is also important to note that the lessons learned from this study and the follow-up of the above-mentioned “strategic crossroads” may provide inputs to future changes of doctrine inside the MB and revisions of government policies related to the Brazilian naval power.

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ANEXO A

COLETÂNEA DE DADOS ECONÔMICOS SOBRE A RPC

DATA	CONTENT	SOURCE
1	[...] In 2005, PRC's GDP reached 1.9 trillion dollars (4th largest) [...]	VEJA (2006, p. 107)
2	[...] <i>per capita GDP</i> = \$ 1,500 (2004). [...]	Trevisan (2006, p.25)
3	[...] Optimistic projections say that in 2050 PRC's GDP will have reached 44 trillion (way ahead of the US). [...]	VEJA (2006, p. 107)
4	[...] In 2005, PRC became the largest automotive market in the world, with sales totaling 5.76 million units, more than Germany, less than the US and really close to Japan. [...]	Trevisan (2006, p.24)
5	[...] PRC is currently the main destination of Brazilian soy bean and iron ore exports and represents almost 6% of Brazilian sales abroad. [...]	Trevisan (2006, pp. 24-25)
6	[...] In 2005, PRC manufactured (or assembled) 400 billion dollars worth of high technology products. [...]	VEJA (2006, p. 148)
7	[...] Relatively to the world, PRC produces 95% of all MP3-players. [...]	VEJA (2006, attachment)
8	[...] Relatively to the world, PRC produces 75% of all CDs and DVDs. [...]	VEJA (2006, attachment)
9	[...] Relatively to the world, PRC produces 70% of all watches. [...]	VEJA (2006, attachment)
10	[...] Relatively to the world, PRC produces 65% of all video monitors. [...]	VEJA (2006, attachment)
11	[...] Relatively to the world, PRC consumes 54% of the cement. [...]	VEJA (2006, attachment)
12	[...] Relatively to the world, PRC consumes 51% of pork. [...]	VEJA (2006, attachment)
13	[...] Relatively to the world, PRC consumes 40% of all motorcycles. [...]	VEJA (2006, attachment)
14	[...] Relatively to the world, PRC consumes 36% of the steel [...]	VEJA (2006, attachment)
15	[...] Relatively to the world, PRC consumes 31% of the coal. [...]	VEJA (2006, attachment)
16	[...] In August 2006, there were 334 million mobile phones in operation in China. [...]	VEJA (2006, attachment)
17	[...] By the end of 2005, there were 111 million people with access to Internet in China 111 [...]	VEJA (2006, attachment)
18	[...] In 2003, PRC purchased 7% of global oil, one fourth of all the aluminum and steel, almost one third of the iron ore and coal and 40% of all cement in the world. [...]	Roach, referred to by Fishman (2006, p.23)
19	[...] PRC is acquiring oil deposits outside its national territory and has been signing exclusive supply contracts with Saudi Arabian and Russian companies. [...]	Fishman (2006, p. 9)
20	[...] PRC answers for about one twentieth of every the whole global production. [...]	Fishman (2006, p. 21)
21	[...] PRC's population corresponds to one fifth of the world's population and represents the largest market ever [...]	Fishman (2006, p. 10)
22	[...] Despite the fact that just 11% of the Chinese territory is fit for agriculture, PRC is the leading rice producer (35%) in the world. [...]	VEJA (2006, attachment)
23	[...] Despite employing most of the population, agriculture contributed just with a 13.1% share of the national economy, according to data published by the Chinese government in December 2005. Industrial activity represents a 46.2% share of the economy and services 4.7%, which is more than the previously estimated 33%. Early in the implementation of the reforms, agriculture's shares was ranging around 30%. [...]	Trevisan (2006, p.53)

ANEXO B

DADOS SOBRE AS FORÇAS INTEGRANTES DO EPL DA RPC

a) FORÇA TERRESTRE

MEAN (1)	MODEL (1)	MEAN (1)	MODEL (1)	MEAN (1)	MODEL (1)	COMMENTS
Tank	59	Anti-Tank	HJ-73 (AT 3)	Artillery	90 122mm	<p>About PRC's Liberation Army, Lobo ([1999?]; p.7-9) remarks that:</p> <p>- [...] It is strategically fragmented into 7 Regional Commands (Military Regions), with some administrative autonomy. In case the Chinese territory was invaded these Commands become autonomous to wage a popular warfare (guerrilla) [...];</p> <p>- [...] It is subdivided into 3 branches: main force, regional force and militia. The main force is destined to fight enemy armies. The regional force supplements and supports the main force and is destined to provide local defense (guerrilla or resistance popular war), including leadership and training of guerrilla units). The militia constitutes the reserve of main and regional forces, acting as last resource of Chinese territory defense (people at arms) and provider of logistic support and intelligence. [...]</p> <p>- [...] A good portion of PLA's armored cars, tanks, vehicles and artillery are based on Soviet models, which are obsolete when compared to the US, NATO and Japan models which are more efficient for the defense policy. [...]</p>
Tank	62	Artillery	54	Artillery	122mm (?)	
Tank	63	Artillery	59/M-46	Artillery	WM-80 273mm	
Tank	69	Artillery	60/D-74	Artillery	WS-1 320mm	
Tank	80	Artillery	66/M-55	Antiaircraft Artillery	55 M1939	
Tank	85	Artillery	83 122mm	Antiaircraft Artillery	56 KS-18	
Tank	90	Artillery	83 152mm	Antiaircraft Artillery	56 ZPU-4	
Armored	63	Artillery	86	Antiaircraft Artillery	58 ZPU-2	
Armored	77	Artillery	WAC-021	Antiaircraft Artillery	59 KS-19	
Armored	85	Artillery	130mm SPG	Antiaircraft Artillery	59 S-60	
Armored	86	Artillery	203mm SPH	Antiaircraft Artillery	63	
Armored	90	Artillery	PLZ-45	Antiaircraft Artillery	65	
Armored	WZ-501	Artillery	54 SPH	Antiaircraft Artillery	72 KS-12	
Armored	WZ-503	Artillery	70	Antiaircraft Artillery	74	
Armored	WZ-504	Artillery	83 SPH	Antiaircraft Artillery	80 23mm	
Armored	WZ-505	Artillery	85	Antiaircraft Artillery	80 57mm	
Armored	WZ-506	Artillery	89	Antiaircraft Artillery	87 25mm	
Armored	WZ-523	Artillery	A100 300mm	Antiaircraft Artillery	88 37mm	
Armored	WZ-551	Artillery	M-1B 350mm	Antiaircraft Artillery	90 35mm	
Armored	WZ-751	Artillery	63 107mm	Antiaircraft Artillery	90II	
Armored	YW-304	Artillery	63 130mm	-	-	
Armored	YW-307	Artillery	70 130mm	-	-	
Armored	YW-309	Artillery	81 122mm	-	-	
Armored	YW-531	Artillery	81 107mm	-	-	
Armored	YW-531H	Artillery	82 130mm	-	-	
Armored	YW-701	Artillery	83 273mm	-	-	
Armored	YZ-750	Artillery	85 130mm	-	-	
Anti-Tank	HJ-8	Artillery	89 122mm	-	-	

(1) Source: <http://www.fas.org>

b) FORÇA AÉREA (continuação do anexo B)

TYPE (2)	DESIGNATION (2)	UN (2)	COMENTS 1 (2)	COMMENTS II
Fighter	MiG-19 (J-6)	1900		<p>Current PRC Air Force Status can be summarized as follows:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) According to the Federation of American Scientist, "[...]PRC Air Force has around 400,000 men [...]"; 2) According to Rühl (2005, p. 95), "[...]the PRC Air Force has about 1700 aircraft of various types, of which 1,000 are Intercept Fighters and 700 are Fighter-bombers [...]"; 3) The existing aircraft models are based on Soviet models, such as the MIG 17 (J-5), MIG-19 (J-6), MIG-21(J-7) Fighters and medium size bombers II-28 (II-5) (LOBO, [1999?], p.10); 4) [...] The Transport aviation, now in a structuring stage, still has no strategic capacity compatible with that existing in the former Soviet Union, NATO countries and in the USA. However, there is some strategic capacity when considering action restricted to the Chinese territory or use against weaker air power neighboring countries. [...] (LOBO, [1999?], pp. 10-11); and 5) [...] PRC air force administrative organization still follows the Soviet standard of training and structure in squadrons. Strategically PRC is divided into seven semi-autonomous regions. [...] (LOBO, [1999?], pp. 10).
Fighter	MiG-21(J-7)	720		
Fighter	J-8 I/II/III	222		
Fighter	Su27SK (J-11)	55	Similarity: F-15 Eagle F-14 Tomcat MiG-29 Fulcrum	
Fighter	MiG-19 (Q-5)	440		
Fighter-Bomber	H-5/II-28	307		
Fighter-Bomber	H-6/Tu-16	142		
Transport	II-76	10		
Transport	Y-5/An-2	?		
Transport	Y-7/An-24	?		
Transport	Y-8/An-12	?		
Special Mission	Y-8	?		
Special Mission	A-50	?		
Fighter	J-8	?	To be produced	
Fighter	JH-7	?	Nuclear attack	
Fighter	J-10 (F-10)	300 (?)	In production (?)	
Fighter	Su-27	-	To be produced	
Fighter	Su-30	24	To be produced	
Fighter	Su-30MK	30-60	To be produced	

(2) Source: site www.milnet.com

c) **FORÇA NAVAL DO EPL (3)** (continuação do anexo B)

TYPE (4)	CLASS (4)	UN (4)	COMMENTS I (4)	COMMENTS II (4)
Destroyer 956	Sovremenny	4		<p>1) According to the Federation of American Scientist, currently, [...] in PRC Navy just seven of all of its ships (specifically in the Luhai, Luhu and Jiangwei classes) present technological standards compatible with or close to the most modern means of surface combat in the world [...];</p> <p>2) PRC does not own a single aircraft carrier (officially the Kiev aircraft carrier, purchased from the Russians belongs to an entertainment company) (HENG, 2002);</p> <p>3) The PRC Navy has about 56,000 marines and a Coastal Defense Force (http://www.wikipedia.org);</p> <p>4) As to naval aviation, Rühl (2005, p.95) states, without mentioning the period or the precise moment, that "[...] the Chinese Navy own just 20 combat aircraft (all land based) [...]";</p> <p>5) Also on the current profile of PRC Naval Aviation, Lobo ([1995?], p. 11) mentions four important facts:</p> <p>1) [...] the strategic distribution is identical to the one deployed for the PRC Navy, that is, three fleets (North, East and South) [...]";</p> <p>2) [...] their types of aircraft similar to those used by the Air Force [...]; and</p> <p>3) [...] there are relatively modern helicopters available, using original Russian and French technologies (manufactured locally under licenses) [...].</p>
Destroyer 054	Luhai	5		
Destroyer 052	Luhu	2		
Destroyer 051	Luda	~11		
Frigate 054	Maanshan	8		
Frigate 059	Jiangwei III	3		
Frigate 057	Jiangwei II	6-8		
Frigate 055	Jiangwei	~25		
Frigate 053	Jianghu	~25		
Guided Missile Ship	Houjian	4		
Guided Missile Ship	Houxin	~36		
Guided Missile Ship	Houngfeng	~25		
Submarine 094	NEWCON SSBN	~8	?	
Submarine 093	NEWCON SSN	4	?	
Submarine 091	Han SSN	5	Nuclear	
Submarine 091	Kilo	4	Conventional	
Submarine 039	Song	5	Conventional	
Submarine 035	Ming	20	Conventional	
Submarine 033	Romeo	15	Conventional	
Submarine 031	Wuhan	1	Conventional	
Amphibian Warfare 074	Yuting	20		
Amphibian Warfare 072	Yukan	7		<p>(3) Situation forecasted for 2010; and</p> <p>(4) Source: http://www.fas.org.br.</p>
Amphibian Warfare 072	Yudeng	11		
Amphibian Warfare 073	Yudao	1		
B-6	Bomber	30		
B-5	Bomber	25		
Q-5	Attack	75		
FH-7	Attack	100		
F-4/F-5/F-6/F-7/F-8	Combat	600		

d) FORÇAS ESTRATÉGICAS DO EPL (continuação do anexo B)

SPECIFICATION (5)	TYPE (5)	COMMENTS I (5)	COMMENT II
DF-11/M-11	Conventional	300 km Range	<p>According to Rühl (2005, p.95), without stating the precise moment (it is assumed to be around 2005), PRC had the following strategic means available:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - "[...] 30 intercontinental missiles for nuclear warheads [...]" - "[...] 110 medium range missiles for nuclear and conventional warheads [...]" and - "[...] 450 to 500 short range missiles [...]" <p>Supplementing the statements made above, the following deserve attention:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - "[...] PLA strategic and nuclear forces are provided with operational capacity to launch from ground platforms. Xia class nuclear submarines and bombers H-6 [...]" (LOBO, [1999?], pp. 14-15). - It is estimated that " [...] 100,000 men are engaged in the management of PLA Strategic Forces [...]" (http://www.fas.org). - Despite Beijing denials, PRC has the technology and the infrastructure required to produce chemical and biological warheads (http://www.milnet.com) [...]; e - Still there is no notice about PRC Liberation Army having an <i>anti-missile</i> shield available (similar to what the US is trying to deploy on the Eastern edge of Europe). Considering the current PRC technical-scientific capacity, it should not take long for them to master this critical military technology (author's note). <p>(5) Source: http://www.milnet.com</p>
DF-15/M-19	Conventional	600 km Range	
DF-3A/CSS-2	Nuclear	2,800 km Range	
DF-4	Nuclear	4,800 km Range	
DF-5	Nuclear	13,000 km Range	
DF-31	Nuclear	8,000 km Range	
DF-21/CSS-3	Nuclear	1,800 km Range	
JL-1/CSS-NX-3	Nuclear	1000-1800 km Range	
J-2	Nuclear	?	
CSS-4 Mod 2	Nuclear	13,000 km Range	
CSS-6	Nuclear	600 km Range	
CSS-7	Nuclear	300 km Range	

ANNEX C
COMPARATIVE EVOLUTION OF PRC DEFENSE BUDGET

USA	US\$ (BILLION)	PRC	US\$ BILLION)	RUSSIA	US\$ BILLION)
1990	431	1990	12	1990	126
1995	337	1995	14	1995	16
2000	322	2000	22	2000	14
2001	325	2001	26	2001	16
2002	365	2002	31	2002	17
2003	415	2003	34	2003	19
2004	453	2004	38	2004	19
2005	478	2005	41	2005	21
2006	502	2006	47	2006	26
2007	537 (1°)	2007	56 (2°)	2007	33 (3°)

Source: (COSTA, 2006, p. 42).

ANEXO D

COLETÂNEA DE DADOS SOCIAIS SOBRE A RPC

ITEM	DATA	SOURCE
1	[...] 92% of the Chinese belong to the Han ethnic group and 8% to 55 other ethnic groups. [...]	VEJA (2006, attachment)
2	[...] 10% of PRC's population average annual income is over 1,501.00 dollars. [...]	VEJA (2006, attachment)
3	[...] 13% of PRC's population average annual income ranges between 901 and 1,500 dollars. [...]	VEJA (2006, attachment)
4	[...] 30% of PRC's population average annual income ranges between 731 and 900 dollars. [...]	VEJA (2006, attachment)
5	[...] Almost half of the Chinese people still live below the poverty line, that is, with an average annual income of less than 730 dollars. [...]	VEJA (2006, attachment)
6	[...] In Xanghai <i>per capita</i> income is 7,200 dollars (richest province). [...]	VEJA (2006, attachment)
7	[...] Country's average <i>per capita</i> income is 1300 dollars. [...]	VEJA (2006, attachment)
8	[...] In Guizhou <i>per capita</i> income is 550 dollars (poorest province). [...]	VEJA (2006, attachment)
9	[...] 60% of the Chinese population, or 760 million people still live in rural areas. [...]	VEJA (2006, attachment)
10	[...] 94% of the Chinese population is concentrated in an area corresponding to just 40% of the Chinese territory. [...]	VEJA (2006, attachment)
11	[...] A survey conducted by the Ministry of Health by the end of 2003 with 190 thousand people concluded that 36% of city dwellers and 39% of those who live in rural areas ceased to visit to doctors offices for not having money to pay charged fees. [...]	Trevisan (2006, p. 59)
12	[...] Between 1979 and 2002, the economic growth removed from poverty the fantastic number of 400 million people, according to World Bank data. [...]	Trevisan (2006, p. 9)

COOPERATION AND OBSTACLES TO COOPERATION IN TWO DIFFERENT SECURITY APPROACHES

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ABSTRACT

The terrorist attack of September 11 generated instability in the International System, compelling the North American hegemonic power to get involved in two wars for the maintenance of the world-wide order. Parallel to that, there is in Asia an emerging power that challenges future US world hegemony. In July 2002, President George W. Bush published the "National Strategy for Homeland Security", identifying international cooperation as one of the pillars of United States security. Thus, the current US Chief of Naval Operations guided the Commander of the Southern Command to make a lecture presenting a proposal of cooperation with the Brazilian Navy. The objective of the present essay is to analyze this proposal, indicating convergent points that are compatible with Brazilian interests.

Keywords: Brazilian Navy. US Southern Command. Terrorism. Global and Regional Cooperation. Security.

INTRODUCTION

Following a request made by the Naval War College (NWC), the Escola de Guerra Naval set out to produce essays on the theme "Global and Regional Cooperation in Security: Implications for a New Maritime Strategy for the USA".

Such a mission might seem difficult, ever more considering that one's roles will have implications, it is believed, for a new maritime strategy. It means making suggestions for a country that holds, or believes to hold, according

to some scholars, the “command of commons”, i.e., the command of the sea, the space, and the air¹.

This pillar that supports American military hegemony is at least, no doubt, an aspiration seen as a goal to be met. However, this objective could be more rational² if the US could count on the cooperation of allies and partners. The present essay intends to briefly review one’s vision regarding the threats to guaranteeing American hegemony and the proposal of cooperation indicated by the NWC request. Afterwards, one will attempt to choose partnership aspects that might be of interest for Brazil, bearing in mind, however, the ambiguous elements of cooperation under President George W. Bush’s administration, which might generate, deliberately or not, some sharp edges in the relationship with neighboring countries³.

A THEORETICAL PLATFORM

For the purpose of the present essay, one shall use “The Theory of Hegemonic War” by Robert Gilpin⁴ since it directly relates to the current context and the theme proposed by the NWC.

Going through the aspects that relate to the issue, one understands that the present International System (IS) is anarchic and composed by independent states. Gilpin’s three IS dimensions are⁵: the hierarchy of prestige, the division of territory, and the international economy. Once the IS is structured under the hegemony of a sole dominant state⁶, there is a distribution of power among the strong states. The transformation⁷ of one or more of these strong states might have an impact on the established IS that is resistant to changes⁸.

The above-described condition is necessary but not enough for hegemonic war. The other condition is challenge. This means that internal changes may take place as long as they do not threaten the vital interests of dominant states, or they might be seen as a challenge.

However, it may be that some other state, even if it is not a strong one, happens to threaten the vital interests of the IS dominant state. It would bring

¹ See Barry R. Posen, “Command of Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” *International Security*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Summer 2003).

² In the pragmatic sense of the cost/benefit relationship.

³ See Alyson J. K. Bailes and Andrew Cottey, “SIPRI Year Book 2006: Armament, Disarmament and International Security”, Chapter 4, p.1. Available at: << <http://yearbook2006.sipri.org/> >>. Accessed on: March 10, 2007.

⁴ ROBERG, Robert I. E RABB, Theodore K. *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*. London: Cambridge, 1998, pp. 15 to 52.

⁵ These three dimensions are dependent on expressions of political, social, economic, military, and technological power.

⁶ This does not mean that other few strong states do not exist.

⁷ Through economic, military and technological development, for instance.

⁸ The IS components would not, in theory, be willing to yield all or part of their power.

about another type of war aiming at order maintenance. The war on Iraq and Afghanistan are examples of this instability situation of the System.

According to Gilpin, international relations have also a close relationship of cause with the differential growth of power among states. Any variation in this power differential will disturb the equilibrium of the IS.

To sum up, the variation on the power differential occurs when, over the same period of time, a state grows more than the hegemonic state. Parallel to that, the hegemonic state might understand it is being challenged by an attitude of one of the states of the system. The following matrix summarizes this understanding of Gilpin's theory.

International System		Was there a challenge?	
		No	Yes
Is there variation in the power differential?	Yes	Unstable IS	Hegemonic War
	No	Stable IS	Unstable IS (War for the preservation of law and order)

In the case of war for the preservation of law and order, there is a state that challenges the hegemonic state despite the fact that it is not powerful enough to effectively threaten it.


CONTEXTUALIZING

Having understood the theory, one will contextualize in a synthetic and objective manner the current US situation after 9/11.

To start with, there is no doubt that the US exercises world hegemony. Despite all the criticism, the country's military, economic, and technological power is unquestionable. At the same time, China has for some time now started to present itself as the greatest challenger of American hegemony, mainly because of its economic growth and, especially, its military growth⁹. Observing the chart below that compares Chinese and American military expenditure one can see the strong tendency to reduce the difference, the biggest gap having been in 1999¹⁰. It does not mean China will challenge the US. The intention here is to point out the latent threat to American hegemony by an Asian state, which could generate a war, either hot or cold, over world hegemony.

⁹ Jornal da Ciência. Available at: <<http://www.jornaldaciencia.org.br/Detail.jsp?id=45193>>; and BBC Brasil. Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/noticias/story/200703070304_chinagastomilitar_as.shtml>. Accessed on: Apr/10/07.

¹⁰ The source for the graphs is SIPRI. Available at: <http://first.sipri.org/non_first/milex.php>. Accessed on: Apr/10/07.



Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)

Nevertheless, the September 11 events have shown to the United States that another threat was able to take advantage of US vulnerabilities and cause a lot of damage, especially to the hierarchical prestige of the greatest power of the present days. There is no doubt that this fact has shaken IS. However, the cause of this threat is not one of the traditional components of the system and, besides, this threat could be in any IS state. Compared to a missile that invades a defensive system and continues to follow its unalterable logic until it hits the target, the terrorist has an alterable logic with the purpose of self-destruction along with the destruction of the target. Thus, albeit not being a state, he/she threatens IS structure. At this point there is a distancing from the theory presented by Gilpin, but the effect of instability is similar.

Even though the September 11 terrorist act did not bear the name of one or more states, it fit in the absence of variation in the power differential and threatened the hegemony in force, resulting in the “war for the preservation of law and order” or in the “war on terrorism” unleashed by President George W. Bush.

Summarizing what has been seen so far, one can presume that the IS instability was caused by two strong reasons: first of all, due to the variation in the power differential in relation to China; and second, to the challenge of transnational terrorism. In other words, hegemonic power is glimpsing at the growth of a country that might threaten its vital interests; at the same time, it has been and continues to be challenged by a kind of stateless organization that uses logic and rationality that differ from western standards.

NORTH-AMERICAN STRATEGY

Since, September 11, one could mention¹¹ the following strategies issued by President Bush’s administration: the “National Strategy for Homeland

¹¹ Other related strategies are: “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction” (Dec/2002), “National Strategy for Combat Terrorism” (Feb/2003), “The National Military Strategy of the USA” (2004), and “National Defense Strategy of the USA” Mar/2005).

Security” (NSHS) and the “National Security Strategy of the USA” (NSS), published, respectively, in July 2002 and in March 2006, still in force.

The NSHS presents the three strategic US objectives to improve security in the American homeland. They are¹²:

- a) Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States;
- b) Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and
- c) Minimize the damages and recover from attacks that do occur.

Two initiatives pertinent to the present paper could be highlighted. They were taken from the “Critical Mission Area” and denominated Border and Transportation Security¹³. These are: to create “smart borders” (SB) and to increase the security of international shipping containers.

Finally, one must consider the foundations of “Homeland Security”¹⁴, which are: Law, Science & Technology (S&T), Information Sharing and Systems, and International Cooperation. In the S&T field, one can observe that this is an area in which the American people are not willing to cooperate. On the contrary, the fourth foundation – international cooperation – is separated from the other three. In other words, the S&T that are so necessary in countries wishing to develop themselves in the globalized world is an issue left out of any cooperation agreement. The American government creates barriers to the dissemination of knowledge by imposing these restrictions to the universities by means of the “Technology Alert List”¹⁵

Having addressed the primary strategy, NSHS, all the other strategies derive from it, including NSS. NSHS consistency can be evaluated by the fact that it has not been altered since it was issued, whereas NSS had two later versions in Sept. 2002 and March 2006.

US SOUTHERN COMMAND

The present analysis will be based on the lecture given by Southern Command Naval Force Commander Rear Admiral James W. Stevenson¹⁶. One will address key aspects (the first aspect has already been addressed) in order to raise awareness on the kind of impacts for Brazilian interests.

The lecture presented the US Chief of Naval Operations’ proposal¹⁷ commented “on the capacities the Brazilian Navy might consider” for the next

¹² “National Strategy for Homeland Security”, jul. 02, p. vii. Disponível em: <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/>>. Consulta feita em: 17 abr. 07.

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. viii.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. x.

¹⁵ An example would be the one published by the University of Harvard. Available at: <http://www.hio.harvard.edu/students_scholars/travel/technology_alert_list.php>. Accessed on: Apr/12/ 07.

¹⁶ Brazilian Navy Seminar. Rio de Janeiro, Escola de Guerra Naval, Nov/17/05.

¹⁷ Protect the American people and their homeland.

20 to 25 years. In Admiral Mullen's own words "cooperation is fundamental because no country can stand alone and do what needs to be done", and he emphasized that "we need to work in a combined environment"¹⁸. One would like to add that this is logical for US security and for the reduction of instability in the IS.

Two aspects were highlighted by Admiral Mullen regarding the need for the US Navy to "continue to be the predominant force in the open sea" and "increase cooperation capacity in green waters" [...] "and in brown waters". Thus they wish to use "the capacity of partner nations to develop a working relationship and the capacity to communicate and operate both in high sea and on land". Such "cooperation in different world scenarios" might help the US to reduce their infra-structure of support to the North-American fleets and "keep global maritime domain".

As a partial conclusion, one could say that, in this manner, the American Navy fulfils two initiatives, by expanding frontiers¹⁹ and being able to increase the security of international shipping containers, within the international cooperation fundament established by the NSHS. It has thus contributed to the reduction of US vulnerability. All this could be summarized by Admiral Stevenson's statement when he says in his lecture that "We would like to have a scenario of cooperation among the Navies of the world, to ensure the security of certain regions."²⁰ Once more one could add saying that such regions are those regions that interest the US.

Once the strategic objective of "reducing vulnerability" has been met, Admiral Stevenson points to another objective, the "terrorist threat" and their campaign of "global war on terrorism". To be able to face terrorism, the proposal is to share the US "global control" of the sea in a regional manner. In other words, the US who are already capable of operating in "green waters"²¹, would include the "brown waters" of other States thanks to regional partnerships. Following another line of thinking, one could say that the Southern Command accepts the partnership of other navies in "green waters" and these navies would in return admit US cooperation in their "brown waters".

For this cooperation to happen it is necessary to foster trust and interoperability, according to the same document, that goes on saying: "we would like to increase our partners' capacity, the capacity of their Navies [...]".

Regarding interoperability, one understands that it might be appealing as long as the Brazilian Navy (MB) receives state-of-the-art equipment through good financing plans. If on one hand this option does not stimulate national

¹⁸ Note from the translator: free translation of quotes.

¹⁹ Supported by International Law, they add "smart borders" to their frontiers.

²⁰ Note from the translator: free translation of quotes.

²¹ According to Rear-Admiral Stevenson, this capacity is "twenty four hours seven days a week"

industry and, above all, our defense-area related innovations in S&T, on the other hand it will allow better preparation in terms of equipment with beneficial consequences in short-term MB readiness.

As to trust, repeating the words of Vinicius de Moraes, a famous Brazilian poet, "it will be eternal for as long as it lives", because one cannot forget that, the moment the US are no longer interested, they may impose a reduction in Brazilian military budget as they have done in the past²².

One could close Admiral Stevenson's thoughts using his own words, when they consider it important for the MB to "keep maritime security **within their own country** (added stress), in the territorial sea, and in the EEZ. That's what Navies are for."²³ In here he includes, at least, the Parana/Paraguay basin and the Amazon basin because they are "within the country".

THE 1988 CONSTITUTION AND THE NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY

According to the Brazilian Constitution, International Relations are ruled by ten principles: I – national independence; II – prevalence of human rights; III – self-determination of the peoples; IV – non-intervention; V – equality among States; VI – the defense of peace; VII – pacific solution to conflicts; VIII – repudiation of terrorism and racism; IX – cooperation among the peoples for the progress of humanity; and X – the granting of political asylum.

One can observe that terrorism is in the same level regarding the principle of cooperation. However, contrary to what the NSHS proposes, which is cooperation aiming at US national security, the Brazilian proposal aims at the progress of humanity. This difference is easily understood if one looks back at the last visit of the US President to Brazil in March of the current year²⁴. The chart below summarizes these differences:

Technology	US Position
At US Universities	A matter of national security (Technology Alert List)
Brazilian ethanol	Have access to Brazilian technology.

Regarding the National Defense Policy (PDN), terrorism stands out on sub item 2.6:

²² In the beginning of the 1990's, Brazil had to submit to US hegemony and accept changes in public expenditure priorities; this was one of the conditions that affected defense policy, the fixing of limits to the country's military expenditures. BANDEIRA, Luiz Alberto Moniz. *Formação do império americano: da guerra contra a Espanha à guerra no Iroque*. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2005, p. 518 a 520.

²³ Note from the translator: free translation of quotes.

²⁴ Orientation given by President Bush to his ambassador in Brazil, Clifford Sobel, on the ethanol agreement: "Bring their scientists here, bring their universities". (Translator's note: free translation of quote) Available at: <<http://clipping.planejamento.gov.br/Noticias.asp?NOTCod=344735>>. Accessed on Apr/27/07.

Nowadays, non-state players, new threats, and the contraposition between nationalism and transnationalism permeate international relations and the security arrangement of the States. Transnational crime of multiple nature and international terrorism are a threat to peace, security, and the democratic order, and are usually confronted by the intelligence and security tools of the States.

Further ahead, the PDN defines the areas of interest for Brazil, which are the South American subcontinent and Western African countries, where Brazil seeks to “strengthen cooperation ties”²⁵.

Sub item 3.3 addresses the concern with processes that help reduce the possibility of conflicts on the strategic environment. They are:

[...] the strengthening of the integration process, [...]; the close relationship with Amazonian countries, [...]; the intensification in cooperation and trade with African countries, made easier by ethnic and cultural ties; and the consolidation of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone.

Once again one can see the term ‘cooperation’ being used with the purpose of achieving peace and not with the objective of increasing the country’s military power. Thus, the “South American integrated and harmonic development process, naturally extending to the regional defense and security area” is prioritized.²⁶

One can see that Brazil is not concerned with hegemony, but with “an international order based in democracy, multilateralism, cooperation, in chemical, biological and nuclear weapon banning, and in the search for peace among the nations”.²⁷ Finally, PDN sub item 4.8 reads:

Brazil considers terrorism a risk to world peace and security. Brazil emphatically condemns terrorist actions and supports UN resolutions, recognizing the need for the nations to work together to try to prevent and fight against terrorist threats.

It is within this conception that the MB, through Diretoria de Portos e Costas²⁸, cooperates with the Maritime Authority in the design of the initiatives

²⁵ PDN, subitem 3.1.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, subitem 3.6.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, subitem 4.7.

²⁸ Diretoria de Portos e Costas, ISPS Code. Available at: https://www.dpc.mar.mil.br/sta/ISPS/isps_index.htm. Accessed on: Apr/11/07.

connected to the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code)²⁹. This type of cooperation appeared after September 11, and all subscribing countries of the International Maritime Organization participate in it.

To summarize, the Brazilian State seeks the path to peace towards security, as utopian as it may seem. It admits the possibility of threats, but considers these threats have low probability of causing damages to the Brazilian territory and people. Once chemical, biological and nuclear weapons have been banned, one believes there will be a reduction in the insecurity caused by these lethal instruments.

CONCLUSION

To start with, one could point out the differences in the two conceptions of security. For the United States, their security depends on their power in the military and technological areas, which have given them the hegemony. The US intention is to increase this hegemonic power vis-à-vis the possibility of challenges in the IS. The Brazilian State bases its security in the belief of peace among the peoples and in a kind of cooperation that is very different from the US proposal. An example of these different stand points is the case of technology, granted by the southern brothers and blocked by their partners from the north.

The converging point is terrorism, a threat to peace and to the IS. To fight against it, the US is seeking partnerships that will allow them to expand their frontiers and, of course, their area of action; for this the US are willing to enter their partners' green and brown waters, with the acquiescence of these. In case they cannot find partners and in the name of security have to invade a State, they will do it, at the expense of billions of dollars. Iraq and Afghanistan are recent examples of this fact³⁰.

The partnership between the MB and the US Southern Command in green or brown waters for the prevention of and the fight against terrorism is not in the Brazilian interest since these actions are a form of intervention. This goes against the international relations principles present in the Brazilian Constitution. The MB should face any identified terrorist threat within its jurisdiction with the purpose of collaborating to international peace and security. This is already done according to the "ISPS Code", there included the security

²⁹ The "International Ship and Port Facility Security Code - ISPS Code" was designed by the Security Committee of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and approved by Resolution #2 of the SOLAS 1974 (Safety of Life at the Sea) Diplomatic Conference, during the meeting held in London from December 9 to 13, 2002.

³⁰ Some examples from the second half of the twentieth century worth mentioning are Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Granada, Panama, and Haiti; all these are Latin American countries invaded by the US.

of the United States as well. The MB can also integrate the communications of the naval means employed in these missions with those of the US Southern Command. This type of interoperability might be vital for the success of a military operation in the face of international terrorism.

In the short term, the interoperability and increase in capacity of the MB are factors that meet the defense interests for enemies common to both countries. However, in the case of Brazil, such interoperability cannot be dissociated from the national defense industry and, likewise, should not hinder development and innovation in this area of strategic interest for Brazil.

Finally, US Navy ships that take part in this cooperation, according to the Brazilian way of thinking, should not carry chemical, biological or nuclear weapons because they are clearly inappropriate to counter the terrorist threat. Actually, these weapons might become themselves a threat to Brazilian interests of consolidating the South-Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone.

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BOOK REVIEW: HISTÓRIA DAS GUERRAS

MAGNOLI, Demetrio. *História das Guerras*. São Paulo: Contexto, 2006, 480 p.

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War: sacrifice, suffering, death; these are ideas that come immediately to our mind associated with this disaster. But could war be something more than a horror-laden plague?

Several academic centers and independent scholars in agreement with synthesis of the “Clausewitzian intelligence” that argues that “war is an extension of politics by other means” are convinced that this phenomenon is as old as the history of mankind and has long ceased to be a subject under the exclusive jurisdiction of the military. The truth of this concept is evidenced when we analyze the geopolitical consequences of warfare, which have mandated, sometimes, definitive changes in the political, economic and social organization of several nations. Therefore, learning about the wars within their historical context is mandatory both to the political powers of any country and to society.

In this sense, the book “*História das Guerras*”(History of the Wars), compiled by geographer Demétrio Magnoli, by publishing house Editora Contexto, is a fundamental work, once it approaches war as a fully and

eminently human phenomenon. Several historians, political geography experts, journalists and Brazilian military were invited to write different chapters. Synthetically and using a clear and agreeable language the authors approach approximately 2500 years of history, analyzing fifteen of its most famous conflicts.

Presenting unique views, from the ideas of Chinese general Sun Tzu to the US way of thinking and the European tradition, in his brief introductory essay “*No espelho da guerra*”(On the mirror of war) Professor Magnoli invites readers to revisit the history of wars. By quoting Heraclitus’s words: “war is the father of all things” and concluding that “by recognizing that we are not much different from the Greeks 25 centuries ago we are just being realistic”, Magnoli, synthesizes the role played by war in history in a precise and direct way.

The historical voyage we are invited to make in the book starts with the Peloponnesian War, continues along the Conquests of the Barbarians, the Crusades in the Middle Ages, the leading conflicts of the 17th, 19th and

20th centuries to take us at last to the Gulf Wars.

The “Peloponnesian War”, a conflict that happened between 432 and 404 B.C, in which Athens faced the other Greek city-states of Sparta, Thebes, Corinth and the Peloponnesian League, is analyzed by historian Pedro Paulo Funari. The author presents the geopolitical context of this conflict – Greece in the 5th century B.C. – describing its structural causes and identifying military alliances permeated by ethnical and cultural rivalries. To conclude his text he outlines the consequences of this war, highlighting the diplomatic and strategic innovations and showing how, along History, the Peloponnesian War has been awakening the interest of all those interested in the study of the art of war.

Between 264 and 146 B.C. Roma and Carthage faced each other in three conflicts, which later on were to be collectively called the “Punic Wars”; after the Latin word *punicus*, which means “the people of Carthage”. Historian Renata Senna Garraffoni was given the task of developing this subject and chose to analyze each one of these three conflicts separately because of their significantly different causes and repercussions. She talks about the Romans and war, Carthage and the Roman expansion and the Roman conquests at that time. By the end of her text, the author looks into the legacy of the Punic Wars, underlining that “on the military point of view, the

Punic Wars furthered the development of new techniques and tactics that were to be much appreciated by generals along the course of History”.

In the following chapter, historian José Rivair Macedo presents the “Barbarian Conquests”. Rivair is very clear in his analysis of this period of history in which the Romans had to face the Barbarian invasions of the Roman Empire. The author describes both the Central Asian and the German peoples and to conclude he analyzes how war influenced the life of the societies that appeared inside the Barbarian kingdoms.

In the sequence comes the text about the “Crusades”. In the Middle Ages the expansion of Latin Christendom clashed with the Muslim plans of territorial expansion and conversion to Islamism, generating a Holy War in which Latin Christians, Muslims and Byzantines fought each other at the farthestmost borders of Christianity (Syria and Palestine) and in the Iberian Peninsula. This long-lived and burdensome military conflict is analyzed by historian Fátima Regina Fernandes. The author describes the context that led to this confrontation, with its social, political and religious causes, the expansions of Christendom and of the Muslim world and their conflicting interests. Fátima concludes the analysis with a balance of the Crusades and their legacy to present time imagery.

Historian Elaine Senise Barbosa was assigned the task of presenting “Genghis Khan and the

Mongol Conquests". The subject is provocative once people have on their minds the figure of sanguinary Barbarians spreading terror and destruction from China to Western Europe, Persia and the Middle East in the 12th and 13th centuries. To start the text the author draws a comparison between nomad and sedentary societies. She also discusses the appearance of Genghis Kahn and his army fated to become an almost unbeatable machine of war and how the alleged largest empire in the world was formed. Last, he presents an explanation of the Mongol expansion phenomenon, always associating it to Genghis Khan – the foremost nomad leader of a stateless society.

The so-called "Thirty Years' War", the prolonged war fought from 1618 to 1648, that inflicted on Germany impacts as devastating as those of the Second World War itself, is analyzed by historian Henrique Carneiro. In his approach to the subject, the author discusses the German Civil war, checks the religious and economic aspects of this conflict and evaluates the situation of countries like Germany, Spain, Holland, France, Sweden and Poland. By debilitating Spain, the Thirty Years' War allowed the resumption of Portuguese independence, in 1640, with consequences for Brazil. By the end of the war in 1648, the Peace of Westphalia established a new order in Europe, in which the "national interest" (from the French term *raison d'État*), supersedes all other principles, generating an international system of

States. In his conclusion Henrique affirms that the recovery of the Alsace region by Germany as a result of the Franco-Prussian War (1871) "is one of the decisive sources of the debacle of the European equilibrium and of the outbreak of two world wars in the 20th century."

When writing about "Napoleon Wars" historian Marco Mondaini presents a synthesis of the feats and works of the famous Corsican general and statesman Napoleon Bonaparte, which are important not only on a historical-military point of view, but, above all because of their political consequences. Mondaini lays out the fabric of the Napoleonic world to the reader, discussing the Industrial and the French Revolutions and the Empire built by Napoleon; and he does not forget to analyze the Great French Army (*La Grande Armée*) and the famous land and naval battles, the Russian campaign and the decisive battle of Waterloo. To close his text the author touches on the subject of the legacy of the Napoleon Wars in his discussion of the consequences to the Western world of the 25 years of European conflict and the Bonaparte legacy.

The American Civil War took place from 1861 to 1865; according to several scholars, this was the first modern conflict in history. This civil war that took away the lives of about 620 thousand Americans and left 4000 thousand other injured or mutilated is analyzed by geographer André Martins. In this chapter the author describes the world and the US in

1860, explains the beginning of the war and the development of combat highlighting logistic aspects, which played a critical role in that war. He presents the technological advancements being used for the first time as military artifacts, such as the use of shielding in naval war – which has completely changed the concept of shipbuilding – the observation balloon and the train. The author closes his analysis with a discussion on the political, legal, and economic consequences of that war.

The ninth conflict discussed in the book, the “Paraguayan War”, was the longest conflict ever to be seen in South America. A war with very specific characteristics, waged in a complex geographical scenario, The Paraguayan war was directly influenced by the American Civil War and by the industrial advancements in Europe. Invited to discuss this subject, Historian Francisco Doratioto, writes about the geopolitical scenario of this conflict, which he calls the “Platine chessboard” in which Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay rallied to form the Triple Alliance against a common enemy, Paraguay. He analyzes the most important battles, highlighting the December 1868 campaign, best known as “Dezembrada”. By presenting the costs and the consequences of this war, Doratioto ends his analysis discussing the cost in terms of human lives, despite the existing controversies surrounding it, the economic burden to which the Brazilian Empire was subject, and the political consequences of this war.

Rear-Admiral Armando Amorim Ferreira Vidigal approaches the “Wars of the German Unification”, taking the reader to the geopolitical context in which the German issue, with its intrinsic complexity, became an important chapter of the European history. Admiral Vidigal analyzes the restructuring of the Prussian Army, the Wars – the Schleswig, Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian Wars – and finishes his considerations on the subject with a synthesis he named *Rumo à Guerra Mundial* (The Path Towards the World War), showing how the German unification and its political consequences spilled into the First World War.

“The First World War was the mother of 20th and 21st century wars”. This concept is advanced by Colonel Luiz de Alencar Araripe in the introduction to the chapter about the “First World War”. Araripe analyses the Geography, the Technology, the strategies and the Theaters of Operations of the war between the Triple Entente (France, Great Britain and Russia) and the Central Powers, an alliance established between the Central Empires of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy (in the first stages of the conflict) and Turkey. The author reserves a specific part of the text to discuss Brazil’s participation in the war, mentioning the Divisão Naval de Operações de Guerra – DNOG (Naval Division of War Operations) and concludes his analysis by discussing what that war would have been like if the United States had stayed away from it.

The “Second World War”, a unique total war in the history of mankind for its incredibly large numbers, for the mobilization capacity displayed by the involved countries and the cruelty, mirrored in the mass destruction of human beings, is analyzed by historian Pedro Tota. The author presents the origins of the war, the beginning, the Theaters of Operation in Europe and in the Pacific, the participation of the Americas, highlighting the role played by the US and Brazil and, last, the inheritance of the conflict which, by the end of the war marked the eclipse of the European hegemony and gave rise to the period of antagonism between East and West, the so-called “Cold War”.

Geographer Demétrio Magnoli, the organizer of this book, took upon himself the task of unveiling the facts of the “Indochina Wars”, which, in fact, are two distinct and interrelated conflicts that took place between 1946 and 1975. The first one, the “French Indochina War” (1946 to 1954), involved a colonial power, France and the Vietnamese national liberation movement called “*Vietminh*”. The second, the “Vietnam War” (1960 to 1975), involved the US and North Vietnam, allied to the “*Vietcong*” (South Vietnam Communists). Magnoli talks about the *Vietminh* and its leader Ho Chi Minh; The Indochina War and the famous battle of Dien Bien Phu that marked the French downfall; the period between wars; and the Vietnam War itself, screened in three phases. To conclude the author presents

a section called “Vietnam and History”, presenting Western and, above all, American insights, once, according to the author, “the Vietnamese, Soviet and Chinese narratives and evaluations are devoid of critical content”.

Reasoning that “the Middle East scenario, and, within it, the Arab-Israeli conflict, cannot be understood except within a more general framework of Western colonialism and imperialism” journalist Cláudio Camargo starts his analysis of the “Arab-Israeli Wars”. Before describing the 1956 conflicts, the “Six-Day War” (1967) and the “Yom Kippur War” (1973), the author approaches political and historical aspects, touching on subjects like “from Zionism to the establishment of the State of Israel” and the “Israeli glory and the Arab-Palestinian disaster”. Cláudio, concludes looking for an answer to the following question: “after so many bloody incidents can we think about peace between Israelis, Arabs and Palestinians in the Middle East?”

The last chapter of the book, by journalist William Waack is about the “Gulf Wars”. In his analysis of the “First Gulf War”, in 1991 and the Second Gulf War, in 2003, the author attempts to prove that these two conflicts are not two halves of a single event. To conclude his text, Waack presents his unique concepts about the “messianic mission of the US in Iraq,” ...something that looked just like an unfinished mission by the end of the First Gulf War, looked simply like mission impossible”.

After getting acquainted with the ideas of the different authors about the fifteen conflicts analyzed in the book, we can infer that the history of mankind is intrinsically related to the wars. Since antiquity, numerous scholars have been trying to develop a theory to support the concept of war as a preeminently political-social phenomenon, in which the basic and primordial element has been, and will always be, man. Despite the sacrifices

imposed to humanity, wars have always in some way contributed to the progress of mankind; not just on the scientific-technological point of view, but also by providing human beings with new social-psychological insights.

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SURNAME, Name. Title of article. Name of publication in italics. Place, v.x, n.x, p.x-y, month and year.

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AT THE REVISTA DA ESCOLA DE GUERRA NAVAL

Regina Boanerges Siqueira*, Cremilda Santos*

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This initial part of the article should present the issue to be discussed and its delimitations, the purpose of the research and other elements needed to set the theme.

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This is the main part of the article and contains a detailed exposition of the discussed issue. It's the core of the work where the author explains and demonstrates the theme in all its aspects.

Conclusion

The final part of the article where conclusions are presented based on the objectives and assumptions. The author gives his/her opinion according to his/her evaluations and interpretations, and might also recommend or suggest further research on the subject.

Abstract in English

Keywords in English

References

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